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Abstract
In “After Scotland: Irvine Welsh and the Ethic of Emergence,” the author’s objective is
to mirror what he argues is the Scottish writer Irvine Welsh’s objective: to chart out a future
Scotland guided by a generative life ethic. In order to achieve this objective, the author lays
open and reengages Scotland’s past, discovers and commits to neglected or submerged materials
and energies in its past, demonstrates how Welsh’s work is faithful to those and newly produced
materials and energies, and suggests that Welsh’s use of those materials and energies enables
readers to envision a new Scotland that will be integral to an alternative postmodern world that
countervails one ruled by late capital.
Each chapter builds toward a Marxist ethic of emergence, which is composed of four
virtues uncovered in Scotland’s historical-material fabric: congregation, integration, emergence,
and forgiveness. To bring these virtues to the surface, the author historically grounds Welsh’s
novels and short stories—Trainspotting, Glue, Porno, Filth, “The Granton Star Cause,” “The
Two Philosophers,” and Marabou Stork Nightmares. Through this historiographical process,
each virtue is uncovered and analyzed in the context of a particular historical period: medieval,
Reformation, Enlightenment, and postmodern. Each context presents a unique set of materials
and energies; each also presents an epistemological and ethical focus. The author brings the first
three contexts and virtues together to formulate the ethic of emergence within the postmodern
context. Throughout, the author stresses how this ethic and each of its virtues are embedded in
Welsh’s work and in Scotland’s historical-material fabric. The author then suggests what he and
Welsh hope will emerge from that fabric according to such an ethic.
Because Welsh is a contemporary writer who has gained relatively little attention from
literary scholars, another aim of this study is to situate Welsh’s work by connecting it with

v

literature produced inside and outside of the Scottish and postmodern contexts: e.g. Gaelic
prehistorical and epic literature, Chaucer, morality plays, Robert Burns, and the modern mystery
genre.
The author concludes the study with an afterword, relating his project to recent events
that have occurred in Scottish politics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If it wasnae for the weavers what would we do?
We widnae hae clothes made o' woo,
We widnae hae a coat neither black nor blue,
If it wasnae for the wark o' the weavers.
—David Shaw1
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the
comprehension of this practice. . . . The philosophers have only interpreted the
world in various ways; the point is to change it.
—Karl Marx2

Irvine Welsh? L’enfant terrible of Scottish letters? The schemie bairn turned junkie,
turned construction worker, turned college student, turned MBA, turned civil servant, turned
writer, turned charity boxer? Scotland’s postmodern prophet of postmodern decay? The writer
who says that he does not write but just tells stories? The guy who has published a collection of
twisted tales, a collection of “chemical romances,” an exposé on the half-baked schemes of
heroine addicts, a tragic saga of government-housing kids’ lives, case studies on
environmentally-induced schizophrenia and psychosis, and most recently, a sardonic
combination of all these in a novel dealing with pornography? The Irvine Welsh who includes
some sort of animal mutilation in almost every novel? The left-leaning writer who enjoyed a
brief stint as a diarist for the right-wing British Daily Telegraph? The man whose books are
dominated by “cunts,” “gadges,” and “punters”? The one who writes in a Scottish underclass
dialect that puts the daunting invented English syntax of Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork
Orange to shame? Yes, that Irvine Welsh.

1

David Shaw, “Wark o’ the Weavers,” performed by Ewan McColl, Four Pence a Day: British Industrial
Folk Songs (Stinson 1993).
2
Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Penguin, 1992) p.
423.
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Welsh is the most significant writer for Scotland at the present time because he has
proved to be the best able to connect Scotland to the humans who compose it, connect Scotland
to readers (and moviegoers) who know little or nothing about it, connect Scots who never read to
reading, connect Scotland to an alternative Scottish future, and ultimately connect Scotland to an
alternative postmodern global probability. I do not make light of downplaying the work of
Welsh’s contemporaries, such as Janice Galloway, James Kelman, A. L. Kennedy, and Duncan
MacLean; however, Welsh has so far proved to be the most literarily, socioculturally,
philosophically, and politically profound. In many ways, he is more than a writer; he is what I
refer to as a conduit.
The term “conduit” might seem strange in a literary and theoretical context, but it is the
most appropriate term to use when describing a historical-material understanding of the role of
the artist in artwork. Extending Theodor Adorno’s conception of artists’ relationship with
artworks, I view a “good” writer as a conduit of historical, material, and cultural elements and
energies, which means that an artist is neither a transcendent master nor a mere stenography
machine.3 A conduit, on the one hand, is a medium. It transfers energy or materials from one
location to another. An artist certainly does this. Saying so might come across as an insult to
artists. It is not an insult, but it does countervail the notion that an artist has a position of
privilege in the artistic process. If an artist is a medium, he or she is on par with ink, paint,
costuming, lighting, and celluloid. To a great extent, this is true. Nevertheless, a conduit is a
medium with a creative aspect. Instead of being a mechanism that just transfers something from
one location to another, a conduit is also the dynamic within which various materials and
energies converge and mix. In modern chemical engineering, for instance, a conduit is
commonly a multi-valve chamber where a variety of processes continuously take place and
3

Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997) pp. 148-53, 168-73.
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where transference is ongoing. In electrical engineering, a conduit is a site of energy
convergence, redirection, and dispersal—a junction. One function of a conduit, therefore, is to
serve as a converter or transformer.
A wool dyer, for example, creates various colors by mixing dyes in a receptacle. The
dyer is at this point not the master of the receptacle, but integrally interacts with the receptacle.
His or her energy, along with the dyes, flows into the tool; consequently, the tool realizes the
dyer’s labor. Dyer and receptacle become interimplicated to convert individual dyes into a new
dye. However, the dyer at this point is not yet a conduit, only a conduit in waiting. He or she
has not yet produced anything because he or she has not connected the new dye to anything. The
conduit realizes itself not only in conversion but also in transference—hence one connotation of
trans-formation, the movement of forms. To become more than just a mechanism that holds a
new color, the dyer is a means of distributing the dye onto the wool that will then be transferred
to another person, the weaver, and then to another, the wearer. The needs of the weaver and the
wearer are provided for by the dyer, and the dyer is realized through providing for them. And
they glorify the dyer when they weave with his or her yarn and wear the sweater produced from
it. Only through such a social network do any of their individual activities or needs take on
significance. A conduit, therefore, is not just a medium; a conduit is also a means of generation
and connection. A conduit is an integral but not superior poetic (i.e. transformative) aspect in a
process. An artist is just such an aspect in an artwork.
All writers arguably fulfill the role of conduit, and postmodern Scotland undeniably has a
growing number of remarkable writers. Nevertheless, Welsh practically sets out to be such a
conduit instead of an author of novels.4 To expand the textile metaphor introduced above, which

4

Welsh aligns himself more with the storytelling tradition than the official writing culture: “I grew up in a
place where everybody was a storyteller, but nobody wrote. It was that kind of Celtic, storytelling tradition:
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is evocative of Scotland’s deep historical connection to textiles, Welsh is a weaver who
creatively and exhaustively channels and combines threads gathered from the materials of the
world to produce a truly vibrant fabric. What he produces, therefore, is of the world, but the
product—the commodity—he produces presents the world in an unusual, scintillating way to
those who live in it. In effect, his work is a historically-materially informed, living, prophetic
map.
Weaving, however, does not always result in a comfortable blanket, a utilitarian bag, a
flattering shirt, or an inspirational tapestry. In the case of Welsh, the textiles he produces are
often rough on the skin of the mind, rubbing off its old scabs and opening it anew. But his fabric
is unexpectedly medicinal, too: it breathes, allowing previously poisoned blood to be drawn out
and diffused so that healing and movement can occur with new vigor. In other words, Welsh
works in good faith with the materials he has, and his work often has a healing effect despite its
harsh truths.
Even though Welsh is now a member of the middle-class literati, he spent his formative
years in Edinburgh’s government housing schemes and mean streets, from which he garnered
many of the experiences and insights that inform his novels’ characters, plots, and themes. The
hodgepodge of working-class mores, lumpenproletariat despondency, middle-class aspirations,
unemployment, poverty, substance abuse, domestic violence, cynical worldliness, bigoted
provincialism, deep-fried diets, and vicious soccer fanaticism are not exotic to Welsh. These
everybody would have a story at the pub or at parties, even at the clubs and raves. They were all so interesting. Then
I'd read stories in books, and they'd be dead.” He continues, “I used to sort of socialize with the [writing] crowd in
Edinburgh, but we never really regarded ourselves as writers.” Moreover, he indicates that writing is less a
professional role and is more a mediatory process: “There's a tension between excitement and intellect [in writing].
Again, going back to The Acid House, I wanted to write something that was exciting, that turned pages, but also
hopefully made people think about things. But it had to turn pages. There's a tradition in novel writing that's selfconsciously intellectual rather than intelligent. The two aren't often the same. It's not knowledge and ideas for their
own sake, it's story and character. Posturing and posing, doing that intellectual dance, isn't really serving plot or
character.” See Irvine Welsh, interview with Dave Weich, Powells.com, 12 June 2001, 13 Aug. 2005
<http://www.powells.com/authors/welsh.html>.
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form the reality that he and a great number of Scots call home. He does not throw out this rough
flax and impure wool; in fact, his fabric is dominated by the rough and impure because most of
the materials he has at hand are rough and impure.
Welsh’s fabric would not be the kind used to make a brilliant tartan for one of Scotland’s
great clans, even if it does contain some of the same threads. Nor would Welsh’s fabric be the
clothing of choice for the heaven-taught ploughmen and balladeers of the Highlands and
Borders, even though its texture retains impassioned honesty. His weaving might most often
take place in the context of millennial Edinburgh, where he employs the materials piled in its
historical storehouses, but what he weaves is not the velvet that might have been worn by the
eighteenth-century literati who filled Edina’s salons and clubs or roamed the halls of its esteemed
university. No, his fabric is the tartan of a Scotland after the Scotland of kilted chieftains and
lairds, after the Scotland of rustic songsters, and after the Scotland of cosmopolitan geniuses
who supposedly brought us the modern world.5 His tartan cannot help but retain the old filial
relations, the old folk wisdom, and the modern epistemological revolution. In fact, the presence
of the past cannot help but be apparent because, in his work, the threads of the past are shaken
from their tight and seemingly complete formations, their ends pulled and then threaded into the
fabric of the present. But the past does not repeat itself: Its materials are threaded differently
than before, and new threads are added; consequently, new intersections emerge, new patterns
materialize, and new materials are produced.6

5

The latter claim—that the Scots brought us the modern world—is most notably made by Arthur Herman,
How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Created Our
World and Everything in It (New York: Three Rivers, 2001). Though frequently informative and astute, Herman’s
work is frequently in the service of neoliberal triumphalism. Historian Michael Lynch indicates that such neoliberal
revisionism actually threatens Scotland’s historical significance by “shifting concentration towards the dramatic
impact that the [Enlightenment Scotland in particular] made and away from the storehouse of existing ideas on
which [that Scotland] drew” (Scotland: A New History [London: Pimlico, 1992] p. xvii).
6
“Artworks derive from the world of things in their performed material as in their techniques; there is
nothing in them that did not also belong to this world and nothing that could be wrenched away from this world at
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Tartans are not some colorful plaid skirts that bagpipers wear for thrills—they are
multidimensional historical and genealogical maps. Each major Scottish family or region has a
unique fabric, like a fingerprint. What color intersects with another, how a distinct line interacts
with a field, and which hues are used all signify family namesakes, regional ecology and
weather, battles, and sociopolitical affiliations. Welsh, though, is a postmodern tartan maker
originally from Scotland’s groundless, clanless lumpenproletariat, who drifted into the middleclass world that he despised and that he now practically works to expose and to implode.7 So,
the tartan he weaves cannot help but be rough and unrefined, according to received standards.
But again, this does not mean that it is bad, that no attention is paid to pattern or to tone or to
history. Indeed, Welsh is highly sensitive—tuned in—to everything in Scotland.
Weaving anything is both physically and psychologically demanding work. Weaving a
tartan is even more so. Weaving a postmodern tartan for postmodern Scotland takes the work’s
intensity to the extreme. Like the tartans made by the weavers of old, the tartan that Welsh
weaves is infused with tears shed for lost comrades and a country’s conflicts, the tinctures of the
time and location that envelop him, as well as the blood that he himself has spilled and lost.
Welsh does not omit the less than glorious events, the unflattering stains, or the self-inflicted

less than the price of death. . . . Art desires what has not yet been, though everything that art is has already been. It
cannot escape the shadow of the past. But what has not yet been is the concrete” (Adorno 134).
7
My use of the term “lumpenproletariat” in this instance and elsewhere throughout this study will probably
be greeted with suspicion by more “orthodox” Marxists. But as with other terms, I intentionally employ it to bring
alive its provocative energy. Indeed, my understanding of the term does not differ that much from the one that Marx
gives in Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 [New York: Penguin, 1976] p. 797.
Nevertheless, the position of the lumpenproletariat in the empire of late capital is integral instead of peripheral, as it
arguably was during the era of modern capital. I agree with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri when they write:
“the poor, every poor person, the multitude of poor people, have eaten up and digested the multitude of proletarians.
By that fact itself the poor have become productive. Even the prostituted body, the destitute person, the hunger of
the multitude—all forms of the poor have become productive. And the poor have therefore become ever more
important: the life of the poor invests the planet and envelops it with its desire for creativity and freedom. The poor
is the condition of every production. . . . The discovery of postmodernity consisted in the reproposition of the poor
at the center of the political and productive terrain” (Empire [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000] pp. 158).
Implied in my understanding of “lumpenproletariat,” therefore, is that the old delineations and roles of the classes
must be reconceived—from the ground up.
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wounds. Added to this, he does not serve the courts of chiefs, lairds, kings, Ministers of
Parliament, or CEOs. He serves those on whose shoulders courts are built, a heretofore faceless
and alienated multitude. He would, therefore, do this multitude a disservice if the tartan he
weaves does not honestly tell their historical, material, and cultural biography. More
importantly, he would do Scots a disservice if he does not give them a fabric that is theirs, from
which they may continue to weave. Welsh, as the following chapters will demonstrate, does
anything but a disservice.
Welsh’s weaving produces maps that bring about some understanding of contemporary
Scotland, but because both his work and Scotland are inextricably connected to—interwoven
with—the rest of the world, his maps lead to engagement with the current global situation.
Ultimately, they are maps that uncover an alternative ethical probability on the debatable land of
postmodernity. As a consequence, they are maps that enable, inform, and inspire the objective of
this study: to chart out a future Scotland guided by a generative life ethic. In order to achieve
this objective, I will 1) lay open and reengage Scotland’s past, 2) uncover and commit to
neglected or submerged materials and energies in its past, 3) demonstrate how Welsh’s work is
faithful to those and newly produced materials and energies, and 4) suggest that Welsh’s use of
those materials and energies enables readers to envision a new Scotland that will be integral to an
alternative postmodern world that countervails the one currently ruled by late capital, which is
also known as multinational or postmodern capitalism.
Because I am dealing with the work of a strange sort of weaver who makes maps that are
far from prescriptive, are descriptive, and are certainly open-ended, I am effectively put in the
position of being a weaver-mapper, too. I have to mirror Welsh’s process as well as produce
something from what I find or connect to in his work. The map I produce will, consequently,
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add at least one more dimension to Welsh’s. Therefore, as a good cartographer would, I need to
provide a key to help us keep our bearings as we proceed.
After signifies place and process. The more obvious meaning is adjectival, implying a
thing or event occurring subsequent to something else. “After,” in this sense, can occur
temporally or spatially (or both) following another position in time or space. In this study, both
the temporal and spatial aspects will be in play. On the other hand, there is an adverbial
meaning, implying that something is actively being sought or followed. This connotation, too, is
valid in the current context. Thus, “after” signifies both descriptive spatiotemporal location and
analytical movement, making it a perfect term for dialectical historical-material study and
construction. I, following Welsh, will lay out Scotland, but to do so means that I must chase
after what Scotland has been as well as what it is. Ultimately, I will be in pursuit of its future
probabilities, as Welsh is.
Scotland is not as simple as it might seem because it signifies a lack of coherence, not an
autonomous, unified state.8 Indeed, Scotland the country is stateless; even calling it a unified
nation stretches historical-material reality. From its very beginnings as an identifiable entity,
Scotland’s sociocultural diversity has been apparent. Its very name literally means “land of the
Irish,” deriving from a Latin word that the Romans applied to the Irish, Scoti. However, the
Gaels that came over to Scotland from around the Ulster region of Ireland, the Dál Riata
(Dalriada in Scottish Gaelic), were by no means the majority. In fact, they were not a strong
presence until around the fourth and fifth centuries AD. The Britons (i.e. Welsh) and the Picts,
who were more than likely distant Brythonic cousins of the Britons, dominated, respectively, the

8

This claim is an extension of Tom Nairn’s assertions concerning Scotland’s lack of a truly modern
national phase. See Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: Verso, 1981) pp.
92-195; and Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited (London: Verso, 1997) p. 180.
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south and north of what we today call Scotland. Then added to the mix were the Norse, the
Anglo-Saxons, and later the Normans.
Efforts to create a unified kingdom that connected Northumbria, the Lowlands, the
Highlands, and the Islands did not ever really succeed, except nominally. The Romans failed to
subdue Scotland. The Holy Roman Empire did not fare much better because Scotland—along
with various parts of Ireland, England, and Wales—did not unequivocally adopt Roman
Catholicism. Celtic Christianity preceded the arrival of the official Roman Church, and it held
sway through much of the first millennium. Where Scotland did adopt Roman Catholicism, it
favored the monastic instead of the diocesan form of church structure, which perhaps explains its
general resistance to episcopal governance, a top-down model dominated by bishops, until the
Scottish Reformation. Only at the beginning of the second millennium (c. 1018-1153 AD)—
under Malcolm II, Malcolm and Margaret Canmore, and their son David I—did Scotland seem to
consolidate. Nevertheless, when a Scottish kingdom was nominally established, the reality was
that Scotland (whether called Caledonia or Alba or Scotland) was really a loosely-knit multitude
that shared similar social structures, as well as pre- and post-Christian cultural traditions. Even
after David I and his primarily Norman associates introduced feudalism into Scotland, the new
sociopolitical system just did not take. Feudal estates merely peppered a terrain dominated by
clanships, self-sustaining agricultural communities, and the like. The feudal powers did manage
to create a burgh system. This brought about a network of larger towns, in which mercantile and
ecclesiastical power could be consolidated. Even so, feudal lords, their ecclesiastical partners,
and the burgh fathers confronted extreme difficulty when it came to gaining control of what was
a diverse and loosely-connected population. It would not be until early modernity that
Highlanders, Borderers, Islanders, and even constituencies in large rural areas of the Central Belt
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between Aberdeen and the River Tweed would be sufficiently subjugated. This subjugation was
facilitated by a Scot, James (Stewart) VI of Scotland, who became James I of England. It was
through the 1707 Union of Parliaments under James’s crown that Scotland would become an
officially subordinate “nation” within the United Kingdom, remaining so until 1997’s devolution
referendum. Even after 1997, Scotland would still remain practically subordinate. During most
of modernity, Scotland’s internal incoherence had been contained, but it actually proliferated
internally: most common Scots were displaced, transported to British colonies, and effectively
imprisoned in mines, shipyards, poverty-stricken urban centers, and land-lorded rural wastelands.
Therefore, Scotland has never been, according to dominant historical standards, what one could
identify as an autonomous, coherent, or modern nation-state. This status as non-state might
explain why one major perception of Scotland resigns it to failure.
Like so many other subordinate and “underdeveloped” countries throughout the world,
Scotland, the reasoning goes, is such a minor player now in global politics and economics
because it has historically failed to organize itself in a way that would have allowed it to benefit
from the undeniable movement of Western progress—whether sociopolitical, ecclesiastical,
cultural, national, or economic. Subsequently, its subordinate status in the United Kingdom and
now in a global capitalist empire is just deserts. To use Mark Renton’s words from Welsh’s first
novel, Scotland is a mass of “failures in a country ay failures . . . colonised by wankers,” which
makes Scots the “lowest of the fuckin low, the scum of the earth. The most wretched, servile,
miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat intae creation.”9 What right do Scots have to
complain?
Despite Renton’s apt though defeatist analysis of one Scotland, historical-material reality
evinces an alternative Scotland and, paradoxically, a promising one at that. If the sociopolitical,
9

Welsh, Trainspotting (New York: Norton, 1996) p. 78.
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ecclesiastical, cultural, global, and economic hegemony of today’s America is supposed to be the
culmination of “Western Civilization,” then Scotland and countries like it throughout the world
might prove to be a saving grace—not just despite of but because of their lesser status. The
threats of perpetual war, government of and for moneyed power elites, exponential destruction of
ecosystems, homogenization of cultural life, sophisticated theocracy, and political
disenfranchisement promised today are exactly the things Scotland has historically encountered,
resisted, and to some extent exorcized over the last two millennia. Although seemingly
powerless and backward according to modern and postmodern standards of progress, subordinate
Scotland emerges from a ground rich with historical materials and energies. It is, therefore, not
the failure that some, including plenty of Scots, might assume. It is because of Scotland’s
particular situation—its historical-material genealogy—that Scotland may prove well-equipped
not only to weather but to emerge from the daunting, uncertain global situation that will play out
over the next millennium.
Even with that note of hope being struck, I do not accept another Scotland that is
becoming increasingly popular. In order to counter a Scotland characterized as a historical
aberration, if not failed abortion, a growing number of commentators have hitched onto the
Scottish Enlightenment as if it were a Nietzschean phoenix that left in the ashes a barbaric
Scottish past. Their Scotland is not only a neoliberal paradise; it is also the source of much of
the West’s, particularly America’s, ability to ascend to global hegemony. 10 If such is the case,
then Scotland is responsible for postmodern capitalist imperialism, which is something that Scots
might not want to own. I certainly agree that Scotland is not and has never been a hopeless

10

To the list containing Herman, add Duncan A. Bruce, The Mark of the Scots: Their Astonishing
Contributions to History, Science, Democracy, Literature, and the Arts (New York: Citadel, 1998); Robert W.
Galvin, America's Founding Secret: What the Scottish Enlightenment Taught Our Founding Fathers (New York:
Rowan and Littlefield, 2002); and Michael Fry, How the Scots Made America (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2005).
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failure; in fact, I think of it as a site of alternative postmodern potential. However, any serious,
good-faith study of Scottish historical-material reality makes preposterous any claim that
Scotland is or has ever really been a great source of and then beneficiary of modern and now
postmodern capital, whether in its sociopolitical, cultural, or economic forms. Do those who are
the descendants of people forcibly displaced, betrayed by others and themselves, exploited, and
subjugated under modern and now postmodern imperialism really want to turn around and
celebrate it? If so, the historical-material bad faith and self-sacrifice involved severely
undermine any supposed triumph. There are, though, alternatives to such ahistorical
sophistication.
The Scotland that will be pursued here is one after the Scotland cast off as a congenital
failure and after the Scotland remade as Western Civilization’s carefully hidden secret society of
savages-turned-savants. This Scotland after those Scotlands is their countervailing postscript,
and it is the detective on their case. To pursue this after-Scotland will, therefore, entail
confronting and analyzing the others. This will not mean repeating them, but it will mean
emerging from them while never pretending to transcend them.11
The Scotland that precedes the Scotland that Welsh is pursuing and that we will be
pursuing with him is a situation. “Situation” connotes a terrain of being.12 Within this terrain—
which I will also refer to as a “context,” “ground,” or “fabric”—are all the materials and energies
of human life. A situation, therefore, is the social space from which humans can produce and
emerge.
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Ethics has become one of those terms that can mean whatever someone wants it to mean;
therefore, it has become hollow, propagandistic, and self-parodying.13 The very fact that the
words “business” and “ethics” are even joined in the context of postmodern capital is a good
indicator of how insubstantial ethics has become. Moreover, ethics has been conflated with such
strange creatures as “moral values.” For the most part, barring the philosophers and theologians
who are sincerely engaged in exploring and deepening ethics, ethics is effectively just a
commodity zipping along in the currents of capital. This commodity’s rapid exchange gives the
patina of legitimacy to capital’s systems and their managers, which are only interested in
accruing more materials and energies—more power—with no interest in the just distribution of
power to those who produce it. As a capitalist commodity, ethics serves as a tool of
rationalization that lubricates and thus quickens alienation, expendability, and the consolidation
of power—a phenomenon illustrated time and again throughout Welsh’s body of work.
Particularity has become the idolatry of the postmodern, signifying the severe anemia of
ethics. Inadvertently, the avatars and defenders of difference—poststructuralist, deconstructivist,
postcolonialist, feminist, postmodernist, and so forth—have actually produced for capitalism its
ethical veneer.14 Their work gives legitimacy to nihilistic self-abandon on the one hand and
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egoistic individualism on the other. To privilege a finite “other” or an absolute “Other” drives
alienation from the self by projecting power toward a sociocultural fragment or to an ambiguous
ideal. Such an ethics of difference, which demands the sacrifice of the self, fosters a kind of
masochistic solipsism, if it does not ultimately foster an escapist nihilism. On the other side of
the same coin, making an idol out of one’s identity—whether cultural, sexual, religious, or
racial—reduces one into an easily exchangeable fragment, paradoxically defusing one’s power to
compose and assert autonomy. In both cases, humans are cut off from composing practical and
mutually enriching connections or alliances. This might explain why many in and out of
academia have blamed moral relativism on the diverse theorists and theories that fall under the
postmodern label. However, the blame is typically misplaced because making idols out of
particularities is a symptom, not a cause of the fragmentation of ethics. Capitalism is the culprit.
That being said, though, difference, dissensus, and so forth negatively testify to an
undeniable, disturbing truth. For too long, the West, itself a particular set of particularities, has
waged war on other particularities, typically in an effort to accumulate economic, religious,
social, and cultural power for whatever particular interests that it, the West, as a particularity
espouses at a particular time. This march toward consolidating all other particularities for the
sake of one religious doctrine, supreme sovereignty, private property, a military-industrial
complex, a master-narrative, global capitalism, or the end of history is responsible for practically
erasing or liquidating human autonomy. The ground that people depend on and produce from
has been ripped from underneath them and then is parceled out to them for the dear price of
sweat, blood, and love. If particularity—whether called sexual difference, cultural identity,
nationality, the West, or something else—is left alone and taken as an end in itself, then it
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promises the destruction of true individuality, subjectivity, and political power.15 However, if
particularity implies particular individuals in a cooperative process, then it promises the
emergence of the whole human being and political power. Therefore, when I refer to a
“particular human” or to a “human individual,” I will be implying the potentiality of a whole
human being, not the egoistic, isolated individual.
Vibrant individuals, uniqueness, cultural identity, sexual empowerment, and freedom are
only probable in healthy and just social networks of constituents—a multitude. 16 Along with
“autonomous human being” or “autonomous human individual,” “constituent” is a term that I
will use when referring to a whole human being, a particular individual who has realized him- or
herself in cooperative social involvement with others. One cannot be an individual, different, or
self-actualizing without being connected to and actively engaged with others and the social
forces that intersect in oneself. The dialectical process of bringing about the constituent and the
multitude runs this way:
A multitude depends on the interaction of autonomous constituents, and such
constituents are sustainable only through cooperative connections—multitudebuilding. Consequently, a global multitude depends on the interaction of
autonomous particular multitudes (constituencies), and such constituencies are
sustainable only through their cooperative connections. Constituents and
constituencies dialectically sustain, enliven, and expand the whole multitude
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through their cooperative interaction; conversely, the dialectically-produced,
growing multitude nurtures each constituent and constituency through ongoing
distribution of materials and energies.
In this process, the whole or autonomous human individual realizes in him- or herself a whole
network of other autonomous human individuals, and that network realizes each autonomous
human individual. In other words, an individual is whole when he or she incorporates the whole
multitude and when he or she recognizes him- or herself in every facet of the multitude.
According to Marx, this is called species-being.17 A vital ethics in our time, counter to the empty
vessel called ethics these days, will not only have to incorporate but will need to perpetually
emerge through this dialectical process of the multitude.
Whenever I am confronted with an entity, practice, or concept that has been all but
obliterated for the sake of power-accumulation and injustice, I am not one to let it “go gentle”:
ethics, like Scotland, is a case in point. There must be a way to connect to and build with its
fragmented materials in order to unleash its buried energy. Thanks to Francis Hutcheson, David
Hume, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Williams,
Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Alasdair MacIntyre, Alain Badiou, and Gilles Fauconnier—a
strange alliance indeed—I have been directed to a method, which is both analytical and poetic:
Take something out of circulation, rub it against what is uncritically taken as
common sense, shake loose its rigidified fabric, locate a still vibrant fiber, and
then begin composing anew and differently from that particular point with the
materials that have been shaken loose.
In the instance of ethics, I am fortunate enough to have an etymological hint to make this
task go easier. A Greek word from which we derive “ethics,” ethos, literally means “use.”
17
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Unraveled to this fiber, therefore, ethics is concerned with how one uses something, how one is
used, and how one uses oneself and others. The charm of ethics is, nevertheless, also its curse.
It is a seemingly neutral process. This, perhaps, is why it is so easily ab-used. An individual or
group can come up with a system and call it ethical even if it “justifies” torture, rape, murder,
genocide, or even eternal damnation. Ethics, however, is concerned with activity in and of itself.
Herein whispers the secret that those who abuse ethics want to neutralize: ethics is about the
perpetuation, generation, and enrichment of life, pure and simple. Any attempt to alienate,
subordinate, liquidate, or obliterate life contravenes ethics. Still, when I speak of “life,” I am not
speaking of the issues of biological reproduction that hypocritical theocrats and moralists-forhire have highjacked. I am speaking of life as a holistic, interconnected web of human activity.
Life is social practice—praxis.
Throughout most of the history of ethics, praxis is a submerged generative aspect; as long
as it is submerged, practical and generative ethics is impossible. Practice is not the same as
custom or habit. Practice works toward a creative, burgeoning movement. At its core, ethics is
predisposed to emergence.18 Consequently, I reassert this radical aspect of ethics by presenting
an ethic of emergent praxis—the ethic of emergence. This ethic defies rigidity, mere
performativity, simple consumption, and so on.
However, I do not want the ethic of emergence to be misconstrued as some explosive,
undisciplined theory. Indeed, it consists of the interaction of four historical-material virtues
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submerged in Scotland’s ground: congregation, integration, emergence, and forgiveness. A
virtue is a dynamic, indispensable aspect of an ethical system—the ethic of emergence in this
context. A virtue arises from a particular sociocultural ground; therefore, it is not automatically
universal in application, even though it may be translated into other situations or adopted and
incorporated by other ethical systems.19 In Scotland’s case, I have uncovered the four virtues
mentioned above. 20 The first three virtues form the “machinery” of the ethic of emergence, and
the last virtue is the “spirit” of the ethic. I briefly offer here a glimpse of these four virtues,
which I will explore in greater detail as this study progresses. Congregation brings emergent
materials and energies together. This convergence, however, is impossible without the human
individual who can integrate these materials and energies into his or her being. Integration
connects emergent materials and energies to the individual so that he or she may enter into the
cooperative process of congregation with other individuals. These two interrelated processes,
though, are not by themselves necessarily productive. Incorporating and sharing materials might
not produce alternatives to the status quo of a situation. The virtue of emergence brings about a
constructive dynamic when it enters into relation to the other two virtues. When integration and
congregation are connected to emergent force, a creative navigational process begins, in which
alternative probabilities begin to materialize. The virtue of forgiveness does not exist
independently of congregation, integration, and emergence. These three apparently mechanical
virtues and the productive ethic to which they give rise produce something non-mechanical but
19

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: U of Notre Dame P,
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nevertheless integral to them. Forgiveness is not a spirit that we can insert into the tripartite
praxis that makes up the ethic of emergence; it is one that this praxis brings into being. Even so,
forgiveness cannot be taken as a given. In order to continue as an emergent practice, the process
that gives rise to forgiveness must continue to intentionally reincorporate forgiveness into every
aspect and thus into the whole.
Each of the three “mechanical” virtues is tied to a certain way of knowing—to an
epistemological aspect. In the following chapters, I will draw lines between congregation and
mythos, integration and pathos, and emergence and logos. “Mythos” has many connotations, but
we will operate under the notion that it is genealogically original, evocative, volatile, and
metaphorical knowledge that attests to a historical-material world that might be shrouded but is
not completely buried.21 This aspect informs and is informed by the other two aspects, logos and
pathos. However, it resists predetermined knowledge, thus unlocking epistemological
probabilities. Information gathered from mythos compels the logos to expand or to reconfigure
knowledge in order to accommodate it. Moreover, mythos maintains a strong connection to
pathos as logos downplays, to its detriment, its connection to pathos. Logos is the authorial
reasoning aspect. This aspect archives information gathered from events, analyzes what has
occurred and is occurring, and weaves together knowledge—an epistemological map—out of the
materials that it and the other two aspects accrue and produce. Pathos is the emotional and
sensorial aspect. This aspect embodies and sensually informs the other two, thus enabling them
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to have meaningful, practical existence. Moreover, it is the bridge which connects mythos and
logos to each other and across which experiential, sensorial data travels to them. Pathos is also
the connective tissue of bodies politic—the permeable membrane through which mythos and
logos can pass to and from the world and through which humans can connect to other humans.
Taken together, mirroring and informing their respective virtues, these ways of knowing create
an integrated epistemological basis for ethos. Therefore, they are integral to the ethic of
emergence presented here.
Greatly informing this study of Welsh’s work and the construction of the ethic of
emergence are the monumental cultural theories formulated by Antonio Gramsci and Raymond
Williams. Discussing both Gramsci and Williams in a study concerning Scotland is appropriate:
Gramsci has greatly informed Scottish socialism, and as a British national, Williams was
certainly intimately aware of what occurred to people throughout Britain, including Scotland.22
Both twentieth-century theorists brought Marx to bear on popular culture. In effect, they led the
way—along with Benjamin, Adorno, Louis Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu—toward
understanding how economics, class consciousness, and revolution are not restricted to the
factory, union halls, or city barricades. The classroom, the church, the painting, the novel, and
the song are also where the conflicts occur between capitalist human alienation and sociallyenabled human autonomy. In other words, Gramsci and Williams made evident that all aspects
of human life are up for grabs.
Gramsci observed that popular common sense is capable either of settling into bad
(folkloric) sense or of producing revolutionary good sense.23 In environments where human
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autonomy would threaten an elite’s accumulation of power, an uncritical, disengaged acceptance
of the status quo is encouraged by the dominant social institutions. Hence, a common sense
geared toward conservatism, acquiescence, and provincial opinion is promoted. In such a
situation, the alternative, good sense, becomes not only a nuisance but a threat. In a capitalist
situation, for instance, good sense will be diffused by cultural productions which relegate it to
the level of spectacle, fantasy, naiveté, idealism, and so forth. Good sense is presented as alien
or impractical so that it can be dismissed. Or, as is the case in post-9/11 America, it is not
presented at all. As Gramsci saw first hand, creative energies aligned with good sense are also
appropriated by bad sense in order to diffuse and neutralize good sense. Because bad sense
becomes natural (or hegemonic), humans will consume themselves and thereby neutralize their
own productive power for the sake of the systems that dominate them. Nevertheless, bad sense
can never totally obliterate good sense because it still depends on some of the energies and
materials of good sense to sustain itself.
Williams uses different terminology to explain this process.24 Humans’ productive
energies are degraded to the level of residual culture (henceforth called residual force), which
allows for those now fragmented and contained energies to be managed and used for the
accumulation of power. Creativity paradoxically becomes a means of rigidification. As with
good sense, though, the probability of something else occurring is always present, no matter how
submerged it might be. The materials and energies indicative of emergent force promise
alternative, generative probabilities.25

Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York:
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It is, therefore, by synthesizing the currently submerged aspects of Scotland, ethics, and
common sense that a Scottish ethic of emergence becomes the philosophical and practical heart
of this study. As I will argue, this is also the heart of Welsh’s work. What has submerged
Scotland and ethics is the manner in which they have been used; likewise, what have
subordinated most humans to the systems that dominate and steal life from them is how humans
have been used and, more importantly, how they have used themselves and each other.
Nevertheless, a Scotland after Scotland, ethos, good sense, and emergent energies and materials
cannot help but suggest alternatives, one of which I will further elaborate and systematize
throughout the body of this study.
The map key I have provided here is by no means exhaustive. Throughout the study, I
will expand and elaborate each of the concepts introduced so far. Moreover, other key concepts
will emerge as we proceed, which I will accordingly flesh out. Presently, though, we have
enough to begin exploring Welsh’s maps and to begin weaving our own.
The weaving-mapping figure I have employed indicates that the map before us has many
layers, connecting points, and knots. Accordingly, I have chosen a method of study that reflects
this reality. Each chapter will be characterized by a particular historical-material context, an
epistemological aspect, at least one literary genre, and a virtue that emerges from the Scottish
ground. Therefore, each chapter is itself a small-scale map feeding into the larger map of the
study.
In chapter 2, “Medieval Thread: Outlaw Congregation,” the virtue to be arrived at is
congregation. I will focus on what I call Welsh’s trainspotting books: the novels Trainspotting,
its sequel Porno, and Glue, the figurative and literal glue between the other two. They permit
access to mythos. These texts practically establish the prehistorical or mythological fabric of
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Welsh’s Scotland. They also disclose the medieval historical-material strands that run through
postmodern Scotland. The narrative technique Welsh uses in these books strengthens these
links. The three novels are written in modes similar to what one finds in ancient Gaelic lays,
Scottish wonder tales, early British historical chronicles, and Gaelic sagas—Fenian literature in
particular. Consequently, we will explore how Fenian outlaw morality still figures greatly in
Scotland’s society and culture. We will also explore how Welsh’s trainspotting books can be
linked to the Highland caterans, the Border reivers and the Celtic Christians that have nearly
been forgotten by history.
In the third chapter, “Reformation Thread: Covenant of Integration,” the virtue to be
arrived at is integration. Two texts will serve as touchstones: a novel, Filth, and a short story,
“The Granton Star Cause.” As a whodunit turned psychological thriller, Filth is a postmodern
twist on the modern mystery genre. The novel’s subject matter explicitly uncovers the bad sense
unleashed by the Reformation as a historical and philosophical rupture, and it implicitly cries for
the good sense of Calvinism to emerge before the bad sense of ultra-Calvinism all but obliterates
it. “Granton Star” is a postmodern, Calvinist morality play that has passed through a Kafkaesque
looking-glass. In it, Welsh turns on their heads the presumed nature of God and humans’
relationship with him. Both stories confront humans’ inability to understand or control the
secular and religious gods of their own making, their inability to identify generative instead of
self-destructive virtues, and their inability to reconcile with themselves and with each other.
These stories cannot be adequately understood without discussing the Reformed theology of,
primarily, John Calvin and John Knox. Admittedly, the theocratic bent of Calvinism in general
and Scottish Calvinism in particular has overshadowed their radical democratic aspects;
moreover, aspects of Calvinism have been appropriated by capitalism to rationalize the
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neutralization of human autonomy and the liquidation of human life. To help illuminate and
chart a way beyond overwhelming Reformation evil and its dreadful impact on individuals and
society, Francis Hutcheson and his concept of a “moral sense” will prove crucial to redeeming
generative energies that emerged from the Reformation.
Then, in chapter 4, “Enlightenment Thread: Mapping Emergence,” the virtue to be
arrived at is emergence. I will enter a short story from The Acid House, “The Two
Philosophers,” into a dialogue with a Robert Burns’s poem, “The Twa Dogs.” The genre of the
two tales is in the estate satire tradition, both tales employing the pilgrimage technique most
famously used by the medieval English poet Geoffrey Chaucer in The Canterbury Tales.
Seemingly anachronistic in both the modern and postmodern contexts, the pilgrimage estate
satire is extremely timely. The effects of unequal distributions of sociocultural power are as
pressing, if not more so, than they were during the later Middle Ages, when the bourgeois classes
were just emerging. More importantly, Burns’s and Welsh’s tales bear directly on what occurred
in the eighteenth century, the modern epistemological crisis. They are deeply concerned with
what has been and still is being passed off as reality in situations dominated by truly disturbing
historical-material forces. As a consequence, they seek alternative probabilities. Because
empirically knowing the difference between what is probable or not probable is a major concern
of this chapter, I will focus here on the epistemological aspect of logos. It is no coincidence,
then, that David Hume’s epistemological and moral theories form the philosophical touchstone
and problem of this chapter. Welsh homes in on and liberates something that Hume had
uncovered in his theories of knowledge but had progressively sidelined in his moral philosophy
and personal life: the best way to enable alternative probabilities is to take what is, produce
anew with it, and then imaginatively build towards the alternative probabilities that emerge
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during the process. Welsh taps into this Humean good sense that, remarkably, is also
substantiated by recent cognitive science. Accordingly, Gilles Fauconnier’s work in the area of
mental mapping (or cognitive construction) will serve a vital role in building toward the ethic
that this study uncovers in Scotland by way of Welsh.
In chapter 5, “Postmodern Loom: Emerging through Forgiveness,” the virtue we will
arrive at is forgiveness. As far as genre goes, Marabou Stork Nightmares fits into one of the
oldest literary traditions, the epic. It will seem, therefore, that the study ends before where it
started, particularly when I draw a line connecting an unmistakably postmodern novel to a
literature that is even older than the Fenian literature discussed in chapter 2. The protagonist of
Nightmares, Roy Strang, is surprisingly evocative of the Ulster Cycle’s hero Cúchulainn and the
ambiguous Gaelic goddess Morrígan. However, when one takes into account that many of the
Gaelic sagas and epics, such as the Ulster Cycle, were presumably written during periods of
monumental historical-material and sociocultural upheaval, the connection is not fanciful. We
are in such a period ourselves. The connections between Nightmares and tales about Cúchulainn
are not just literarily analogical. There are battles in both between a society based primarily on
generation and one based primarily on destruction. What will not be surprising, though, is which
type of society has proved dominant. Even after the Christian and the later socialist
revolutions—or perhaps because of them—the progress of what is effectively an empire of death
has gone almost unchecked. To arrive at an alternative future informed by forgiveness, the
various threads that have been untangled and engaged in the preceding chapters will be brought
together to weave a map towards an emergent postmodern Scotland. This Scotland will open
way for conceiving a global alternative probability. Such a view reflects Marx’s conviction that
the emancipation of one particular situation—Germany in Marx’s case, Scotland in ours—is the
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emancipation of all people.26 A world built on that conviction could be one that countervails the
empire of late capitalism. Such a world would be a world after Scotland, after Colombia, after
Vietnam, after Algeria, and so on.
Finally, in an afterword, I will re-ground this whole project in recent political events that
have occurred in Scotland and the rest of Britain, and in my personal rationale for taking on this
topic.
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Chapter 2
Medieval Thread: Outlaw Congregation
The past is all forgotten now
This is a young, modern land
Fit for zeros
—The Proclaimers27
“. . . and the friendship that you have not found up to now, you shall now have.”
—Acallam na Senórach28

Alan Johnson-Hogg replies over the phone to Spud, “this is a badly written celebration of
yob culture and of people who haven’t achieved anything noteworthy in the local community.”29
Johnson-Hogg is the director of a major Scottish publishing firm, Scotvar Publishing Ltd., who
unexpectedly receives a call about a form-letter rejection he had sent to Spud. The manuscript
rejected: Daniel “Spud” Murphy’s history of post-1920 Leith, “a history ay Leith fae the merger
[with Edinburgh] tae the present,” as told by the people of Leith themselves, “the real
characters” (Porno 147, 260). The method of writing such a history: “Start oaf in 1920, n
maybe go back a bit, then forward again, like aw they fitba-player biographies” (Porno 147).
The first reason for writing such a history: “Leith wis sucked intae Edinburgh against the
people’s will. That was when aw the problems pure started, man! Four-tae-one against, man,
four-tae-one against” (Porno 185). The second reason: “Aw that info, aw that history, even if
it’s selectively written by the top cats tae tell their tales. . . . But ah reckon thit thir’s other
stories thit kin be teased oot” (Porno 257). The ultimate reason for writing the history: “Yuv
goat the Scottish Office at one end and yuv goat the new Parliament at the other.
Embourgeoisement, man, that’s what the intellectual cats call it. Ten years’ time, there’ll be nae
27
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gadges like me n you [Begbie] left doon here. . . . They want us aw oot in schemes oan the edge
ay toon, Franco, ah’m telling ye, man” (Porno 261). As nonplussed as Johnson-Hogg is by
actually receiving a phone call from a rejected writer—a taboo which all professional
intellectuals obediently do not violate—Spud is shocked by the crass insincerity of the rejection
letter after he has contacted the undeniably pro-establishment Tory operative or New Labour
hack or kailyard Scottish Nationalist (all amounting to the same). He throws his manuscript into
the fireplace, watching that “wee part ay ma life go up in smoke like the rest ay it” (Porno 380).
It is difficult to pick just one reason for why Spud’s book is rejected, at least according to
the established publishing standards of our time. Let us, nevertheless, begin with style. Spud’s
stated method of historical narrative is to start off from a specific historical point “n maybe go
back a bit, then forward again.” This indicates a more elliptical than linear approach to narrative.
Spud demonstrates his awareness that a point in the past is not the past, and in order for a point
in time to be historically meaningful at all, one must show from what contextual materials and
energies it emerged. In effect, the genealogy of a particular historical event must be charted
before the import of that moment may be recognized, as Walter Benjamin illustrated in his
monumental, incomplete project on the arcades of Paris.30 Moreover, all that proceeds from a
particular historical moment certainly affirms and transforms the significance of that moment,
which is never totally finished or absorbed. Like Peter Pan’s shadow, the past lives on in the
present and future, even if that past is an ambiguous one. The type of narrative that Spud will
write, therefore, will be a helix whose spirals will emerge from a common point (Figure 2.1),
never losing their bond with it. And to complicate things further, such a narrative will constantly
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draw connections between the spiral that leads to the central historical moment and the one that
proceeds from it (Figure 2.2). Thus, Spud’s history will be a living constellation.

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2

Most popular and academic publishers would reject outright a historical manuscript written in
such a way. It would be accused of lacking focus, coherence, linearity, readability, and so forth.
But Spud would never think of writing his history any other way; he probably could not. His
history of Leith is not so much a history of or about Leith; it is a living Leith given back to itself
in all its richness and complexity.
There is another intricacy involved in Spud’s historiography. Whereas most historians
write to summarize, elucidate, or formalize for posterity the actions and events that have affected
a certain group of people or people in general, Spud tries to write into life humans who have
practically been erased by history: in historical practice, they have been subordinated, and for
the sake of narrative practicality, they have been muted. To write such a life means to
effectively write in a different language, the language of the “the real characters,” the “no ones.”
Therefore, the narrative methodology of Spud’s project alone is equivalent to rupturing
established narrative with its own submerged materials.
Therefore, how could Spud’s rejection be anything but inevitable?
Fortunately, Welsh has overcome rejection, and the phenomenal success of his novel
Trainspotting, along with the success of its movie adaptation, has secured him relatively safe
passage in the publishing world. And because he submits his work as fiction, he does not have to
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abide by the standards confronting historians. Hence, Welsh has found a way to do what Spud is
not allowed to do by Johnson-Hogg: to tell the history of the no ones by sneaking it into fiction.
Welsh not only knows “thit thir’s other stories thit kin be teased oot”; he knows how to weave
those stories together and deliver them.
However, he is not just any kind of storyteller. He has a very serious agenda. We
already know what it is because it is the same as Spud’s. One key difference is that Welsh
attempts to do for all of Scotland and all human beings what Spud attempts and fails to do for
Leith. Like Spud, Welsh chooses Leith and Edinburgh as his starting point and construction
yard, but Welsh’s scope is global. If we look at what connects Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno,
we might understand why Welsh cannot restrict his vision for Scotland, even though his works
are certainly Scottish in origin.
The three trainspotting novels, as I will call them, are connected by the characters’
collective, overwhelming sense of not belonging anywhere. This sense culminates in the general
impression that Scotland is a non-place. Technically, home for the trainspotters of Trainspotting
and Porno is, as Spud’s manuscript attests, Leith. Nevertheless, Spud’s attempt to bring this
place to historical life negatively indicates that Leith is nonexistent to most people outside of it.
Historically, the life of Leith was virtually evacuated from it when “Leith wis sucked intae
Edinburgh against the people’s will.” Any life that now exists in the non-place of Leith is being
pushed “aw oot in schemes oan the edge ay toon.” The same goes for the hooligans in Glue,
who hail from the schemes of Edinburgh, not the glorious Edinburgh to which academics and
festival-goers typically flock. Widening the scope, Mark “Rents” Renton concludes that the
Scotland that he and the others inhabit is “a place fill ay nosey cunts who willnae mind their ain
business. A place ay dispossessed white trash in a trash country fill ay dispossessed white trash.

30

Some say that the Irish are the trash ay Europe. That’s shite. It’s the Scots. The Irish hud the
bottle tae win thir country back, or at least maist ay it” (Trainspotting 190). He goes even further
when he angrily responds to Tommy’s kailyard nationalism in the film adaptation of
Trainspotting:
I hate being Scottish. We’re the lowest of the fucking low, the scum of the earth,
the most wretched, servile, miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat into
civilization. Some people hate the English, but I don’t. They’re just wankers.
We, on the other hand, are colonized by wankers. We can’t even pick a decent
culture to be colonized by. We are ruled by effete arseholes. It’s a shite state of
affairs and all the fresh air in the world will not make any fucking difference. 31
The message in all cases is that Scotland does not exist, at least not a viable Scotland.
Scotland’s peripheries, therefore, are windows through which to ascertain the whole
Scottish situation. By way of the peripheral narrative windows that Welsh gives us, he indicates
that there is certainly a historical terrain on which Scots exist, but its topography is inconclusive.
Welsh resists even negatively affirming Scotland as a nation-state, as a unified sociocultural
entity, or even as an “imagined community,” to use Benedict Anderson’s famous term. Welsh
illustrates that Scotland is a non-place. Coincidentally, it is not surprising that Welsh would
couch his characters in the schemes of Leith and Edinburgh, non-places within a non-place
called Scotland: non-places of dispossessed no ones in a non-place full of dispossessed no
ones.32
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Scotland’s historical-material status over at least the last half-dozen centuries begs the
question about its national existence in terms that modern perceptions might recognize.
Arguably because Scotland has never actually recognized itself as an actual, homogenous, and
autonomous historical reality, Scotland has proved so susceptible to being reduced to a catalogue
of kailyard nationalist fetishes—i.e. a fantastic place of fresh air, craggy vistas, kilted parades of
noble-savage Highlanders, heaven-taught Lowland ploughmen, single malt whisky, and golden
oatmeal—or of being abstracted to the level of a neoliberal utopia—i.e. Edinburgh-land as a
source of modern Western Civilization’s triumph over Dark Age barbarism.
Welsh is most certainly not a kailyard nationalist or Edinburgh-land neoliberal. In his
work, Welsh refuses to employ the essentialist identity politics and neoliberal truisms that have
done more to subordinate Scotland than anything else. National identity and bourgeois ideology
are abstractions that have excluded the majority of Scots, “the real characters.” These
abstractions are occlusive master-narratives “selectively written by the top cats tae tell their
tales,” not generative narrative sites in which to engage the actual “shite state of affairs.” Welsh
refuses to follow the lead of the “fuckin parasite politician[s] that ever stood up and mouthed lies
and fascist platitudes in a suit and a smarmy smile” (Trainspotting 228). In fact, one could easily
argue that he is extremely concerned about the present and future of Scotland—not as an ideal
place, but as a vital, empowered terrain of no ones which can connect to and cooperate with
other domains of no ones.
Even though Welsh practically documents Scotland’s status as a non-place, and even
though he does not buy into either reduction of Scotland, Welsh is not anti-Scottish. Some of the
few commentaries on Welsh mistakenly claim that he is because they get too distracted by
Renton’s authoritative tone, forgetting that Renton is perhaps the least trustworthy of all Welsh’s
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characters, including Simon “Sick Boy” Williamson.33 Renton is undoubtedly a fantastic
diagnostician of the current “state of affairs,” but his jadedness, lack of compassion, and inability
to commit to anything or anyone, including himself, undercuts his ability to produce anything
like hopeful alternatives. Renton is probably anti-Scottish; however, this would be so mainly
because he hates himself and, as a result, feels disconnected from anything or anyone outside of
himself. Welsh, however, is not Renton, and again, he is not anti-Scottish. If Welsh were antiScottish, he would contradict his whole objective: to locate a vibrant Scotland and map it out.
Perhaps it is best to think of Welsh as a writer who has an “outlaw” understanding of Scotland.
From the margins, he observes what Scotland could be beneath the bad sense that has
overwhelmed it.
Welsh does not assume that there is a healthy preexisting community to which Scotland’s
dispossessed may simply return: a primal, ethnic, or national Ur-state. “But we can never have
what we had,” Carl “N-Sign” Ewart tells himself, “it’s all gone: the innocence, the lager, the
pills, the flags, the travel, the scheme . . . it’s all so far away from me.”34 Through the mouths of
practically all his characters, Welsh indicates that the abstractions of self, home, community, and
nation condemn humans to creating for themselves “a smokescreen of bullshit and baubles”
(Glue 463). Nevertheless, Welsh explicitly or implicitly returns to the idea that amidst all the
injustice, bullshit, and death, “something [hangs] in the air between [us]. There [is] just
something, some kind of second chance” (Glue 455). Amidst all the chaos that Welsh discloses
in his books, he illustrates how a new history and life—a living biography—is realizable through
congregating apparently disparate materials and energies within an undoubtedly bleak context,
such as a Scotland, on the margins of postmodern capitalism’s empire. He does not just sense an
33
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alternative world, existing somewhere in the genes or in the ether; indeed, he recognizes it as
existing within Scotland’s historical-material fabric.35 This alternative, though, is deeply
submerged, and the representatives of it are elusive because they live on the margins.
In this chapter, therefore, we will hypothesize that Welsh is, in fact, put in the position of
creating a prehistory for Scotland from which he can then build towards an alternative Scottish
history. To build this hypothesis, we will first look at what sorts of stories Spud fails to have
published, which are the sorts of stories that Welsh does tell in his three interrelated trainspotting
novels. Then, we will look at the literary tradition and epistemological category within which
Welsh is arguably working. That will enable us to uncover affinities which Welsh’s Scots have
with specific marginal groups of medieval Scots. As a consequence of our hypothesizing and
analysis, we will arrive at the virtue of congregation.
2.1 First Medieval Strand: Outlaw Tales
The following synopses of Welsh’s trainspotting books might give an indication of what
Spud’s history recounted before being burned.
Mark “Rents” Renton went through school, and he did well. He went through a trade
apprenticeship, but mass unemployment made that an absurdity. So, he went to Aberdeen
University for a couple of terms, majoring in history. He could have done well, but he detested
the culture of deception that it represented: a middle-class culture of spiritual anemia masked by
physical appearances, of lies veiled as truths, and of sadomasochism veiled as Civil Society.
Then, when we actually meet Renton in Trainspotting, he has turned to heroin, “smack,” because
it is “an honest drug, because it strips away these delusions. . . . It doesnae alter yir
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consciousness. It just gies ye a hit and a sense ay well-being. Eftir that, ye see the misery ay the
world as it is, and ye cannae anaesthetise yirsel against it” (Trainspotting 90).
But the world of delusions, the middle-class world, is dominant, and Renton cannot fend
it off, perhaps because of his drug addiction. He makes a few attempts to go clean, to be a
contributing member of society. The first time that he attempts to go clean, he takes methadone
for awhile, but then he squanders the detoxification drug by abusing it. He makes a visit to
Mother Superior, a major Edinburgh narcotics guru, to break his heroin fast. Renton takes a bad
hit, and he ends up in the infirmary. As a result, his parents place him under house arrest so that
he can make a clean break. This is the turning point for Renton, which has dramatic impact on
him and his ragtag collection of friends: most notably, Spud, Simon “Sick Boy” Williamson,
and Francis “Franco” Begbie—a saintly junky, a sadistic con artist, and a raging psychotic,
respectively. The world that Renton detests has broken him, and it has done so through the very
people it has subjugated: his working-class parents, his hapless friends, and the destitute scheme
culture as a whole.
Despite the bold declaration he makes midway through Welsh’s first novel—“Well, ah
choose no tae choose life,” as in the “life” prescribed by capitalist bourgeois-liberal Western
society (Trainspotting 188)—he hatches a plot, within a drug plot hatched by Sick Boy, to make
his escape from the Scottish lumpenproletariat. He steals thousands of pounds that he, Second
Prize, Spud, Sick Boy, and Begbie make off a major drug deal. Renton abandons his comrades,
slipping off to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. They go to prison, flee to London, or fall back into
the government housing-schemes of Leith, on the outer edge of Edinburgh. After Renton crosses
the North Sea, we discover in Porno that he owns and runs a lucrative discotheque. Again,
despite his bold declaration, he does choose the life of “societal reward . . . sustained by the
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socially-supported condoning of wealth, power, status, etc.” (Trainspotting 186). Thus, he
presumes, that free from his friends “for good, he could be what he wanted to be. He’d stand or
fall alone” (Trainspotting 344).
Things do not go much better throughout most of Glue, which is a tragicomic love story.
A core group of four childhood friends grow away from each other—Carl Ewart, “Juice” Terry
Lawson, Billy Birrell, and Andy “Gally” Galloway. This dissolution occurs, as it does in
Trainspotting, because of betrayal. Except here, the betrayals that accumulate for a span of
nearly thirty years are rarely intentional or terminal, just recurring. Whereas Terry, Billy, and
Gally take for granted a lumpenproletariat code of posse comitatus among Scotland’s
dispossessed, Carl figures that abiding by strict alliances to his childhood friends imprisons him
and them. He decides that their affiliation perpetuates the cycle of self-destruction which a
foundationless postmodern world is more than willing to accommodate. Ironically, to achieve
his dream—to be a world-renowned rave DJ—he will have to abandon what amounts to a premodern existence in Edinburgh and delve into the very heart of the postmodern world that feeds
off the perpetual self-destruction of people like him and his mates.
Deeply intimate, loyal relationships are a hindrance to success in the age of late capital,
but they are also what can keep humans from becoming totally groundless. Nevertheless, in
Carl’s mind, he cannot continue to enable the egocentric sex addict and con artist, Juice Terry.
He cannot continue to worry about the introverted boxer, Billy, who lives under his older
brother’s and organized crime’s shadow. And Gally is too harsh a check on reality: he is the
embodiment of working-class Scotland’s social, cultural, and economic decay; consequently, he
is the embodiment of psychological and sociological anomie. A life of petty crime, alcoholism,
soccer hooliganism, and psychological denial has contributed to their all being dominated by
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what Juice Terry calls “the grey,” which consists of the “scheme, the government employment
scheme, the dole office, the factory, the jail” (Glue 456). Carl must escape this abject situation
and his comrades so that he may make a lucrative career out of staging escapist pseudo-events at
nightclubs—weaving hypnotic beats, cascading sounds, digitally hybridized recordings, and
entrancing light effects.
However, as the disjointed series of episodes in Glue progresses, something almost
imperceptible happens. Even after moving to New South Wales, Australia, Carl cannot escape,
and he ultimately does not want to. Carl is, in fact, not the primary gravitational force in his
world. He realizes that his future as a human individual, not to mention as an artist, is
impossible without Terry, Billy, the memory of Gally, as well as the adoration of his parents and
the socialist-Presbyterian ethic they represent.36 Carl returns to Edinburgh as a result of this
realization. Upon the little tribe’s reunion, the former street scruffs not only save a dried-up pop
star’s musical career; the friends of thirty years reaffirm their bond by reckoning with personal
and sociocultural ghosts, even though this puts them back on the margins of postmodern success.
Learning from their friend Gally, who “apprenticed [them] all to loss” and who died because he
could not love “himself as much as he loved the rest of the world,” the three remaining friends
ultimately try to love each other and the world as much as they loved themselves (Glue 418).
So, what happens when we meet the schemies of Trainspotting and Glue in the early
twenty-first century—who are now more or less off hard narcotics, who are now in their thirties
and forties, and who want to make a legitimate mark on the world? Porno. One could use Sick
Boy’s words to understand the surface narrative of Welsh’s fifth novel: “an erotic tease, but with
extended hard-core fuck scenes . . . inserted into it” (Porno 90). The book is a “tease” because it
plays on its readers’ expectations; likewise, the “fuck scenes” have more to do with readers being
36
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confounded than with sexual arousal. Welsh practically carries out a social experiment,
exploring what happens when people like Renton, Sick Boy, and Juice Terry enter the middleclass world. The fantasies that are enabled by owning a discotheque, running a bar, prostituting
in a massage parlor, and making B-grade pornography videos will not prove at all exotic against
bourgeois norms: a little money to put away, a chance to travel, funds for college tuition,
gaining notoriety amongst peers, and power.
After returning from years in London following the drug plot in Trainspotting, Sick Boy
decides to enter the mainstream by buying an Edinburgh bar and running a porno film business
on the side. His business scheme and the narrative plot of Porno are mirror images of
Trainspotting’s. As was the case with its predecessor, Welsh employs a well-worn story along
the lines of Chaucer’s The Pardoner’s Tale in order to ironically disclose a deep set of serious
problems. When individuals are reduced to and segregated by their private desires and faults,
they are destructive. They become mutually destructive and, therefore, self-destructive.
Since he betrayed and abandoned his mates in Trainspotting, Renton is certainly alone at
the beginning of Porno, even though he has been successful as a club owner and has had a
relatively “normal” domestic relationship with a German woman. His solipsism has increased,
though; consequently, he has become an almost obsessive traitor. Spud is in worse shape than he
was before—more drug-addled, more emotionally broken, and more needful of comradeship
than ever. He wants love, friendship, and truth, a combined desire which does more to alienate
him from those around him as they pursue accumulation of power. Sick Boy’s sadism has
evolved into sociopathy. The thrill of making the “next big deal” in one of his many selfdescribed schemes is no longer good enough. An increase in others’ suffering must correlate
with any increase in personal success. Juice Terry has become a parody of himself: no longer
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Carl’s manager, he is literally reduced to a broken penis, the result of starring in Sick Boy’s
films. The already vicious, psychotic Begbie has become violence incarnate, hell-bent on
exacting revenge against the traitorous Renton for a decade-long stint in prison after the drug
deal in Trainspotting. When Begbie is released, Sick Boy orchestrates a nearly fatal
confrontation between the former soccer hooligan and his betrayer. Nikki Fuller-Smith appears
as Welsh’s first serious female character. She hails from the middle class that Renton, Sick Boy,
and Juice Terry are trying to enter. This in itself is important, for she demonstrates that being in
the middle class is far from a cure for lower-class subordination. To keep herself in university,
she makes money on the side by giving handjobs to professional men in a salon. She is also
bored: hence her love affair with an abusive, risk-taking Sick Boy, her stint as a porn star in his
films, and her ultimately betraying him by running off to America with Renton, all the porno
money in tow. All that Porno seems to prove is that humans cannot help but abuse and be
abused.
Despite the morose character of these novels, the basic plot of all of them seems simple
enough: a boy gets tired of his home and friends, leaves, and returns somewhat wiser. However,
depending on a plot to understand Welsh’s books really leads nowhere. The way a story is told
is everything to Welsh, and he rarely takes a simple path. Second only to the difficulty a nonScot might experience with the Lowland Scots language that permeates much of Welsh’s fiction
will be the difficulty one might experience because of the dialectical interaction of many
particular narrative strands. In the case of the three trainspotting books, immediately apparent is
the absence of a consistent spatiotemporal location and authoritative voice. The reader is taken
in and out of various narrative levels, which coincide with different states of consciousness and
alternative spatiotemporal dimensions.
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The movie Trainspotting is quick to stress this disjointedness. It opens with a scene in
which Renton (Ewan McGregor) dives into a pub toilet to retrieve a suppository, and the world
he enters is an aquatic dreamscape.37 He reemerges from the toilet with suppository in hand and
then, soaking wet, exits the pub. In view of this and many other instances in that movie and the
novels, it would not be an exaggeration to link Welsh with the magical realism most commonly
associated with Latin American writers. Moreover, the reader, or movie spectator, hitches a ride
with a given character, who might or might not be narrating his or her experiences and thoughts.
Then, once a reader has become accustomed to one character or narrator, he or she will probably
experience what linguists call a “rough referential shift,” as another character or narrator abruptly
enters into focus.
The books’ section and chapter titles imply some sort of coherence, but they also signal
the disjointed situation that the novels uncover. For example, in Trainspotting we may discern
some sort of historical progression from the section titles: “Kicking,” “Relapsing,” “Kicking
Again,” “Blowing It,” “Exile,” “Home,” and “Exit.” Within most sections, however, we are
confronted with a virtual cacophony of chapters, which are formally and conceptually different.
“Exile,” for instance, is composed of the chapters “London Crawling,” “Bad Blood,” “There Is a
Light that Never Goes Out,” “Feeling Free,” and “The Elusive Mr. Hunt.” Renton narrates
“London Crawling,” which covers what he experiences and the observations he makes during
one of his escapes to London. Renton narrates differently at different times in the trainspotting
books. In this instance, he employs a thick Scots dialect and adopts the posture of a decidedly
streetwise Scottish junky and hooligan. Elsewhere, he adopts a more measured, middle-class,
and generally British tone. “Bad Blood” seems completely unrelated to the rest of the chapter
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and novel. It is narrated from the perspective of Davie Mitchell, a character not directly
connected to the trainspotters. He is HIV positive and plots revenge on the man who gave him
AIDS by raping Mitchell’s girlfriend. Both “There Is a Light that Never Goes Out” and “Feeling
Free” are set in the same pub on the same night, but they seem unrelated because of their
differing narrative perspectives. Like a movie camera, the omniscient narrator of “There Is a
Light” moves from observing at a distance a pub and pub culture to going deep into the activities
and conversations within. And for a rare moment, we see Spud, Begbie, and Renton together as
a group, as if in a snapshot photograph. Spud narrates “Feeling Free.” This story is consistent
with Spud’s rhetoric in most of his other stories: a blend of self-deprecating internal monologue,
gregarious banter, elegy, psychological analysis, social commentary, and negotiation. Finally, in
“The Elusive Mr. Hunt,” which takes place in another pub at a different time, an omniscient
narrator serves as a vehicle for an old bar joke: a double entendre based on a phone call to a
bartender who subsequently calls out to someone with a sexualized name, “Mark Hunt” (“more
cunt”) in this case. But despite the comic relief, the narrator permits us to observe one of the few
instances in which Renton is forced to move out of his egocentrism to acknowledge the feelings
of others.
Moreover, the stories are meaningless without sociocultural context. Welsh takes us into
the underworld of Edinburgh’s schemes, and we follow the characters as they trek around Britain
and the globe during what many would characterize as a key period of cultural and economic
transition in global, as well as Scottish, postmodern history—the 1970s to present.38 The rave
culture emerging during the early 1980s of Trainspotting becomes dominant, along with its drugs
of choice, heroin and ecstasy. Discotheques and super-heroic DJs come to replace concert arenas
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and larger than life punk rockers. The dysfunctional Scotland under Margaret Thatcher’s neoimperial United Kingdom becomes the slightly devolved, dysfunctional Scotland under Tony
Blair’s neoliberal, US-controlled Britain. The government social projects, such as public
housing developments (schemes), that came about during and following the World Wars have
disintegrated, displacing further the working and lower classes and the communities that they
had developed. With the passage of a little over three decades, the claustrophobic tinge that
consumes the trainspotters and hooligans wherever they go begins to disperse, and by the end of
Porno, seeping in is the recognition that globalization is a euphemism for the global
dispossession of the working class and lumpenproletariat. But along with this recognition is
anticipation—that, to borrow from Welsh’s epigram by Nietzsche, a festival may emerge from
the cruelty. 39
It is the preceding recognition that will help us to better understand how Welsh tells these
tales and why he tells them the way that he does. The task that Welsh has set before himself,
therefore, is to artistically break the hegemony of the general anti-social and, thus, anti-human
terrain of “nastiness,” as Spud calls it: “ma nastiness is like a kind ay passive nastiness, a sortay
nastiness by omission, by no daein anything cause ah dinnae really care aboot anyone strongly
enough tae sortay intervene” (Porno 284). This terrain of nastiness is a virtual burial ground for
Scotland and human life in general. Welsh’s trainspotters and hooligans fuel this nastiness by
their self-destructiveness and lack of concern for their fellow dispossessed. Welsh, however, is
not interested in just laying out the terrain of nastiness and indefinitely chastising his characters.
That terrain, along with the people on it, is the place from which to begin. Instead of abandoning
Scotland because it is a site of defeat, betrayal, subordination, and alienation, Welsh turns to a
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seemingly hopeless Scottish situation so that he may discover the alternative potential—the good
sense—buried under the nastiness.
Superficially, Porno obliterates whatever reconciliation could have occurred after
Trainspotting and whatever hope could be emerging in the last chapters of Glue. Superficially,
the third trainspotting book is a farce with a comic ending; in actuality, it is a tragedy of the
deepest, most classical proportions. One could conclude, therefore, that taken together, all three
novels are an open and shut case on betrayal and failure. We should be suspicious of such a
conclusion, though. Using unorthodox narrative techniques, Welsh is after something else: a
world where “real choice” overwhelms “consumer choice,” where injustice is not obscured by
society but eradicated by it, where “all you need tae dae in life” is to just “be yourself” (Glue
386, 462-63, 367). However, when one is a working-class heroin addict, thief, football hooligan,
con artist, or idealist, a world in which one can “be yourself” would certainly be a world beyond
most people’s comprehension. The dispossessed already do not exist in the mainstream mind.
Moreover, if we just look at what is explicitly presented in the novels—frenetic tales recounting
the half-baked schemes and total failures of delinquents, misfits, and the lumpenproletariat in
general—then we will miss what Welsh is envisioning through his tales: an alternative world
that bubbles up in the gaps and on the fringes of what seems to be a hopeless situation peopled
by hapless and worthless individuals. What would such an alternative world look like?
Such a world will, to the post-Enlightenment mind, seem to exist in a dream, nightmare,
fairyland, or myth. As Carl and other Welshian characters understand, though, making any
alternative “unnatural” or “unrealistic” is exactly how a dominant society maintains its
superiority. We can safely assume, therefore, that Welsh understands that there “is no document
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of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”40 The true barbarism:
civilization silencing all opposition to itself. Dominant society shuts out alternatives by dropping
a veil between so-called fact and so-called fantasy, by “setting up a smokescreen.” This
segregation of knowledge reflects a deeper process of alienation: the segregation of being into
useful being (practical, civilized) and un-useful being (impractical, barbaric). This divorce at the
very root of human life opens the way for all kinds of divisions, which Welsh’s trainspotters and
hooligans certainly demonstrate. The world can be broken into ever-increasing fragments. On
the one hand, bonds between thought and action, dream and reality, self and other can be
dismissed as superstition, naïveté, or idealism. On the other hand, as capitalism has sublimated
its exploitation, these bonds have been made so elusive that they become siren songs luring
humans further away from engaging directly in cooperative, autonomous historical-material
production.41 Therefore, an alternative world where these bonds are the rule and not the
exception—where “being yourself” is not something you might attain only through hard work
but is the foundation, means, and end of the whole world—will seem mythological.
As Welsh reminds us time and again throughout his work, and as Marx asserted almost
two-hundred years before Welsh, the duplicity of this process is astounding. The so-called real
world of bourgeois capital founded itself on making unreal the bonds between human practice
and thought, human society and the human individual, and human power and what that power
can produce. Nevertheless, this duplicity—this bad sense—dominates modern and now
postmodern common sense. So, we cannot help but proceed under the mythological label.
What we can do, though, is assert a very specific understanding of the mythological, a
historical-material understanding. We will operate under the notion that mythos is original,
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evocative, and metaphorical knowledge that attests to a historical-material world that might be
shrouded but is not totally engulfed by “a squalid stink of low expectation which could choke the
life out of you if you let it” (Glue 456). 42 Unlike essentialist mythologies that grew to
dominance from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, historical-material mythology is not
interested in retroactively predetermining a biological legacy for the sake of domination.
Instead, it is committed to teasing out how materials and energies have been used, unused, or
abused in the past and, consequently, how those materials and energies might be used to produce
a vibrant future based on something other than alienation and domination. In effect, a historicalmaterial mythos is not so much a settled category of knowledge as it is an epistemological space
in which people may construct, in the present, a prehistory in which to ground, in the present, an
alternative future. As a consequence of historical-material mythos opening up a living history,
human engagement in historical production is reopened instead of alienated.
The presence of such a mythos is certainly reflected in Welsh’s work. Welsh is not
interested in maintaining preexisting mythologies, “these trivial things, they petty jealousies”
(Trainspotting 190). He is interested in unlocking their emergent materials and energies in order
to work towards a world where we have learned “tae love oorsels” and are “drawn by a greater
need, the need to belong to each other, to hold on to whatever force has fused” us (Trainspotting
272, 263).
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In Illuminations, Benjamin observes that in modernity’s rational historicism there is the tendency to
content “itself with establishing causal connection between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is
for that very reason historical [i.e. “real”]. It became historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be
separated from it by thousands of years”; alternatively, the historical-materialist parts ways with this official
historicism and “stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation
which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a conception of the present as the
‘time of the now’ which is shot through with chips of Messianic time” (263). If history is recognized as living—
“filled with the presence of the now” (261)—then it will probably seem unreal and, therefore, mythological because
it defies the bourgeois-liberal conceptions of normalcy and progress.
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By employing mythos in such a way, Welsh effectively sets out to open up a truly
“medieval” space.43 I am not referring now to the historical medieval, as in the Middle Ages.
We will get to that soon enough. Instead, as I did with “ethics” in the Introduction, I am
returning to an etymological meaning of the term “medieval”—“mid-age/period/phase”—and
linking it to mythos in order to reawaken the emergent and generative aspects of both “medieval”
and “mythos.” Such a space is not unlike the “thin places” of Celtic pre-Christian myth and
Celtic Christian spirituality, in which one can glimpse another world that exists in the midst of
this world, a place in the middle of another.
Is Welsh alone in trying to work in such liminal, marginal locale with the materials and
energies that dominant society has cast off? No. In fact, he is in league with a very old literary
tradition, which is native to both Ireland and Scotland by way of the Gaels.
2.2 Second Medieval Strand: Fenian Scéalta44
Welsh does not exaggerate when he aligns his writing with a “kind of Celtic, storytelling
tradition,” in which “everybody [is] a storyteller.”45 Closer evaluation of the trainspotting books
within a Scottish context reveals that far from being avant garde, as it were, Welsh works
squarely within an ancient, still active, though critically overlooked literary tradition native to
Ireland and Scotland: Fenian storytelling.46 Fenian literature is by nature an amalgamation of
oral and literary history, legend, wonder tale, and elegy concerned with the life of a marginal
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constituency antagonistically linked to the dominant sociocultural centers of Gaeldom.47 Even
the most comprehensive embodiment of Fenian narrative, the twelfth-century Acallam, is “a
loosely framed anthology of Fenian stories, poems, and trivia,” a “potpourri.”48 Though
interesting and rich, the Acallam is far from a smooth read if one approaches it according to
modern narrative standards. Multiple temporalities exist side by side, a situation which is
accentuated by an ancient Fenian meeting and accompanying Saint Patrick (c. 389-c. 461)
hundreds of years after he should be dead. Celtic mythology and Irish history interweave. PreChristian and Christian religious beliefs exist side by side as well; oftentimes, they intersect and
illuminate each other. Narrative perspectives are in perpetual flux. The legendary Fenian poet
Caílte is able to, through his incredible poetic abilities, bring the past into the present, thereby
bringing Finn and other major Fenian figures to life.49 Alternatively, Patrick is virtually guided
through the past to witness ancient events and meet legendary figures for himself.
“‘May victory be yours, Caílte, with my blessing,’ said Patrick. ‘You have lightened our
spirits and our mind, even though our religious life is being disrupted and our prayers
neglected.’”50 The Patrick who is so diplomatically chastising Caílte is none other than Saint
Patrick of Ireland. Caílte is none other than the legendary Fenian poet. Approximately three
hundred years after they should be dead, Caílte and Oisín, the son of the legendary Fenian Finn
mac Cumaill, inexplicably emerge in fifth-century Ireland. They are the last remaining Fenians.
Their heroic powers significantly reduced, the two Fenians part ways. Caílte comes across
Patrick and his fellow monks. From that point, the Acallam is a collection of tales about the
“elders,” the heroic but liminal Fenians of pre-Christian times, that are told by Caílte at Patrick’s
47
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request. This all seems straightforward enough. As noted, though, the truth of the matter is quite
different. The Fenian tradition is far from straightforward, and its subject, the Fenians
themselves, is not an easy one to pin down.
The very small passage from the Acallam quoted above is indicative of what kind of
literary tradition and subject material we are confronting. When Patrick says, “victory,” he could
feasibly mean a few things. As the official representative of Christianity, he may mean “glory,”
as in “God’s glory.” Because the Acallam was an attempt by the twelfth-century Irish church to
subsume pre-Christian traditions under Christian hegemony, such a conclusion is appropriate.
However, context is everything, and the context of the Acallam is dominated by Caílte
recounting stories about pre-Christian battles, hunts, and expeditions that occurred centuries
before. In view of that, Patrick may very well be giving Caílte and the Fenians his best wishes as
they enter into those battles, hunts, and expeditions—for things that they have already done!
Because of its polylogical and multi-temporal characteristics, an agenda deeper than pure
entertainment is not evident when one first reads the Acallam. Much the same could be said of
Welsh’s work. However, closer evaluation indicates that a very serious agenda is afoot.51 By
literarily making synchronous the materials and energies of the prehistorical and historical past
with those of the present, the writer of the tales “releases the text and allows it to convey
meanings of a more up-to-date kind.”52 One can aptly extend this understanding of Acallam’s
style to argue that its writer is trying to convey meanings of a more prophetic kind. Is the writer
(more likely writers) of the Acallam unique in his or her methodology? All indications are that
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the Acallam is far from an original form of Fenian literature, just a more comprehensive instance
of it.53
Indeed, the Fenian genre is a well-established genre and had been before and after Acallam’s
inscription; nevertheless, it is a genre which, like its subject matter, is a liminal one that cannot
be attributed to one “author” or to a specific “folk” within Gaelic history.54 Fenian literature is
both extremely longstanding in duration and democratic in spirit. Therefore, when we return to
Welsh’s narrative method, as illustrated in his work and practically described by Spud, we can
see that he is tied to a formal tradition in which “at any given point in its historical span or
throughout that span, every story has something to say about every other story within the
tradition . . . every story, in both a thematic and a structural sense, ‘flows into’ every other.”55
Or as Spud might put it, every story starts off in one place, “n maybe [goes] back a bit, then
forward again.”
The stylistic aspects of the Fenian tradition allude to a profound sociocultural force in
Gaeldom. Let us return again to the above quote from the Acallam in order to uncover that force.
Patrick follows his wish of good will to Caílte with this: “‘You have lightened our spirits and
our mind, even though our religious life is being disrupted and our prayers neglected.’” Patrick’s
statement is equivocal, to say the least. On the one hand, he is grateful for what Caílte has given
to him and his fellow monks. The poet has enriched their lives with pre-Christian, prehistorical
stories. Nevertheless, almost out of guilt for enjoying the Fenian tales so much, Patrick points
out to Caílte that he has disrupted the life of the official world, the hegemonic Christian world
that the twelfth-century scribes were retroactively telescoping into the fifth century. As isolated
as this incident might seem, it is socioculturally momentous. Christendom had not been as
53
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successful as it thought it had been in submerging alternative systems. Moreover, this moment
illustrates how the Fenians as a sociocultural force had always related to a dominant power.
When Johnson-Hogg characterizes Spud’s history of Leith as “celebration of yob culture
and of people who haven’t achieved anything noteworthy in the local community,” he could just
as well have been describing the subject of Fenian literature and society. Fenian culture was yob
culture among the ancient Irish and Scottish Gaels. Composed of literal bastards, runaways,
abused children, exiles, refugees, fugitives, misfits, and general outlaws, the fíana were what
loosely translates into “war bands.” However, “war bands” is not a term that does adequate
justice to what we should call “congregations of outlaws.” Like Welsh’s trainspotters and
hooligans, the fíana were by no means totally innocent outcasts; nevertheless, according to a rich
folkloric tradition that exists to this day, as outlaws they were generally held to be marginalized
members of society who had either become invisible within society, had been wronged by
society, or both. If “ye dinnae join in and tow the line,” Juice Terry observes, “yir a mug” (Glue
200). One can see the Fenian plight evident in the Scot J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan stories, vis à vis
the Lost Boys of Neverland, and in the Scottish national J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter stories, vis
à vis the students at Hogwarts Academy. Children who had been abandoned, abused, or
ostracized entered into bands led by typically longtime, if not terminal, outcasts.
To be a member of what the ancient Irish called a legitimate túath, or what the Scots
called a clan, one had to have a clear genealogical relationship to a major family or chieftain.
Only the most elite members of society could usually establish such lineages, and according to
ancient Irish law, lineages were only formalized upon becoming an “adult.” Becoming an adult
was synonymous with receiving one’s inheritance; this means that one had to have an inheritance
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to receive in order to ever be considered a possible adult.56 So, for example, if one was not the
first son in an elite family, if one was an illegitimate child in or out of the elite estates, if one was
a daughter who bore a child out of rape or outside of a society-approved relationship, or if one
was a member of the common majority who did not have an inheritance to inherit in the first
place, then one was technically a fénnid, a Fenian. In other words, practically everyone, barring
a very few, were latent Fenians if they were not already active ones. Not only were the
chronological youths Fenians, as Finn mac Cumaill and his son Oisín can attest. In fact, fíans
(individual bands of Fenians) comprised a sociocultural limbo whose membership consisted of
all those individuals wronged by society (typically chronologically, not legally, “adults”) and
those people who had not transitioned or would never transition into adulthood (chronologically
or legally “youths”). 57
The Fenian tradition of legend and mythology, therefore, arose out of a very real
historical phenomenon which arose out of the unequal distribution of sociocultural materials.
Thus, historical Fenians were yobs who gave rise to the Fenian literary tradition, “a celebration
of yob culture.” The question now becomes whether or not this Fenian/yob phenomenon
continued anywhere else outside of literature, as in the more concrete historical-material fabric of
Scotland.
2.3 Third Medieval Strand: Historical Fenian Continuum?
To accentuate further the importance of yob culture in Scotland’s fabric, it will help to
expand our historical net—first to the secular and then to the ecclesiastical Scotland of the
Middle Ages. In medieval Scotland, there was a huge sector of Scottish society about which no
historian has been able to uncover any substantial or unambiguous record. Arguably, Scotland
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has had a sizeable lumpenproletariat since at least the beginning of the Middle Ages: its
members were the “lowest of the fuckin low” in the peasant hierarchy, below husbandry workers
and cottars, which is a good indication of where they were in the whole Scottish socioeconomic
scheme of things.58 Images of some sort of Scottish pastoral and maritime utopia are the stuff of
tourist brochures and Scottish National Party propaganda. These people were more than likely
serfs to servants, were migrant laborers, or were destitute and homeless. If they had any
affiliation at all, they might have had only the scarcest of clan affiliations, thus some form of
social protection. However, it is undeniable that the Scottish economy and social system could
not have survived without them.59
Enter the Highland caterans and Border reivers. These were groups on both the northern
and southern poles of Scotland who emerged from the unenviable social, economic, and
geographical environment that Scotland presented to many of its inhabitants. They are
phenomena we can use to illustrate and historicize lumpenproletariat power in medieval
Scotland. This is not to say that all peasants—or even many—were directly associated with the
caterans and reivers, just as the majority of today’s Scots are not heroin addicts, football
hooligans, or porn actors. But for us today, these two historical groups should be taken as
symptoms of an underreported and sometimes romanticized force in Scotland’s biography. They
represent a Scottish multitude that is a substantial pregnant absence in official histories, not just
“a bunch ay radges oot oan the piss” (Glue 229).
What brings these two groups together as an indication of emergent force in the Scotland
of the Middle Ages are their Fenian-like social structures, mores, and relation to dominant power
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centers in London, Edinburgh, and clan seats. There is not much recorded about the caterans
(ceatharn in Gaelic), barring most notably their involvement in a series of power grabs during
the fourteenth century by one of the early Stewarts. Alexander Stewart (1343-1405), the “Wolf
of Badenoch,” “imposed himself on the Highlands and Islands” by depending almost completely
on an “armed force of a most unruly and undisciplined kind.”60 The Stewart family, which was
ascending at the time, was not closely connected to the clans in the areas that they were
attempting to control because the Stewarts, along with some other ascending families, were
Norman imports who began arriving under the auspices of David I (1124-53). This observation
points to why at least one Stewart depended on the caterans. It also indicates that the Stewarts
themselves had always effectively been outsiders within royal Scotland. 61 There is another,
deeper implication embedded in this area of medieval Scotland’s historical terrain: while the
Stewarts were not integral members of the Highland elites, the mercenary groups that fought for
them represented a powerful though incoherent native Highland class much farther down the
sociopolitical hierarchy and therefore more alienated than their Norman Scot leaders. As with
the fíana, this underclass must not have been as chaotic as some might assume. Such a claim is
not fanciful if we take into account nearly half a century of the Wolf’s military successes, which
included the sacking of the Moray coast, a major power hub at the time. Moreover, later
stereotypes of Highland culture—as outrageously violent, bloodthirsty, wicked, disobedient,
oversexed, and so forth—came as an unfair response from the Central Belt (i.e. Edinburgh,
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Glasgow, and other Lowland power centers) toward the activities of the caterans under direction
of the Wolf. 62
Even though he was a Norman Scot tearing through the Highlands, Stewart was
practically one of the Lowland’s own. In other words, as a son of Lowland power, he hired
members from a dispossessed Highland class to gain power in the Highlands and to be
recognized by his Lowland contemporaries. As a consequence, these outlaw Highlanders were
estranged even further from their native lands; so were their clan-aligned compatriots, who were
guilty by sociocultural association. In addition to increased displacement, Highlanders in general
were practically cut off from the emerging powerhouse to the south. On the one hand, this
situation planted the seeds for what would happen centuries later at Flodden (1513) and Culloden
(1746); on the other, this is a true precursor in the Middle Ages of the capitalist sleight of hand—
the alienation of labor power from the laborer—if there ever was one.
Medieval Highlanders were not alone in their historical and political quandary. To the
south of the belt of ascending power in the Lowlands were the Scottish Borderers. These were
also a marginalized population nearly lost from official Scottish history, save for some popular
ballads. Borderers were people who gave royalty and each other fits during the thirteenth
through sixteenth centuries. The Borderers lived in the Border Marches between Scotland and
England. The southern Lowland Scots and the northern English claimed their respective sides of
the Border, but they were anything but loyal to the governments in Edinburgh or London. Also,
they did not follow the patterns of the official Scots or English when it came to religion. Until
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the eighteenth century, they remained predominantly Catholic even after the Anglican
movement, the Reformation, and the Presbyterian ascendancy. They had complex, Fenian-like
familial and community structures that were very similar to the Highland clans. These
affiliations could expand or contract, and they were not necessarily ethnically determined: Scot
could love or hate Anglo-Saxon or Scot, and vice versa. Alliances and affiliations were
constantly mutable and negotiable; negotiations were often facilitated through the theft of
livestock and land. Like the society of Welsh’s trainspotters, their “boundaries were invisible tae
outsiders, but [if one was part of that society] you gained an intuitive feel for them”
(Trainspotting 75).
The Borderers, not unlike many Highlanders, were radically nomadic in both social and
cultural terms. One writer goes so far as to characterize their life as “guerrilla living.”63 Mainly
because the Borders were in perpetual chaos because of the conflicts between two kingdoms,
“ordinary Borderers . . . learned to live on the move, to cut crop subsistence to a minimum and
rely on the meat they could drive in front of them. They could build a house in a few hours and
have no qualms about abandoning it; they could travel great distances at speed and rely on their
skill and cunning to restock supplies by raiding.”64 Moreover, the Border Marches—like the
Highlands—were known for instances of abject brutality. It would be risky, therefore, to give
the impression that these people were either some sort of pure anarchists or pure democrats.
Indeed, the Borderers’ most radical element parallels the Highland caterans: reivers—
whose name derives from a derogatory Broad Scots word connoting banditry, lawlessness, and
so forth—were an important aspect of Border life. Typically in opposition to the official Border
Wardens appointed by London and Edinburgh, they shaped the legal and social environment of
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the region. Border Law, as it was called, reflected the chaotic situation in which the Border
Scots, along with English Borderers, found themselves.65 Altogether, we are definitely dealing
with an always profound but frequently wretched phenomenon when we are dealing with the
Borderers.
There is another significant aspect of Scotland’s medieval history that indicates a Fenian
strand deep within Scotland’s sociocultural fabric, the Celtic Church. Celtic Christianity
emerged after missionaries from the Near East and a newly-converted Rome visited Britain and
Ireland during the first three or four centuries. Nevertheless, contact with the Continent and the
Near East was scarce and inconsistent, which was reflected in the more monastic character of the
early Christianity. Subsequently, Christianity among the Celts took on a more local form,
interweaving with the existing sociocultural fabric. Monasticism in the context of earlymedieval Britain and Ireland contradicts the perception of monastic life most prevalent today.
As the Scottish Saints Ninian (c. 360-c. 432) and Columba (521-97) demonstrated in fact,
contrary to popular legend, monks did not live in terminal isolation, cloistered away in their
home bases at Whithorn, on the island of Iona, and on the island of Lindisfarne. 66 More
important than composing such awe-inspiring texts as the Book of Kells and the Book of Durrow,
Scottish monks were deeply involved in not only the religious life but also the political life of
communities throughout a region that extended from today’s Yorkshire to beyond today’s
Aberdeenshire.
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However, Celtic Christianity had been marginalized since its earliest days—not by nonChristian Celts, but by other Christians. In 431, at the Council of Ephesus, Saint Augustine of
Hippo’s efforts to outlaw the theology of a British monk, Pelagius (c. 355-c. 425), succeeded.
Pelagianism, as the heresy is known today, contradicted what would become the very basis of the
early Roman Catholic Church and thus of practically all Western Christianity: humans are born
of sin and can only reconcile with God through a mediated faith in Christ by way of the Church.
In effect, what Juice Terry says about the Tories could apply as well to the imperial form of
Christianity arising during the fourth and fifth centuries: the “biggest achievement” was “tae
make huvin principles cost ye” (Glue 200). Alternatively, Pelagius and his followers, like some
Eastern Christians of the first millennium, held that God had always existed in all things and that
Jesus Christ was the realization of this preexisting truth.67 As opposed to the abstract faith of
Augustinian Christianity, Pelagian Christianity espoused a more practical, material, and
immanent version of faith. The Pelagians’ position reflected their affinity for the Gospel
according to John, the Hebrew Psalms, and their interpretation of Paul’s letters to the Romans.
Recent scholarship suggests that Augustine’s enmity toward Pelagius was more political
than theological.68 The imperial impulse was arguably already well-established in Christian
Rome. Consequently, indigenous Christianities were a threat to Rome’s ecclesiastical and, more
importantly, political authority, which depended on a very strict hierarchy controlled by “top
cats,” a bishopric answerable only to Rome. Even so, Pelagianism reflected a Christianity that
existed in various degrees throughout what we today call the British Isles and Ireland. The
Acallam is, in part, a literary indication of the “unorthodoxy” of Celtic Christianity, which is
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characterized by the interweaving of existing Celtic secular society and a Celtic spirituality based
on perpetual regeneration with early Christianity’s practical understanding of communion and
eternal life.
In contrast to Roman Christianity, indigenous British and Irish Christianity was not
threatened by the pre-Christian or so-called pagan beliefs of the local Celts (Gaels, Britons, and
Picts). Alternatively, historical evidence indicates that the Celts had very little difficulty in
accepting monotheism because they did not interpret it as a system of exclusion but as a system
of integration. Celtic Christians did not observe a binary opposition between monotheism and
pantheism. This perspective, which applied not only to the Celtic Christians but also to
Christians in the East as well, is sometimes referred to as “panentheism”: “the sense that God is
to be found both within creation and outside it.”69 Spud echoes this Celtic theology when he
suggests, “We’ll never likesay, learn tae love oorsels, until we kin look eftir weaker things,
likesay animals n that” (Trainspotting 272).
Two hundred years after Rome had outlawed Pelagianism, the Celtic Christianity of
Scotland and much of the surrounding Celtic world remained strong. Such was the case until,
first, the Synod of Whitby in the seventh century and, second, the convergence of secular
feudalism and ecclesiastical diocesanism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In 664, Celtic
Christianity and its monastic tendencies were officially ruled illegal. Celtic churches persisted,
but during the following centuries, they were increasingly marginalized by local governments
and congregations aligned with the Roman Church. Then, at the turn of the first millennium, the
efforts of the Canmores—particularly Queen Margaret (1046-1093) and her son David I—
brought the Scottish Kirk into total line with the Roman Church, a process that coincided with
introduction of European feudalism into Scotland. The former venture was somewhat more
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successful than the latter; consequently, Saints Ninian and Columba, as well as Saint Bride, were
supplanted by the canonical Saint Andrew as the patron saints of Scotland. Christianity became
a state religion with its center planted close to the Continent, at St. Andrews outside of Fife.
What was undeniably achieved by both the Synod meeting in 664 and the millennial Canmore
dynasty was the alienation and submersion of Celtic Christianity as a viable spiritual and
political force. Perhaps, as some suggest today, traces of Celtic Christianity in Scotland are
evident in the Presbyterianism and social structures that emerged from the Scottish
Reformation.70 Even if this is so, Celtic Christianity is still an estranged emergent force—
virtually a Fenian Christianity.
Taken together, caterans, reivers, and Scottish “panentheists” call attention to a marginal
or outcast power deeply embedded in Scotland’s biography. Most of the characters in Welsh’s
trainspotting books are, therefore, the figural descendents of the medieval caterans and reivers.
And one could easily perceive characters like Spud and Carl as devalued counterparts of Celtic
monks. As noted before, most Scots were and are still ignored or exploited by the power elites.
And they have rarely been loyal to a given power elite. It is in these secular and ecclesiastical
medieval outlaws, therefore, that we can observe the very real historical existence of a Fenianlike constituency that persisted and still persists in Scotland. They arguably represent a large
contingency of no ones who nevertheless enable and fuel the official history of the “someones.”
In view of this historical background of Scotland during the Middle Ages, a key point to
keep in mind is that one of the aspects of the historical fíana—who were mirrored by their
Christian counterparts and whose legacy effectively continued in the later caterans and reivers—
was that they were an indispensable part of ancient Gaelic society, even though on its margins.
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This is an aspect that Johnson-Hogg also gets wrong about “yob culture.” The importance of the
legendary and historical outlaw constituencies explains why Fenian lore remains, in one form or
another, so culturally powerful in Ireland and Scotland. 71 The big secret that was apparently not
such a big secret to ancient Gaelic society was that if it were not for the outlaws intervening from
their posts in the surrounding forests, hills, and islands, then Gaelic society would crumble under
the weight of its oligarchic elites. We observe, therefore, an almost invisible alternative
sociocultural reality that was not as much out of bounds as it was a check on the bounds of
hegemonic society.
In other words, if it were not for the Fenians breaking the law—testing it, pointing out its
faults, undermining it—then Gaelic society and culture would enter into a self-destructive
process that would not only harm those within its bounds but would also infect others outside its
bounds. Hence, Fenian resistance and intervention were not destructive in a broad sense. They
worked dialectically: from deconstructing dominant society, to redistributing sociocultural
power, and thus to promoting continued sociocultural life.
The Foucauldian reader, however, might reasonably argue that the Fenians actually
maintained the center of power by being its venting mechanism: that, at most, the fíana were
reforming agents and, consequently, were by no means revolutionary; that, yes, they might have
contributed to society, but only inasmuch as they diffused internal resistance to dominant power.
Sent to the margins, the argument might continue, Fenians actually secured Gaelic society’s laws
by being a correlative “other” which served as a gauge for self-correction. In effect, the Fenian
exception negatively affirmed the hegemonic Gaelic rule, thereby maintaining and strengthening
the rule. There is, though, a significant blind spot in such a view. The Fenians might have also
positively alluded to an alternative sociocultural possibility that had been submerged under
71
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hegemonic society’s dominance. When, for example, a Fenian band would enter a village, rob it
of prized cattle, and then deliver the cattle to another village which had been wronged by the
other, the band was not necessarily enforcing established laws. Indeed, the Fenians arguably
demonstrated that laws passed down through custom or by ruling elites failed to address the
needs of living human individuals and, therefore, of living human society. Because Fenians
were “below” the rank of a “citizen” (or in Gaelic society, below the rank of a fine, “family
member”), they represented a concept of human social relationships that official Gaelic society
tried to hide and that, by extension, future societies would continue to hide: human individuals
are social before they are members of an officially constituted family, village, clan, city,
kingdom, or, later, state.
It is with the latter, non-Foucauldian attitude that we can better appreciate the Fenian-like
characters and tales in Welsh’s prehistory. Welsh brings together life histories that initially seem
bonded only by their “collective insanity,” the “grey [that] gets in,” “the rows [they] have about
nothing at all,” and “a dynamic which will draw [them] right back into the slaughter”
(Trainspotting 98, Glue 456, and Porno 139, 365). The trainspotters’ and hooligans’ lives are
virtually lives on the Borders and in the Highland hinterlands. They are mercenaries up for sale.
They are kin unified only by their marginality. They are, as Renton describes his set, a “mutual
coincidence of wants” (Trainspotting 321). However, the real objective of Welsh’s weaving
together their stories is to counter such common-sense bonds, which have hardened into bad
sense, with the good sense they negatively affirm. Their stories are altogether the generative
social negation of an estranging egocentric negation of human life.72 What emerges as a result?
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2.4 Fourth Medieval Strand: A Postmodern Medievalism
The preceding sections of literary and historical background are not digressive. It would
be more apt to describe them as archaeological or genealogical. What we have uncovered is a
rich stratum of materials and energies that have gone unused, have been abused, and have been
silenced. Knowingly or unknowingly, Welsh taps into this seam of castoff literary methods and
historical materials in order to write his three trainspotting books.
In Fenian-like fashion, Welsh confounds fiction-writing standards with his tendency to
stow away his preferred genre in a dominant genre.73 As will become apparent in this and later
chapters, Welsh’s mode of writing employs more contemporarily accepted forms of narrative in
order to conduct less common and perhaps more “traditional” storytelling. He takes, in effect, a
viral approach to narrative: a host genre delivers and is then consumed by a virus genre. What
seem to be straightforward plots driven more or less by a single protagonist are vehicles in which
he, like Caílte, delivers a virtual multitude of stories, themes, and problems. We noted above
that when Caílte tells his stories to Patrick and his followers, the Fenian poet disrupts the life of
the official world, the hegemonic Christian world that the twelfth-century scribes were
retroactively telescoping into the fifth century. To put it another way, Caílte ruptures a dominant
situation by opening a space in it with materials and energies that the dominant situation had
presumed to be subordinated. Welsh and his work operate similarly; nevertheless, there is a key
difference. In the Acallam at least, Caílte brings apparently subordinated Fenian materials and
energies into the present in order to gain legitimacy from the present, whereas Welsh dredges up
subordinated historical-material elements in order to open up the emergence of an alternative
probability, an alternative world in the future.
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Historically, Scotland did not undergo the divorce between the pre-modern and modern
that the major players of the Western world presumably did.74 As will be stressed throughout
this study, Scotland did not totally become caught up in the modern revolutions of the
Renaissance and Reformation as they were experienced on the Continent and in England.
Moreover, Scotland’s crucial role in the Enlightenment had more to do with its seemingly
groundless nature than with its being a well-established modern nation-state.75 The reasons for
this seemingly anomalous status are historical, cultural, economic, and political. For instance,
something that in bourgeois-liberal terms would probably be laudable today hindered Scotland’s
movement into modernity as an autonomous nation-state: its diversity. Scotland’s greatly
heterogeneous composition, which existed during and after the Middle Ages, was a detriment to
Scotland when it came to forming a modern nation-state. It was a hodgepodge of diverse prefeudal Celtic societies, Anglocentric feudal networks, international economic and political
centers in the Central Belt, nearly anarchic Lowland Border societies, ethnic and linguistic
variety, and so on. Moreover, directly related to Scotland’s national identity problem was its
political and economic relationship with England. As a subordinate, Scotland became merely the
southern kingdom’s northern appendage or hinterland, and Scotland’s development would
ultimately have to be stunted in order for Britain to become a modern and modernizing force.
Current symptoms of Scotland’s historical medievalism can be found in modern and
postmodern Scotland. Geographically, Scotland is a medieval construct, as a whole and in its
constituent parts. Legal and educational institutions stem from the medieval period, even pre74
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medieval in the case of Scottish law, which is a derivative of Roman law. Scotland’s general
lack of dissent and deviation during modernity—which arguably inhibited “innovation,
intellectual curiosity and enterprise”—indicates the persistence of stifling medieval residues.76
Despite spurts of significant development, such as those of the eighteenth century (intellectual)
and late-nineteenth century (industrial), Scotland has generally gone the direction of
underdevelopment.
This underdevelopment becomes evident in areas like health. During much of the
twentieth century, Scotland was reminiscent of the fourteenth century: birth mortality was high,
overcrowding and squalor were a norm, stairwells and streets were the places for human
defecation. 77 The last three facts frequently find their way into Welsh’s fiction. Moreover, if we
keep an eye towards medieval residues in postmodern Scotland, it might give us a unique insight
into the fact that in a small country where middle-class emigration persists, over a million Scots
live in poverty.78 This is not to mention that the loss of Scottish capital to the English continues
even when Scottish capital increases. 79 This is certainly a bleak picture, particularly if we look at
it with well-established bourgeois assumptions. However, Scots must have some power that has
allowed them to endure, even if on the margins of power.
Beyond the bleakness, one could argue that Scotland’s standing attachment to certain
medieval materials and energies has been a matter of survival. What sustained Scotland in the
absence of having substantial, unified control over a diverse population, sovereignty, religious
institutions, natural resources, and economics? Arguably, the various, seemingly chaotic social
and cultural systems that had developed from the Neolithic Period onward maintained the
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Scots.80 This does not imply that we should romanticize those systems, but it does imply that we
should probably not ignore that there might be something positive or emergent in the Scotland of
the Middle Ages. And if this medieval something has been a source of power for the Scots,
finding out what that energy is might prove instructive in the present and as we look forward
(hence the rationale behind the “genealogical” section preceding this one).
In such a light, Welsh’s task is undoubtedly monumental because the historical materials
and energies with which he has to work are so heterogeneous and volatile. The Scotland of the
historical Middle Ages does not provide much guidance, just rich potential, as he opens a
generative “medieval” space in our midst. It bears reiterating that Welsh has to first open a
mythos-infused “medieval” space in which to work with heterogeneous materials and energies so
that he may begin mapping an alternative Scotland. Thus, Welsh’s “medieval” space is not just a
window onto another Scotland but is, more importantly, a space from which to generate that
Scotland: it is a spatiotemporal domain in which the materials and energies of the past will be
unlocked, redistributed to those people from whom those materials and energies have been taken,
and then used by those people to produce their future.
For the trainspotters and hooligans and porn stars of Welsh’s three trainspotting books,
such a space is necessary in order to persevere, as Spud comes to discover when he begins to
write a history of Leith (Porno 181). For them, there is effectively no such thing as Scotland,
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just fragments and disappointments—nastiness and cruelty. But frequently bubbling to the
surface is the recognition that something else is possible.
To combat the nastiness and cruelty, Welsh’s stories document the terrain of nastiness
and cruelty so that we may, in negative relief, observe other possible terrain. The gaps and
conflicts between various characters’ accounts are fundamental to Welsh’s technique: the
potential for an alternative story emerges between individual characters’ stories, in their
congregated interaction. Furthermore, we are forced to constantly adjust our perspective on the
larger situation. Welsh’s stories persistently unsettle the historical-material ground of their
telling, hence creating an environment in which despair and hope are in vibrant conflict. Then
after we read awhile, intersections among the stories materialize and an uncertain “something”
emerges on the horizon. In the trainspotting books, Welsh puts various narrative perspectives
into interaction with each other—he congregates them—in order to demonstrate that the
possibility of collectivity still exists despite the fragmentation. These narrative characteristics,
therefore, allude to another way of perceiving the world—an “outlaw way” to which our world
of transparency, linear systems, consumption for the sake of consuming, and “going somewhere”
might not be well-attuned.
2.5 Medieval Virtue: Congregation
“Yip,” observes Spud in one of his soliloquies, “ah’m jist no a gadge cut oot fir modern
life n that’s aw thir is tae it, man. Sometimes the gig goes smooth, then ah jist pure panic n it’s
back tae the auld weys” (Porno 63). The “life” to which Spud is referring is not technically the
world of Finn mac Cumaill, fifth-century monks at Whithorn and Iona, or of fourteenth-century
caterans and reivers. Obviously, the “modern life” to which Spud is referring is the world of late
capital, and the gig is capitalism. It is a world after Finn, after Ninian and Columba, after the
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virtually nameless mercenaries who served the Wolf of Badenoch, and after Border bandits, who
went by names like Kinmont Willie, Auld Wat, Geordie Burn, and Cleave the Crune. But one
can still question how close Spud and company are to this world, and one can still question how
far away they are from the concerns of their figurative and literal predecessors. As today’s no
ones, do they not enter the “medieval” space or “thin place” of all no ones, where alternative
worlds are submerged?
As endearing or perhaps as pitiful as Spud might be, he comes across as something as
near to a non-subject and non-author as possible. He is not protagonist material. “Even in his
Ma’s womb,” muses Renton, “you would have had to define Spud less as a foetus, more as a set
of dormant drug and personality problems” (Trainspotting 328). In effect, Spud is neither a
subject nor an object, just a collection of sociocultural refuse. “Nothing had gone right for Spud.
The world had shat on him, and now his mate had joined it,” an omniscient narrator continues
after Renton has betrayed his mates near the end of Trainspotting (343). Spud is truly liminal.
This is why a reader might privilege the more “concrete” Renton, Sick Boy, Begbie, Juice Terry,
Nikki, or any other character when, in fact, Spud’s liminality should draw more attention.
Indeed, it is Spud’s marginal relation to society that also goes a long way toward
explaining why his history of Leith is completely unacceptable to Johnson-Hogg. Without
intending to, Spud puts his finger right on the problem of legitimate historical narrative, whether
it is Scotland’s or practically any other nation’s history. It is a propagandistic master-narrative
created by a hegemonic minority for the purpose of maintaining the hegemony of that minority—
“Four-tae-one against, man, four-tae-one against.” It is the reduction of the majority—the
potential multitude—into a “people” or into an undifferentiated “mass,” a reduction which makes
way for the sanctification of “top cats” who are supposedly responsible for the dominant
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narrative’s success. Consequently, so-called history is really about producing “identity,”
“society,” “culture,” and “nationality” as too-easily consumed commodities or too-easily
sanctified fetishes. In such a situation, common humans’ histories are, using Renton’s words,
degraded to “trivial things, they petty jealousies.” Or as Spud demonstrates figuratively and
literally, most of human history is marginal, prehistorical, and mythological. It is “medieval” in
the sense that it is between legitimate narratives of history. Instead of being recognized as the
active participants in the generation of and movement within their respective situations, most
humans become personae non grata in an over-history or master-narrative that manages and, in
fact, profits from the reduction of common human life into petty concerns and trivia.81
Historicalness—the active social production of materials and energies and life—is taken out of
history; subsequently, history becomes nothing more than flattened, “homogenous, empty
time.”82 All that is left are hegemonic state and corporate self-promotion narratives composed
for the purposes of accumulating and containing historical activity, not for the purpose of
generating history. Many of Welsh’s characters tell us about this situation, but it is Spud who
demonstrates it for us.
So, what is Spud? Spud, as we have noted, has a completely unorthodox relation to
history and way of telling it, which directly reflects Welsh’s methodology in his three-volume
prehistory of Scotland. Without Spud, as well as Carl, Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno would
arguably be disconnected fragments pasted into cardstock covers, lacking any real connective
spirit or purpose. Spud is a diffuse presence that connects all the fragments. He is a figure for
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the potential multitude. And in Welsh’s fiction, his function is that of a conduit. Through Spud,
Welsh introduces us to an alternative world that is certainly connected to the dominant world,
that is as complicated and troubled as the dominant world, but that is also one which challenges
the dominant world’s legitimacy. To elucidate further, let us return to Johnson-Hogg’s rejection
of Spud.
Johnson-Hogg only gets things half right about yob culture, or perhaps he indicates the
devaluation of the Fenian in our time. He states to Spud that Leithers, both of yesterday and
today, are people “who haven’t achieved anything noteworthy in the local community.”
Historically, he begs the question. In fact, during the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth
centuries, Leith was the equivalent of a Glasgow East, a major shipbuilding hub and trade port
between Edinburgh and the Continent. The common Leithers were who made it what it was, and
the trainspotters of Trainspotting and Porno are their descendants. Spud is attempting to
congregate the materials and energies of them all in order to bring about the emergence of
something better than the nastiness that has consumed him and his friends’ lives.
Like Welsh, Spud has set before himself a very difficult task. Spud is the first to admit
that when confronted with the hardships that he experiences under late capitalism, he goes back
to his “auld weys,” which means descending further into drug-induced dementia. He, like his
mates, becomes a hopelessly isolated fragment of a human. Unlike the hills, forests, and islands
to which the fíana would go after intervening in the affairs of Gaeldom, the “auld weys” to
which the trainspotters and hooligans run do not offer recuperation and regeneration. Much is
the same when compared to Scottish monks, who could retreat to their spiritual centers after
having gone on difficult missions to Pictland. Even when compared to caterans and reivers, who
certainly lived in harsh circumstances, Welsh’s characters inhabit a world that does not even give
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them a little credit for persevering. The “auld weys” for Spud and company do not strengthen
their resistance to late capital; they confirm and increase its dominion over them.
Practically all of Welsh’s characters turn to some equivalent of a drug when confronted
with the postmodern capitalist empire. But they are far from alone. Indeed, we can take drug
abuse as a metaphor for the typical response to today’s capitalist situation. The use of drugs—
alcohol, pain killers, ecstasy, and heroin—are completely in keeping with postmodern
capitalism’s religion of choice, which is parodied by Renton in Trainspotting:
Choose us. Choose life. Choose mortgage payments; choose washing machines;
choose cars; choose sitting oan a couch watching mind-numbing and spiritcrushing game shows, stuffing fuckin junk food intae yir mooth. Choose rotting
away, pishing and shiteing yersel in a home, a total fuckin embarrassment tae the
selfish, fucked-up brats ye’ve produced. Choose life. (187)
Despite Renton’s rebellious tone, his and other drug addicts’ choice “no tae choose life” is really
their total concession to the bourgeois systems that they either despise or envy.
“Choice,” the postmodern incarnation of a bourgeois-liberal conception of individual
“freedom,” is actually a term that indicates labor power divorced from its source, the actual
individual. When this separation occurs, power becomes ephemeral. This power becomes a
ghost of itself that humans purchase and consume in order to momentarily make themselves feel
as if they have regained it—by making a “choice.” Like a vampire, this alienated power
transforms into an entity that consumes the humans that originally created it; subsequently, this
alienated power gains more control over them, making their own power increasingly alien.83 In
such a situation, humans become trapped in a progressive (or is it regressive?) cycle of
consuming and being consumed, as the characters of Welsh’s trainspotting books illustrate time
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and again. Humans dislocate even more of their power every time they consume in the capitalist
situation, mainly because they will work increasingly harder to consume more. This power is
“good junk,” and humans understandably want more. Therefore, they will continue to go to their
pushers—department stores, electronics outlets, frozen dinner aisles, insurance salespeople,
stock brokers, movie rental shops, fast food restaurants, and so forth—to perpetuate their habit.
And rarely do humans concern themselves with the fact that the commodities and services which
they consume are stolen from their and others’ wages, made in sweatshops by virtual slave labor,
made with less-than-par materials from exploited regions, and made to steal more power away.
In such a situation, humans become increasingly isolated as individuals, leading to their
increasing fragmentation. Does anyone have time to be concerned about such things when
choice calls? Is there real freedom? Is there freedom from “meaningless choice”?
Where are the Fenians now?
At the beginning of the Acallam, Caílte and Oisín part ways. We have already
discovered where Caílte goes. What of Oisín, Finn mac Cumaill’s son? Isolated from his fellow
Fenians—the powerful congregation of outsiders, misfits, delinquents, outcasts, and abused—he
retreats to the Gaelic Otherworld, Tír na nÓg. However, he knows that he cannot continue in
such a place. It is not a place conducive to true comradeship—to true life. Even though the
Celtic Otherworld is lively when compared to other Otherworlds of antiquity, it is still the realm
of the dead. Living there is like living in a perpetual ecstasy or heroin trip. Even though one
might feel alive there, one is actually far removed from life. Oisín decides to leave paradise for
the trees, hills, plains, and most importantly, the fellowship of humans. As he departs, he is told
that his feet must not touch the ground of the outside world. If he does, he will lose all his
Fenian powers; in addition, he will lose the gift of eternal life that he gained when he entered Tír
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na nÓg. He continues, nevertheless. When he enters the outside world, he discovers that all
Fenians are gone. He travels alone throughout Ireland on his horse, and one day he hears
hundreds of people crying to him, “‘Come over here and help us! You are much stronger than
we are!’”84 He sees a group of men being crushed underneath a huge slab of marble. The
onlookers plead again, “‘Come quickly and help us to lift the slab or all these men will be
crushed to death!’” From his horse, Oisín is able to maneuver the flagstone off the men, but the
buckle on his saddle breaks. The Fenian jumps on the ground to recover balance. The instant he
does, his strength leaves him, and his body shrivels to that of a frail old man.
As with any mythic tale, the one that recounts the demise of the last Fenian is
overflowing with possible meanings. In the present context, this story serves as an analogue for
Spud’s situation. Spud cannot afford to remain in a state of drug-induced fantasy. It keeps him
away from species-being, living a real life with fellow human beings. He and his mates have got
to engage “modern life” even if they do not feel cut out for it, even if they “jist pure panic.”
Oisín is obviously not “a gadge cut oot fir the modern life” of his time either. Nevertheless, he
does not panic and return to Tír na nÓg. He saves human life. Moreover, his coming down to
the ground and becoming mortal is not a price or sacrifice as much as it is a realization of human
species-life. He already paid the dearest price when he had entered a supposed paradise,
removing him from his fellow Fenians. But what he gains when he steps out of a static utopia
and onto the land of the living far exceeds anything the Otherworld could have given him. He
enters into true connection with the Irishmen he saves, and one can be confident that his work
will be glorified by them. Like Oisín, Spud might suffer for his efforts. Indeed, his function in
Welsh’s trainspotting books is not just to be a fellow Fenian-like historian, a virtual descendant
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of Caílte; he is also the peacemaker in his fiction, which tends to get him emotionally and
physically hurt. Spud knows that if he does not touch the figurative ground and bring others
together—as well as save their collective life in his history of no ones—then they will be
“[s]ortay like the saber-toothed tiger,” extinct (Porno 63). He recognizes that there is a power
greater than drugs, violence, solipsism, and despair. This power alludes to an alternative world
that is neither a Gaelic fairyland nor neo-Darwinian dystopia.
Carl negatively alludes to an alternative in Glue—a world free of “meaningless choice,”
which would be a world of true autonomy—when he recognizes how the gig of choice operates:
by the time you’ve made the token choice you’ve eaten up a bigger chunk of your
allocated three score and ten than any drugs could have. They try to con you that
making that kind of choice day in, day out, makes you feel free or alive or selfactualised. But it’s shite, a lifebelt to stop us all from going fuckin mad at the
lunacy of this fucked-up world we’ve let them shape around us. . . . Freedom
from meaningless choice. (386)
As has probably become apparent, Welsh does not explicitly state what this alternative free
world looks like or where it might be located. Beneath and between the surfaces lies the
alternative world. As recent astrophysics suggests, it is a mistake to base the existence of the
universe on what can be seen but on what cannot be seen, which cosmologists call dark matter.
Supposedly, the gravitational pull of dark matter is what holds the universe together, not just the
gravitational pull of perceivable stars and planets. Returning to the language of our study, the
alternative world lies in the no ones as a collectivity—as an interconnected multitude. 85
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According to recent Marxist thought, humans are constituents involved in cooperative
social networks before they are subsumed under a constitutional entity.86 Any constituted
society, therefore, proceeds only because of the constituents’ socially-realized work.
Constituents—the particular members of the multitude below and on the edges of the surface of
the official world—precede constitution—the surface. Socially-engaged constituents, not a
constituted society, are primary to generating any world. Spud’s history “ay Leith fae the merger
[with Edinburgh] tae the present,” as told by the people of Leith themselves, is nothing less than
a testament to this fact, which is the actual reason behind Johnson-Hogg’s rejection of it. The
publisher—as a sentinel of dominant, constituted society—is relatively comfortable with the hoi
poloi as long as they keep showing up to their jobs, taking the dole, rotting away in schemes,
consuming bad drugs and bad food, and waging war on each other. However, the moment they
attempt to be recognized as the source of human society and culture, then the Johnson-Hoggs of
the world must cast them even further into the depths and onto the margins. Spud intuits how
this works, which he indicates when he exclaims to Begbie, “there’ll be nae gadges like me n
you left doon here. . . . They want us aw oot in schemes oan the edge ay toon.”
When Spud makes this warning about further historical-material estrangement on the
horizon, he is not making some weak, egocentric call for self-preservation; nor is he raising
undue alarm. He is issuing a wakeup call to the overworked, underemployed, unemployed,
supposedly faceless, and supposedly expendable: Resist the antihuman erasure of the common
multitude, and emerge as the practical foundation of human life.
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According to Negri, “The law and the constitution follow constituent power: constituent power gives
rationality and substance to the law. Constituent power stands as a revolutionary extension of the human capacity to
construct history, as a fundamental act of innovation, and therefore as absolute procedure. The process started by
constituent power never stops. The question is not to limit constituent power, but to make it unlimited”
(Insurgencies 24).
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Spud’s whole objective in writing the history of Leith is effectively Fenian, which means
that it is radically pro-social and pro-human. Therefore, Fenian Spud is like the Fenians before
him: far from being anti-social, the fíana were extremely social, and individual Fenians were
known to act cooperatively when it came to defending general sociality—species-being—against
society’s injustices. Accordingly, when Spud homes in on the fact that “Leith wis sucked intae
Edinburgh against the people’s will,” he reflects the Fenian concern with rectifying the injustices
of dominant society. He is not interested in merely telling subaltern tales to entertain or to make
him and his mates feel better about themselves. The stakes are too high for that. He wants
people like him, in Scotland and elsewhere, to “agitate for change” and to get back into
producing human history (Porno 259). He takes to heart what Renton, his best friend who
double-crosses him, passes off as a convenient cliché: one is “better making history than
studying it” (Trainspotting 147). Therefore, Spud’s history of Leith is not just an exposé on a
little-known part of Scottish history; it is an attempt to reopen from a particular situation
universal historical production. He is calling for the congregation of the dispossessed.
Even though Welsh shows in his Scottish prehistory that an intense, well-established
process of self-perpetuated alienation is hindering human individuals from productively shortcircuiting and emerging from the current situation, he continually points to a persevering mythos
of submerged good sense and emergent force lurking in the background. This persevering
knowledge will not allow those who recognize it to give in to the “life” so provocatively
described by Renton and Carl. Spud in particular can no longer abide by the “auld weys.” Even
after Spud suggests that he is not “cut oot fir modern life,” he discovers in his historical research
“that Leith’s motto is persevere,” and he consequently says to himself, “ah’ve goat tae dae jist
that,” persevere (Porno 181).
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All things considered, though, what is Welsh telling the potential Scottish multitude and
perhaps the potential global multitude to persevere from or to persevere towards? The first part
of the question has been answered in the preceding pages: persevere through low expectations,
the grey, nastiness, weird symbiotic relationships, false freedom, and estranged life. The second
and most important part of the question is somewhat more complicated, but its answer has also
been disclosed in the preceding pages: in our alienated states, persevere together towards
ourselves as true individuals. To be more precise, congregate.
“Congregation,” in both its nominal and verbal forms, is an interesting concept which is
similar to such concepts as “community” and “communion.” However, it retains an aspect that
those concepts have arguably lost. Integral to any community or communion is the individual.
As they stand today, though, “community” and “communion” have been practically emptied of
this truth and, therefore, their practicality. “Community” implies a homogeneous, alienated
state. As such, it is narcissistic and segregationist. This is perhaps why “community” is such a
popular common-sense idea in the context of late capital. On the terrain of late capital,
communities are really just active or potential markets that will increase capital’s profit margins
by diversifying patterns of consumption. Perhaps because of its association with and centrality
to established Christian institutions, “communion” implies assimilation: i.e. one is permitted to
be absorbed into an elect group. Like “community,” “communion” falls in step with capitalism’s
process of political neutralization through particularization. Alternatively, “congregation” still
strongly implies a historical-material process involving the convergence and active collaboration
of multiple individuals. “Congregation” connotes a process that does not abide by a predisposed
set of affiliations. To congregate is to first emerge as an individual, come together with other
individuals, lay bare one’s individual materials and energies, collectively work with all presented
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materials and energies, generate alternatives as a result, and thus enable further emergence.
Institutional, economic, or societal acceptance is not what brings legitimacy to congregation;
instead, congregation itself brings about its own legitimacy because the individual and the
congregation realize themselves in the other.
Congregation is not, however, a matter of casting off differences and entering into a
blissful embrace with fellow latter-day Fenians, caterans, reivers, or Celtic Christian monks.
Congregation is not a matter of coming together despite differences. Throughout his “medieval”
Scottish prehistory, Welsh makes clear the self-destructive implications of not openly
confronting and working through differences: denial, neglect, violence, uncritical groupthinking, and death. These are what dominate Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno. Congregation is,
instead, a process of individuals bringing differences together, each individual seeing others’
differences as his or her own, cooperatively working through those differences, and thus
producing the opening for further congregation.
Despite overwhelming nastiness, Welsh is like Spud: he cannot let go of hope. To keep
this hope alive for his characters and his readers, Welsh concludes each of the trainspotting
books with instances of congregation. Thus, he demonstrates that congregation is here in
waiting, but individuals have to bring it about. As Renton is en route to Amsterdam, he glimpses
the congregation he is leaving behind through the guilt he feels for betraying his friends
(Trainspotting 342-44). In the page before the three-page coda of Glue, Juice Terry, Billy, and
Carl walk together across a park, “three men, three middle-aged men. One looked a bit plump,
the other muscular and athletic and the final one was skinny and dressed in clothes some might
have considered a bit young for him” (464). Welsh also implies that the memories of Gally and
Carl’s father are with them, becoming the spiritual glue that keeps the group together. In Porno,
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three parallel but unexpected convergences occur, their common bond being the psychotic
Francis Begbie, of all people. Renton demonstrates a rare instance of loyalty in attempting to
return Spud’s cat. While Renton is on a payphone asking Spud to meet him for the cat, Renton
observes Begbie crossing the street. Renton knows that Begbie is coming to kill him. As Begbie
crosses the street, he is hit by a car. Without hesitation, Renton runs over to a prostrate Begbie:
I’m over there without consciously knowing what the fuck I’m doing. I’m down
at his side, supporting his head, watching his busy eyes blaze and jive, brimming
with baffled malevolence. I don’t want him like this. I really don’t. I want him
punching me, kicking me. –Franco man, ah’m sorry . . . it’s oot ay order . . . ah’m
sorry, man. . . . I’m greeting. I’m holding Begbie in my arms and I’m greeting.
I’m thinking of all the old times, all the good times and I’m looking into his eyes
and the rancour is leaving them, like a dark curtain being drawn back, to let in a
serene light as his thin lips twist into a wicked smile. . . . He is fucking well
smiling at me. Then he tries to talk, says something like: —Ah eywis liked you,
or maybe I’m just hearing what I want to hear, maybe there’s a qualification.
Then eh starts coughing and a rivulet of blood trickles oot from the side of his
mouth. (Porno 470)
After Renton has conned the conman Sick Boy once more, Sick Boy and Begbie converge while
Begbie is in the hospital. Begbie grabs Sick Boy’s wrist, “his hand is like a vice around it,” and
when Sick Boy looks up, Begbie’s “eyes have opened and those blazing coals of enmity are
staring right into [Sick Boy’s] lacerated, penitent self” (Porno 484). Granted, these instances of
congregation are inconclusive. Even so, congregation does emerge from the terrain of nastiness.

78

These particular instances in the trainspotting books are indicative of hope. That hope, though,
does not come from the ether. It is grounded. It is not a hope based on denial or naiveté or
idealism; it is a good-faith hope built from the very materials that have hitherto denied hope.
Returning to Carl’s statement after his father Duncan’s death, this hope is “just something, some
kind of second chance” that materializes right when “pieces of the circumstances of . . . death”
are coming together (Glue 455, 457). The circumstances of death always originate in life.
Along with Spud and other Welsh characters that we will encounter, Carl realizes that those
circumstances could be redirected toward life. We can look at Welsh’s tales in the three
trainspotting books as documents of those circumstances. Taken alone, Welsh’s tales are
fragments scattered on the terrain of nastiness, like the fragmented details we have about the
Fenians, Scottish monks, caterans, and reivers. As such, they are certainly testaments to
solipsism, cynicism, defeatism, self-destruction, and estrangement—i.e. death. Borrowing
Spud’s words, they are “wee parts ay life going up in smoke.” When taken together as a
congregated whole, however, these tales from yob culture point to something significantly
different. The key to continuing congregation is not the perseverance of an isolated individual
for him- or herself, as Spud discovers, but is the perseverance of multiple individuals for each
other. To persevere in the latter case, though, implies more than just coming together: a deeper
connection is involved. Congregation, therefore, must work in conjunction with some other
virtue, which we will discuss in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Reformation Thread: Covenant of Integration
“. . . for their worm shall not die. . . .”
—Isaiah87
Meanwhile, the people were preparing the reaction against this splendid
parasitism in the form of the Protestant Reformation. . . .
—Antonio Gramsci88

In Porno, Begbie offers this explanation for why he has murdered Chizzie, a convicted
child molester:
But they tell ays thit the Bible says thit God made man in ehs ain image. So ah
take that as meaning thit no tae try tae be like God wid be a fuckin big insult tae
the cunt, that’s the way ah see it. So aye, ah wis playin God whin ah wasted the
nonce cunt. (Porno 409-10)
Begbie directly associates himself with a certain kind of God: a God who, with cold and brutal
rationality, puts things into their rightful, preordained order. Acts of prejudice are their own
justification.
By situating himself this way, Begbie is able to rationalize his own brutal habits and
subsequently to raise them to the level of paternal care because, according to him, he has “made
the fuckin world a better place, cause they fuckin things deserve tae die, that’s the wey thit ah
fuckin well see it. Too right. The polis, if they wir bein honest, wid tell ye the same thing”
(Porno 409). Such care does not extend to appreciating or understanding that child abusers, for
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instance, are themselves typically the former recipients of child abuse, as was Chizzie’s case. To
be caring in the sense described, though, does not mean to sympathize.89
The terms “sympathy” and “sympathize” are often associated with sentimentalism.
Empathy, therefore, has replaced sympathy as the appropriate way to express one’s appreciation
of another’s situation. In other words, one only has to safely imagine what another person is
experiencing, not risk taking on as one’s own what another is going through. One reason for this
shift from “fellow-feeling” to “in-feeling” is arguably to reflect the significant insights of
Modernism and existentialism: that we are alone and incapable of actually knowing anything
outside our individual selves. But the bourgeois pedigree behind this insight is unmistakable.
Solipsism is one side of a coin whose other face is self-sufficiency or “rugged individualism.”
Then moving into the context of postmodern capital, the potential moral consciousness involved
in being an existential “alone-self” has been replaced by consumer-centered marketing.
Loneliness, angst, and anxiety are now privacy and customer satisfaction. Nevertheless, the
change is only a superficial one; indeed, it covers a deep lack of pathos and thus a meaningful,
feeling life. Emptiness is where emotional bonds should be. Juice Terry and Spud refer to this
emptiness as “the grey” and “nastiness” (Glue 456 and Porno 284). This emptiness is not
outside of the individual; it emanates from fragmented individuals. It seems to come from the
outside, but it is perpetuated and expanded by human individuals. In the case of someone like
Begbie, this emptiness is intensified and redirected violently at others. Begbie is an
unsympathetic God.
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Indeed, sympathy would hinder Begbie as he bolsters whatever order it is that he deems
to be good. Accordingly, he can come to this conclusion about murdering Chizzie: “ye could
say thit ah took fuckin pity oan that cunt, cause eh’s jist gaunnae git abused again, n the nick n
that. Best fuckin deal aw roond” (Porno 410). According to such thinking, pity does not
prohibit killing; in fact, pity might actually require it. It is far removed from sympathy. Pitying
people is an act of leveling judgment on them so that the rightful order of the world—strong over
the weak and the elect over the reprobate—is maintained. Justice must be served. Therefore, the
God that Begbie emulates is one that operates according to a strict righteousness, “righteousness”
being the biblical term for “justice.”
The way to maintain such justice is to keep people and their activities within well-defined
boundaries. While often a mystery to everyone else, these boundaries are well-defined to
Begbie. To shore up these boundaries, he enacts either preemptory or reactionary terrorism, in
both physical and psychic practice. In Trainspotting, for instance, he throws a pint glass into a
pub crowd, purposely creating an antagonistic situation to sort out, “like a psychopathic detective
oot ay an Agatha Christie whodunit, cross-examinin every cunt” (80). In Porno, Begbie beats
June, the mother of his first two children, because he wrongfully suspects that she has had sexual
relations with Spud. Begbie does not care for this woman or her children, whom he abandoned
long before. Nor is he particularly jealous of Spud. What Begbie jealously guards is his control
of everyone he encounters. Without any regard for circumstances or facts or feelings, Begbie’s
primary interest lies in reminding people of their place. For this reason, Begbie is a jealous God.
Begbie is also a vengeful God. Begbie is interested in retribution and reprisal for “trivial
grievances,” as Renton calls them (Trainspotting 21). This is best demonstrated in Porno.
Begbie is obsessed with finding Rents and making him physically pay for what Begbie himself
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would have probably done—betray his mates and run off with the money that the Trainspotting
gang made in their nearly twenty-thousand pound drug deal years before. Furthermore, Begbie
blames Renton for any harmful act that he has committed since, including the murder of a man,
hence making Renton’s blood price even higher:
Renton hud been muh mate. Muh best mate. Fae school. And eh’d taken the
fuckin pish. It’s aw been Renton’s fault. Aw this fuckin rage. N it’s nivir
gaunnae stoap until ah kin git that cunt back. It’s his fuckin fault ah goat the
fuckin jail. That Donnelly goat wide, but ah widnae huv done um sae bad if ah
hudnae been fuckin crazy about bein ripped oaf. (Porno 129)
For Begbie, this is also part of justice, making people pay with life and limb for theirs or others’
sins. In Gaelic, a word for this is díoltas. The Norse and early Anglo-Saxons had a term,
wergild or “man-price.” In Anglo-Scottish Border Law, it was called “cold trod,” to chase down
a robber long after the robbery has occurred. In today’s ironically less subtle terms, it is called
“getting even.” Regardless of the name, this is a powerful form of bad sense.
How in the world does Begbie get to this point? His theological position is the exception,
not the rule, right? He has got Christianity totally wrong, does he not? Is he not just using God
as an excuse? We will hold the first question for later and now address the other interrelated
questions.
Historically, Begbie’s theology is in tune with major swaths of official Christian doctrine,
which have been handed down to us from at least Saint Augustine of Hippo’s day. When we
consider Begbie in the context of Scottish Christianity, he is a well known type of Christian, a
severe and self-righteous Calvinist.90 The ground from which such Christianity comes is a large
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and rich one, owing much to some of the more stringent strands of the Old and New Testaments:
e.g. Leviticus, Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Proverbs, Matthew, and Revelations. Perhaps most
important, though, are three verses of one chapter in Saint Paul the Apostle’s Letter to the
Romans:
We know that in everything God works for good with those who love him, who
are called according to his purpose. For those whom he foreknew he also
predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son, in order that he might be the
first-born among many brethren. And those whom he predestined he also called;
and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also
glorified.91
If one is looking for the most succinct biblical rationale behind the doctrine of predestination in
the Reformed and Presbyterian branches of Christianity, this is it. But austere Calvinist
theologians, pastors, and elders in France, Switzerland, Holland, and Scotland were by no means
the first to fixate on this and similar other passages in the Bible.
In Book 5 of Saint Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430) monumental theological
systemization of Christianity, The City of God, the quoted section of Paul’s letter to the Romans
haunts practically every page.92 Indeed, this fifth book is part of what could arguably be called
Augustine’s Ten Books to the Romans. In it, Augustine counters the secular and pagan elements
of the Roman Empire by arguing that the Christian God—not Greek or Roman gods,
philosophers, or poets—informed and empowered Rome’s pre-Christian history. From the very
beginning, then, Augustine’s project demonstrates predestinarian logic. In equally important
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political terms, Augustine ensures that any great human achievement, such as the successes of
empires, is not human in origin but is preordained by God.
Practically in the middle of Augustine’s ten-book groundwork for revealing the City of
God, Paul’s verses make a somewhat veiled but incontrovertible cameo appearance:
In [God’s] supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created
spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some,
not granting it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the
bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being
contrary to nature, which is from Him. . . . For one who is not prescient of all
future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as
God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power
they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do,
they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew
that they would have the power to do it, and would do it.93
By way of an argument with none other than Cicero about fate and free will, Augustine’s
interpretation of Paul goes something like this: God is pure good from which all other good
comes. The difference between God’s goodness and mortal goodness is that God’s is untainted
by creation, which he himself made, whereas mortals are tainted by creation. Humans are
formed by God, which means that they are good, but they are less than good because they were
formed. So, humans must conform their goodness as much as possible to pure goodness, as it is
embodied in God, even though mortals cannot fathom God’s goodness. Those who are evil were
never of God, so they never will be of God. Those who are good—whose conformity to God’s
goodness is solid—are justified and are consequently guaranteed to enter into God’s pure
93
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goodness. This homecoming to the City of God will occur during the Last Judgment of
Armageddon, according to Augustine.94
As authoritative as all of this may sound, it represents a strand of theology that is
negligible in the four Gospels and is inconsistently present in Paul’s letters; nevertheless, it is a
strong thread running throughout much of the Old Testament. Perhaps this predestinarian aspect
of Augustine’s theology owes more to Paul’s background as a Pharisee than to the gospel
message at the center of his letters. The Pharisees were Old Testament literalists, religious
fundamentalists, and theocrats. Including Paul (nee Saul) before his conversion to Christianity,
they also happened to be the most troubled by the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth; consequently,
they caused him, his disciples, and the majority of their Jewish contemporaries the most trouble.
Indeed, one of Jesus’ and then Paul’s most annoying habits, according to the Pharisees, was to
violate the Old Testament by arguing for the inclusion of all people in the promise of
unconditional love and everlasting life.
What might be surprising is that the theological father of the Roman Church, in many
ways second only to Saint Peter as a patriarch, is far from refuted by the father of the Reformed
Church, John Calvin (1509-64). In his massive theological systemization of Protestant
Christianity, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin first signals his agreement with
Augustine by reasserting that the “secrets” of God’s will, “which he has seen it meet to manifest,
are revealed in his word—revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and
welfare”; then quoting Augustine, “‘We have come into the way of faith . . . let us constantly
adhere to it. . . . [I]f the last day shall find us making progress, we shall there learn what here we
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could not.’”95 Not to be outdone by Augustine, Calvin asserts that predestination is not merely a
reflection of God’s will but is a manifestation of his pleasure and mercy:
We say, then, that Scripture clearly proves this much, that God by his eternal and
immutable counsel determined once and for all those whom it was his pleasure
one day to admit to salvation, and those whom, on the other hand, it was his
pleasure to doom to destruction. We maintain that this counsel, as regards the
elect, is founded on his free mercy, without any respect to human worth, while
those whom he dooms to destruction are excluded from access to life by a just and
blameless, but at the same time incomprehensible judgment.96
Calvin’s God takes pleasure in condemning people to eternal damnation without any indication
of why. In this way, the doctrine of predestination reflects a sadistic God, Begbie’s God.
Nevertheless, Calvin’s claim to clear biblical justification of this doctrine begs the question about
this doctrine’s validity. Throughout an extensive, labyrinthine argument for predestination, he
raises Hebrew laws concerning inheritance to declarative statements by God concerning
predestination. He also takes statements from Paul out of context, without qualifying them
according to the unique situations that determined each of Paul’s epistles.97 This is not to
mention that Calvin’s use of the four Gospels in his lengthy argument for predestination is
unusually cavalier for a man who is otherwise extremely rigorous when it comes to interpreting
scripture.
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In Calvin’s theology, as well as Augustine’s, something suspicious is occurring. When
addressing the topic of predestination, two of Christianity’s greatest thinkers employ reasoning
and rhetoric that would make a high school debater blush. In all fairness to Augustine and Paul,
it would be wrong to reduce all of Augustine’s theology to the doctrine of predestination, and
despite the views and actions of many of Calvin’s theological descendants, predestination is not
central to Calvin’s theology.98 Nevertheless, the presence of this doctrine in their major works
and their bold defenses of it cannot be avoided. Moreover, at the time of this writing—when
ideas of religious, sociocultural, ethnic, historical, and economic election are at the base of
almost every conflict on the planet—the doctrine of predestination appears alive and well in
practice.
In effect, if not in intention, Augustine and Calvin underpin the legitimacy of
Christianity’s emergent force with a residual force: the promise of universal love, equality, and
peace is, to use Calvin’s adjective, “gratuitously” reserved for the elect.99 Thus, predestinarians
neutralize Christianity’s emergent force. As much as they might depend on Paul to buttress their
arguments, predestinarians violate the ecumenicalism that dominates Paul’s missions to the
Gentiles, of which his letters are a testament. It is probably unnecessary, therefore, to say that
their doctrine of predestination flies in the face of Jesus’ teaching and acts.100 However
unintentionally, Augustine and Calvin place at the core of Christianity anything but a clear
doctrine. Instead, backed by disembodied scriptural passages and tautological arguments, they
introduce a black hole of contradiction into a revolutionary spirituality of reconciliation. The
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implication of this move is not the glorification of God but the alienation and accumulation of
power from humans.
The effects of predestination’s ascendancy, not only as a theological doctrine but also as
a sociocultural one, are starkly evident in Scotland’s history. Using presbyterian structures,101
which contrasted with the bishop-centered model that had dominated much of Europe before the
Reformation, the Calvinist theologians who came to dominate the Scottish Church (Kirk)—such
as John Knox, Samuel Rutherford, James Durham, James Fraser of Brea, John Brown of
Haddington, and Andrew Melville, among others—recognized that formerly secular social
institutions would be indispensable vehicles for gaining control of practically all aspects of the
Scots’ lives.102 Education, which had always been a cornerstone of Scottish sociocultural life,
became a means of indoctrination. Most often in their parish sessions, presbytery meetings, and
sometimes at the General Assembly, Scottish Presbyterians employed juridical power as a form
of figurative and sometimes literal witch hunts. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
what various Kirk leaders and sects did with their newly gained secular authority virtually
perfected the bad habits of Anglo-Saxon, Gaelic, and Catholic royals: nepotism, narrowmindedness, self-service, domination, and gratuitous persecution.103 Morality as a theological
concern turned into a political and juridical obsession; the Protestant Kirk became a vehicle of
religious and secular repression. Morality became the rationale and acid test for almost all
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human activity between the late-sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. 104 Therefore, what Martin
Luther’s and John Calvin’s protests and reforms challenged in the Holy Roman Empire is exactly
what a radical Scottish version of Calvinism, which we will call ultra-Calvinism, gave to a
predetermined syndicate of God’s chosen. 105
Returning to Trainspotting, when Begbie intentionally throws a pint glass in a crowded
pub so that he may interrogate, persecute, and terrify just about everyone, he demonstrates the
premeditated negative judgment that Augustine and Calvin theorized, and that early-modern
Scottish Presbyterians enacted through psychological and physical violence. He demonstrates
his superior goodness by creating a test, by then implicating everyone else in guilt over the
incident, and by finally putting himself into the position of judge, “examinin every cunt.”106
Victims of Begbie’s violence become enactors of his violent will, proliferating victimization that
cannot be traced back to its origin, and if it were traced back, Begbie would feel obliged to
unleash inordinate wrath on any who questioned him. Begbie becomes a latter-day version of an
early-modern protestant judge at a heresy trial, representing the gratuitous will and pleasure of a
jealous, vengeful God.
Today, most of Scotland’s Christians are practicing or lapsed Catholics, which reflects
the huge part that recent immigrants from Ireland have played in Scotland’s recent history;
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nevertheless, Scotland is still socially, culturally, and politically Presbyterian.107 More than
William Wallis and Robert the Bruce, more than the Stewarts and Jacobites, and more than
David Hume and Adam Smith, Scottish Calvinism has had the greatest overall impact on all
aspects of Scottish life. Just from what has been presented in this background, one can catch
glimpses of how powerful certain aspects of Calvinism can be. In the context of Scotland,
preordained superiority, justified subordination of the reprobate, gratuitous judgment, and the
like are not exactly a blessing. As the previous chapter and the above account of Begbie
illustrate, these aspects can easily be blamed for the subordination that many Scots and Scotland
as a whole have experienced. On the scales of preordained judgment, Scotland does not
historically seem to be in the ultra-Calvinist God’s favor—being apparently a nation of the
reprobate rather than of the elect. Moreover, the draconian aspects of Calvinism obscure much
of what was good about the Reformation in general and the Scottish Reformation in particular.
Once again, bad sense obscures good sense; thus, with sometimes disastrous results, Scotland’s
emergent materials and energies have gone relatively untapped and unused.
How did things get to this point? The question we posed above but held off on
answering—How does Begbie get to this point?—is one we will redirect and expand before
answering. Let us pose the question this way: Why is Begbie where he is, and by extension,
why are we where we are?
In these questions, the place implied by the words “point” and “where” is the same terrain
of nastiness discussed in chapter 2: the situation of subordinates under the empire of late capital.
Within that terrain of nastiness, ultra-Calvinism is a significant factor. It has left the domain of
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theology and has entered into the domain of late capital.108 Indeed, it has been appropriated by
it. Most humans in the world are, to some degree, under the nebulous sovereignty of ultraCalvinistic late capitalism, and the implications of living in its empire are more than just
theoretical. 109 When we look to Scotland, therefore, we are not treating Scotland as an isolated
case; instead, Scotland is a window through which to observe global processes and, thus, to
explore the challenges confronting the potential global multitude. In chapter 2, Welsh opened
that window for us in Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno.
In the questions posed above, the terms “point” and “where” also indicate a state of
being. In Welsh’s writing, we are encouraged to confront why, say, a Renton, a Spud, or a
Begbie acts the way he does. The reason cannot be—and is not—as simple as this: each of them
is a congenital failure. To claim such would be rather prejudicial and negligent. We know that
they represent sociocultural outcasts that have proliferated through the long process of the
multitude’s or common humans’ alienation from power and autonomy. Consequently, humans
have become destructive toward themselves and each other, despite themselves. In the previous
chapter, which connected the postmodern present to its medieval materials and energies, we
explored how the disintegration of social networks has contributed to the self-destructiveness of
marginalized groups. As we did so, we only touched on some of the effects that the
fragmentation of society into isolated individuals has on those individuals. Here, we will
intensify that line of inquiry, but instead of making connections to the medieval, we will connect
our present concerns to Reformation materials and energies.
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The virtue we have already arrived at is congregation. Even so, the individual, or lack
thereof, is today the greatest stumbling block for congregation. In the age of late capital, the
disintegration of the individual into incoherent sets of egocentrisms, empty moral truisms,
prejudices, and dysfunctions is nearly, if not totally, complete. As the trainspotters and
hooligans we have already encountered illustrate, human individuals have been fragmented by
trivia, petty grievances, and escapist consumption patterns. Such a situation does not allow for
sympathy; thus, individuals are hollow, eliding their lack of pathos (feeling) with self-consuming
habits. To use Sick Boy’s words from the closing lines of Porno, all individuals are “lacerated”
and perhaps “penitent” selves (484). To be lacerated and penitent indicates that one is in a state
of fragmentation and lack. In effect, all individuals are wee Scotlands—subordinate in their
dispossessed-ness and self-destructiveness. In order for congregation as a virtue to persevere
after it emerges as a key element of an alternative world, another virtue must therefore be in
play: integration.
With Welsh’s third novel, Filth, and his short story, “The Granton Star Cause,” we will
first look at how antisocial and destructive an individual can become in the empire of late
capitalism; then, we will “tease oot” the virtue of integration from emergent materials and
energies in Scotland’s Reformation fabric. In Filth, Welsh provides a historical-material and
psychological case study of Detective Sergeant Bruce Robertson, perhaps the vilest, most ultraCalvinist character in Welsh’s whole body of work. 110 In our reading of Filth, we will uncover
1) how the situation of late capital informed by ultra-Calvinism makes way for an individual’s
internal disintegration and 2) the disastrous results of that disintegration. Our study of “Granton
Star,” a postmodern and Calvinist morality play that features the clueless amateur soccer player
Boab Coyle and God, will consider 1) Welsh’s rereading of Calvinism, and 2) his judgment
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concerning the complicity of human individuals in their disintegration and their power to bring
about something else. 111 What will surface during our exploration of both texts is the recognition
of a major hindrance to human integration: the corruption of pathos and its disconnection from
both mythos and logos. As I noted in the Introduction, pathos is incarnated sensory knowledge.
This kind of knowledge embodies and sensually informs the other two, thus enabling them to
have meaningful, practical existence. Moreover, it is the bridge which connects mythos and
logos to each other and across which experiential, sensorial data travels to them. Pathos is also
the connective tissue of bodies politic—the permeable membrane through which mythos and
logos can pass to and from the world and through which humans can connect to other humans.
With all of this brought to the surface, we will ultimately use Francis Hutcheson’s postReformation reformation of Scottish Calvinism to articulate the virtue toward which Welsh’s two
stories point: integration.
3.1 First Reformation Strand: The Worm That Shall Not Die
“Same rules apply.” This is the mantra of Bruce Robertson, perhaps the most loathsome
character to appear in Irvine Welsh’s fiction. In his third novel, Filth, Welsh delivers us into the
banal, bigoted, and perverse world of Detective Sergeant Bruce Robertson. Barring a few key
exceptions, the reader perceives everything through Robertson’s internal monologue, which is
more like a catalogue of a psychopathic and burnt-out police officer’s mundane daily activities,
delusions, and half-baked opinions. One striking consequence of this novel, however, is that it
intentionally fails to give the reader what he or she would presume to find in it. The novel
initially presents itself as a standard twentieth-century whodunit, in which one will find out who
murdered the journalist-son of a dignitary from Ghana. But even when this mystery is
technically solved, the actual mystery is far from being solved because it is located elsewhere.
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For starters, the case of Efan Wurie’s brutal death is the case Robertson is trying to solve, if
Robertson can be believed. And he cannot be believed. Robertson already knows who murdered
Wurie. As he finally discloses in the last pages of the novel, he did. In fact, dressed as his wife
Carole, Robertson has killed Wurie in a jealous rage because Carole had slept with a black man.
So, with that wild goose chase out of the way, what is it that we are supposed to be after?
What crime is Robertson circumscribing with his self-deceptive charade before he kills another
person, a schemie named Lexo, and before he ultimately hangs himself? Welsh forces the reader
to be the unfortunate sleuth in this whodunit, to chart out the circumstances and the motives for
Robertson’s actions. All clues point to a crime much deeper and complex than the one suggested
in the early pages of the novel. This crime is one which has drawn in quite a few victims, not
just Wurie and Robertson. The scope of Filth’s mystery, therefore, takes us well beyond the pale
of typical mystery novels.
Narrative theorists have for around half a century made narrator intent or reliability the
standard fare of undergraduate literature students’ term papers. So, is Robertson an unreliable
narrator? The question implies its obvious answer. The problem or point of the book apparently
rests on the credibility of the detective who seems more concerned about his promotion to an
inspectorship and about his various sadistic sexual and criminal adventures during business hours
than he is about the murder case he heads. As we will come to find, his whole world and his
power over it depends on keeping a vast assemblage of mysteries in play—like the
“smokescreen” to which Carl Ewart refers in Glue (463).
Granted, most detective mysteries are at least as focused on their protagonists as they are
on the cases at hand. Often, the way a case pans out frequently gives the reader insight into the
hero, the sleuth. So, is Robertson a psychological case study? Again, the question implies its
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obvious answer. The generally accepted founder of mystery writing, Edgar Allan Poe,
masterfully exploited such a strategy. The psychology of the mystery-solver is the key to
understanding so many of his stories. In this vein, are not the eccentricities of Oedipus, Sherlock
Holmes, and Hercule Poirot what often draw people to Sophocles’, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s,
and Agatha Christie’s mystery classics? (Peter Sellers made quite a career out of spoofing sleuth
mystique in the Pink Panther movies.) Therefore, saying that Robertson’s internal conflicts are
important is not radical at all when considering the mystery genre.
What is literarily unique about Welsh’s psychological narrative approach has to do with
the split in the narration between D. S. Robertson’s conscious voice and the voice of the others
that live in the deeper strata of his being. Even though one might complain about the overdetermined psychological aspect of Filth, Welsh does not make Robertson’s mind an easy one to
figure out. Unlike the trainspotting books, this book is claustrophobic in the sense that, for the
majority of the narrative, it traps the reader in one part of one narrator’s mind. And because
Robertson only permits the reader to have access to what is the most superficial layer of his life,
he becomes an increasingly disturbing mystery as the story progresses. Robertson is effectively
a purloined letter, to borrow from Lacan’s analysis of Poe’s famous story “The Purloined
Letter.”112 Determining the psychological state of the main character is still a mystery even after
the last page because there is such a disjointed relationship between D. S. Robertson and the
other voices or personalities Bruce Robertson contains—including his estranged wife and a
tapeworm. For these reasons and perhaps others, Filth and a few other texts by Welsh sit
comfortably alongside Samuel Beckett’s How It Is and The Unnamable.
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Moreover, the mystery at the core of Filth also bears a strong affiliation with the doctrine
of predestination. Like Begbie, Robertson’s dominant surface persona adopts the role of an
ultra-Calvinist God. In Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, God is an elusive and arbitrary force.
God’s treatment of the damned (the reprobate) of the world, as compared to the chosen (the
elect), is what both punctuates his indecipherability and bolsters his power: “those whom he
dooms to destruction are excluded from access to life by a just and blameless, but at the same
time incomprehensible judgment.” Even so, the question cannot help but emerge: Why does a
supposedly omnipotent God need to bolster his power by judging what he himself foreknew and
created from his own perfect being?
It is easy to forget that this is a question that stems from a highly suspect Christian
doctrine that moves to abstract God from human life while at the same time ascribing to God
what are undoubtedly human desires for supreme power. Indeed, it is a doctrine that not only
violates the spirit of the New Testament but also violates two interrelated commandments of the
Decalogue handed to Moses on Mount Sinai: the prohibition of graven images and the
prohibition of bearing false witness. 113 As Calvin introduces his argument for predestination, he
indicates that he is treading on very dangerous ground, “penetrating into the recesses of the
divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently instead of satisfying his
curiosity will enter into an inextricable labyrinth.”114 But Calvin cannot help himself, despite
warning everyone else to not enter this labyrinth. This betrays a high level of presumption on
Calvin’s part: that he is not only one of the elect but that he is also an elite member of the
elect.115 As noted earlier, he enters what is effectively a labyrinth of his own making, and he
makes it even more complicated. Like the arrogant artisan Dædalus, he creates a mysterious
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structure from which he himself cannot escape. Calvin tries to organize the mind of God, which
he himself says cannot be fathomed. This is Calvin’s graven image. Then, based on a confusing
examination of others’ preordained degrees of belief, Calvin presumes to know who God has
chosen to be the elect and the reprobate.116 As a consequence of flouting the second
commandment, Calvin cannot help but to violate the ninth, bearing false witness against his
fellow mortals. When it comes to the doctrine of predestination, therefore, Calvin’s
systematization of the Christian religion becomes a mystification of it. Instead of helping
humans understand God, he has compounded the mystery; thus, he has further alienated the very
God he elsewhere tries to bring closer to humans. Not only that. He attributes to God a
pathological “secret pleasure” in his arbitrary treatment of the reprobate.117 By aligning himself
with such a God, Calvin betrays his own pleasure, which we might call Schadenfreude. What
Calvin offers us, then, is not as much a doctrine as it is a document of his own pathology. It
should come as no surprise that, in the context of Welsh’s Scotland, the pathology of this
labyrinthine version of God is also the pathology of someone like Robertson.
As Calvin unintentionally demonstrates, to take on the psychology of God is to actually
take on one’s own psychology. By no means is doing psychological analysis in itself a bad thing
to do. Sometimes, though, such analysis might be a distraction or, even worse, an obfuscation of
a deeper problem. In the case of Filth, it is putting the cart before the horse. The novel’s
primary narrative voice and its literary implications are greatly intriguing. Moreover, its
psychological insights can be greatly unsettling, as we will surely find. Yet taken alone, the
psychological terrain is a symptom of a deeper social terrain. Getting to the latter through the
former is the ethical purpose behind Welsh’s foray into mystery. To say so does not mean that
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psychology is off limits—far from it. But psychology cannot be alienated from historicalmaterial terrain when confronted with someone like Robertson. Calvin’s predestinarianism
demonstrates the disastrous, antihuman implications of such alienation. Therefore, to better
understand the evidence of the crime at hand, we as sleuths will have to analyze the scene of the
crime. Returning to terminology introduced in the previous chapters, we will need to assess the
historical-material situation—the fabric, terrain, ground—that gives rise to the psychological
state and sadistic actions of the perplexing Robertson, who guards his mysteriousness like ultraCalvinism’s God.
The crime scene, per se, is presented to us by Robertson’s tapeworm. All indications are
that Robertson is actually infested by first two tapeworms and then, after passing one of them,
only a single tapeworm. The one which remains is sentient. Whether or not there is actually a
remarkably cognizant parasite inside Robertson is beside the point. The tapeworm is more
important as a figure. Like a genealogy, it is a collection of epistemic segments stacked on one
another, and each segment informs the whole genealogical body. Even after Robertson has
managed to evacuate one tapeworm from his bowels, the remaining sentient tapeworm cannot
even consider abandoning Robertson. “How can I forgive you?” asks the tapeworm, and then
answering itself, “But forgive you I must. I know your story” (Filth 260). The tapeworm knows
Bruce Robertson’s story—his life—because it has ingested his story. Therefore, Robertson’s
story has become the tapeworm’s history, genealogy, biography, and life. Robertson and the
tapeworm are literally and figuratively, mentally and physically inseparable.
As the novel progresses, the tapeworm discloses more details about why Robertson hates
himself and everyone else, about why he is a misogynist, homophobe, racist, classist, sexual
predator, and murderer. He was born out of rape, abused by his stepfather, abused by middle-
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class teachers, accidentally caused his brother’s death, witnessed the horrible death of his high
school girlfriend, witnessed the mutilation of crime victims, lives as a repressed bisexual, and
has apparently been accused by his daughter of sexual abuse. Like segments shed by a
tapeworm, the details come in disjointed fragments, and the reader, along with Robertson, is
responsible for putting together the pieces. Consistent in method, Welsh again encourages us to
weave a map in order to first figure out a situation and then to seek for that alternative
“something” in an otherwise bleak situation.
Some fragments that will help us to reconstruct the historical-material ground of
Robertson’s situation are related to a series of major twentieth-century labor movements. After
his demoralizing school years and stints in hard labor in coal mines, Robertson joined the
Edinburgh police force in the mid-1980s. He entered law enforcement not because he was
devoted to the law. He entered law enforcement for power, the source of laws. As the tapeworm
explains, “Power was everything. . . . It wasn’t for an end, to achieve anything, to better one’s
fellow man, it was there to keep and to enjoy” (Filth 261). Marxists know this power as the
accumulation of capital. Robertson’s first real taste of this power came when he violently broke
the resistance of striking Scottish coal miners, such as his stepfather, as a rookie policeman
during the 1984-85 British labor strikes (Filth 160, 261).
When compared to labor strikes that took place in the early 1970s, the treatment of
striking miners in 1984-85 demonstrated a significant change in policing procedures under the
Tory regime of Margaret Thatcher.118 Strikers saw increased police numbers and increased
police aggressiveness.119 For every miner on strike, there might be two or more police officers.
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Not only mines, but whole mining villages would be cordoned off and patrolled. As strikers
would proceed to their picketing sites, they would be confronted and provoked. In the case of
large pickets, more officers would be called in as picketers were arriving, and these “officers
would then pile out of the vans with a military-style surgency and march in paramilitary fashion
to the existing police lines, thereby enhancing the atmosphere of conflict.”120 In addition to
blatant intimidation, outright violence was by no means the exception; it was the rule. Beatings
and torture were par for the course.
When Robertson boasts—“what I still love, and always fucking well will, is that good
old-fashioned two-on-one with a scumbag in the interview room” (Filth 160)—he is thinking
nostalgically back to his earliest days as strike-busting police corporal during Thatcher’s militant
anti-labor heyday. It makes him bristle “with excitement and satisfaction. It’s that front-line
feeling; that rush when you’re at a picket-line . . . and you’ve got your truncheon and shield and
the whole force of the state is behind you and you’re hyped up to beat insolent spastic scum who
question things with their big mouths and nasty manners into the suffering pulp they so richly
deserve to become” (Filth 160). He feels confident of his position as one of the sociocultural
elect because his treatment of the “suffering pulp” of the reprobate is authorized by the
government.
Indeed, Robertson is the personification of the late-twentieth-century British
government’s attitudes and social policies. At the foundation of Thatcher’s and Tony Blair’s, as
well as most capitalists’, antipathy toward low-skilled, unskilled, and surplus workers is the fear
that those workers will realize that they are the majority and the foundation of society. They
might entertain the idea that they are not the reprobate after all. To keep the potential multitude
in line, the leaders in such a situation do not personally enforce “the games,” as Robertson calls
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life under the empire of late capital. They enlist the literal and figurative children of workers
who have entered middle-class professions like law enforcement and corporate middle
management. These middling people are the most powerful sentinels of capitalist imperialism.121
They are the best at keeping under wraps the emergent materials and energies of subordinated
people because they intimately know those people, their sociocultural life, and their weaknesses.
They are the best at keeping the potential multitude on the margins of power. “Zero tolerance of
crime in the city centre,” thinks Robertson, “total laissez-faire in the schemie hinterlands. That’s
the way forward for policing in the twenty-first century. Tony Blair’s got the right idea: get
those jakey beggars out of the city centres. Dispossessed, keep away . . . we don’t want you at
our par-tay” (Filth 273). The role of enforcer subsequently becomes a whole way of life, an allpervasive moral code. “That’s what life is all about,” muses Robertson: the “management” of
each subordinate’s “uncertainty levels. We don’t want this cunt getting too big for his boots,
thinking that he somehow counts” (Filth 195).122
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that Robertson’s Thatcherite-Blairean
perception and treatment of labor is something new, an aberration. Systematic political,
economic, and even military alienation of labor power from those who produce it is part of precapitalist and capitalist civilization’s history; or to use Benjamin’s idiom, it is the barbarism at
the core of any civilization. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels recognized in the nineteenth
century, few situations illustrate this as well as Britain’s. Therefore, we will remain focused on
Britain and, more specifically, on early-twentieth-century Scotland to further build the genealogy
of Robertson’s class consciousness (or lack thereof).
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The nexus and breakdown of the power of Scottish workers occurred in and around
Glasgow during the early 1900s. The Clydeside uprisings (1914-18) are, depending on the
historian, collectively the greatest or most tragic event in Scottish labor history. It was more than
likely both.123 Granted, it gave us the Clydeside Reds and their school-teacher-turned-Marxistrevolutionary leader, John MacLean (1879-1923). Whether the Red Clydeside movement was
more legend than reality misses the point.124 If the Clydeside events were a success, they were
so because they uncovered once and for all the unholy marriage between a presumably
democratic government and capital. If they were a failure, it was for the same reason.
Using the British military and all the muscle of his Liberal premiership, Prime Minister
David Lloyd George (1863-1945) deported labor leaders, imprisoned socialists, shut down the
pro-worker Labour newspaper Forward, and the like. He did so in order to bring workers of all
kinds (e.g. shipbuilders, steel workers, munitions workers) into line with the will of his
government and its business partners.125 Moreover, skilled labor and middle management, such
as engineers and shop stewards, were also significant in delivering what the British industrialmilitary state wanted. They would break the resistance of workers through methods of
intimidation, con-artistry, and disinformation. It was only a matter of time before the striking
workers’ power was absorbed.
When the institutions and representatives that are supposed to be answerable only to the
constituency separate themselves from the constituency and bond themselves to the institutions
and representatives of capital, then the subordination of the constituency and its appropriation are
easy to attain and maintain. Consequently, the constituency’s sociocultural, economic, and
political power is ready to be continually dissolved and absorbed by the capitalist state, for the
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capitalist state. In such an environment, the individual member of the constituency is painfully
aware that he or she does not “somehow count.” The individual knows that he or she is one of
the reprobate.
However, individuals such as Robertson come to think that they somehow count. This is
a well-oiled trick employed not just by ultra-Calvinist-informed capitalism but by any imperial
system.126 To adequately and loyally maintain such a system, the military officer, the office
manager, the shop steward, the small business owner, the church minister, and the professor must
be under the illusion that they are equal shareholders of accumulated power. Nevertheless, with
ultra-Calvinism as a potent ideological tool, capitalism surpasses the efficacy of previous
empires in sustaining this illusion. Again, power is a sign of a more universal kind of election in
such a context: those who have power over others are so because they are the elect, and those
who are subordinate to power are the reprobate and must submit to the elect. In such a
framework, the so-called Protestant work ethic is an effective tool for capitalism, teasing the
delusional non-elect with the chance of becoming elected through playing “the games.” All the
while, these middling people avow unthinking obedience to the “same rules” of discipline: hard
work, strong moral fiber, and stoic persistence that presumably “have to apply in each and every
case” (Filth 12). Accordingly, to keep the Bruce Robertsons of the world (the middle classes) in
such a delusional state, imperial capitalism offers them a drug better than heroin: the gratuitous
domination of the means of production, power over other humans and the pleasure that comes
out of it.
After he has had sex with a prostitute while on holiday in Amsterdam, Robertson
encounters a group of young men and, without provocation, “slyly” connects a punch to one of
the men’s ribs “and he’s winded and bent over double as I push through the crowd, sliding away”
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(Filth 160). This gratuitous act metaphorically indicates how the narcotic of power can work
among those people in the middle classes (and even in the working and lower classes) who
believe themselves to be beneficiaries of capital. Under the influence of such a drug, other
individuals are merely catalysts and receptacles for the immediate gratification of one’s
impulsive desires. They are merely “something to smash” (Filth 160).
But there is a twist deeply hidden in capitalism. As we discovered in chapter 2, the
consumption of a drug becomes a perpetually self-consuming habit because the empowerment
that it offers is fleeting and disconnected. Humans who consume such a drug must, therefore,
enter into an endless spiral of consumption, which thereby consumes them. In other words,
one’s delusions of being the elect of late capital are contingent on one’s perpetual subordination
to late capital. Not only that: it is contingent on continually subordinating others. Mirroring
Calvinist double justification, this is a process of double estrangement—the estrangement of the
self and the estrangement of others.
Robertson’s sister-in-law Shirley asks the detective after they have sex, “why is it you
have to savour everything bad that happens to others” (Filth 253). He offers an ultra-Calvinist
answer: “It stems from a belief that there’s only a finite number of bad things that can happen in
the world at any given time. So if they’re happening to someone else they ain’t happening to me.
In a way, it’s a celebration of joie de vivre” (Filth 253). Robertson sums up the underlying
predestinarian logic of his ultra-Calvinist predecessors and cuts to the heart of what motivates
such logic—self-righteous, self-perpetuating, and unsympathetic gain. His celebration of what
he says is the joy of life, echoed by what Juice Terry calls the “spice of life” in Glue and Porno,
comes at the perpetual expense of others. This surpasses Schadenfreude, for it is more than just
an attitude or secondary emotional gain. It is an existential practice. When it comes to his

105

profession as a policeman, he advances above his colleagues by making “a point of remembering
his associates’ [Achilles’ heels]. Something that crushes their self-image to a pulp. Yes, it’s all
stored for future reference,” when he makes final judgment on the poor, unsuspecting souls
(Filth 20). This ultra-Calvinist capitalist approach to human beings produces the systematic
destruction that Robertson plans and carries out against his one male civilian friend, Clifford
Blades:
The more our friendship has developed, the more the destruction and humiliation
of this sad little creature has grown to obsess me. He needs to be confronted with
what he really is, he has to feel, see and acknowledge his inadequacy as a member
of the human species, then he has to do the honourable thing and renounce that
membership. And I will help him. (Filth 174)
As if this were not enough, he attaches a Thatcherite slogan to his juridical practice, echoing
Nazi rhetoric and the worst bad sense of Calvinism: “The Robertson solution. Real zero
tolerance” (Filth 74). Indeed, through the course of the novel, Robertson collects all of his moral
positions under the principle of “zero tolerance,” which he also calls “in a word, professionalism,
and I’m a total fucking pro. . . . Same rules apply in each and every case” (Filth 75).
Robertson’s tapeworm is suspiciously astute when it comes to understanding how this
process works. “You must accept the language of power as your currency,” explains the worm
to Robertson, “but you must also pay a price. . . . The price is your soul. You came to lose this
soul. You came not to feel. Your life, your circumstances and your job demanded that price”
(Filth 262). As a result of Robertson’s internal deadening, he reproduces what the dominant
system needs to perpetuate itself—inequality, instability, hatred, division—but his labor is
productive insofar as it is destructive, a key point to keep in mind when analyzing capitalism.
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The presumptive elect, like Robertson, are only possible in an unsympathetic world built
on an increasing number of the reprobate. To keep elect status, the wretched status of the nonelect must be maintained through psychological, social, cultural, political, and economic
violence. But the capitalist twist continues to turn: all humans, including the members of the
middle classes who have come to believe that they are running “the games,” are not the elect and
never will be. Only capital is the elect; all humans are merely reprobates who secure capital’s
preeminence. 127 While teasing them with the possibility of election, capital encourages humans
to facilitate their own disconnection from personal power. Thus divided against themselves—
internally and socially—humans are condemned to sustaining the status quo that imprisons
them.128 They are perpetually consumed; this is their gratuitous, merciful reward.
Through our study of this crime scene, we have finally discovered the body at the center
of the crime, and the body we have found is both the victim and perpetrator of a horrible,
ongoing crime.
We noted above that the tapeworm knows Robertson so well because it has accumulated
his life-history, like a genealogy. But as the novel progresses, we find that the tapeworm is not
just some bizarre sort of biographical archive. In the more dramatic sense, the tapeworm has
consumed Robertson’s life—from his birth to his youthful attempts at being a good son and
brother, to his adolescent stint in the coal mines, and finally to his adult work as a police officer.
Robertson’s power—his labor power—as an autonomous human being has been sapped away.
The tapeworm teases Robertson with the possibility of regaining autonomy, giving him enough
hope to continue living despite the emptiness of his life. But as we have seen, Robertson
continues to live—to labor—with little other purpose than to torment others. His labor, though,
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can only come to naught because it is all based on the absence of real autonomy and power. The
tapeworm’s survival depends on Robertson’s efforts to save himself from total oblivion;
however, the tapeworm knows it must also keep Robertson from something it calls the “Self”
(Filth 260).
The tapeworm is, in fact, the figural representation of late capital. So, who better to turn
to than the tapeworm for further elucidation of how capitalism operates on the human individual:
I live in the gut of my Host. I have an elongated tube-like body, eloquently
adapted to the Host’s gut. It’s indeed ironic that I seem to have no alimentary
canal myself, yet live in that of my most generous landlord’s . . . as I continue to
eat, ingest and excrete through my skin. (Filth 139)
The Host is Bruce Robertson. He is not an autonomous subject but is merely a vehicle for
capitalism. Robertson is also a parasite within capitalism, as are all those who live under it. In
this light, Robertson is the real tapeworm of Filth, representing the status of the individual in the
global empire of capital. Hollow inside and barely connected to anything outside of himself, he
is in a perpetual dynamic of consumption and excretion. In the alchemical and paradoxical
process of capitalism, he is consuming and being consumed, all the while growing and decaying.
Robertson, as a representative of the individual in the empire of late capital, has been
transformed into a miniature copy of capitalism.
This figure of an infinitely emptying, infinitely consuming membrane that has the
capability of perpetual growth while in a state of perpetual decay evokes Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari’s characterization of capitalism.129 Capitalism evacuates its center in order to fuel
its insatiable, perpetually growing body. It empties internally to make room for what it

129

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Mark Hurley et
al. (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983) pp. 217-71.

108

consumes externally, all to produce an infinite body. Of course, because it has a body—no
matter how expansive it is—it cannot be infinite; therefore, it cannot stop consuming. It will
consume forever, in a perpetual loop of consumption-expansion-disintegration-consumption.
The fact that the tapeworm, taken as a separate entity, is more credible as a subject than
Robertson brings into sharp relief Robertson’s status as not only radically inhuman but also as
something not even identifiable as a complex living organism. The tapeworm has alienated and
appropriated what could have enabled Robertson to become an autonomous human being.
Consumption in such a situation has become the only legitimate activity, and the system in which
consumption occurs is the only legitimate system. For all practical purposes, this dynamic is
today’s ultra-Calvinist God. What, then, is the individual human’s relationship to such a God?
Through the perpetual process of consuming and being consumed, without attaching to anything
or anyone except to bolster one’s egoistic power, one becomes a disassociated fragment.
Reduced to a mere hollow thing—as both consumer and commodity—autonomous human
subjectivity falls out of view. Therefore, the gratuitously damned reprobate fuel and pave this
God’s kingdom; they enable this God to accumulate his secret pleasure and to jealously enjoy it.
Is the tapeworm the figural second-coming of Calvin’s God? Is the Kingdom of Heaven
really reflected in the earthly empire of capital?
3.2 Second Reformation Strand: An Individual Bigger Than One Individual’s Ego
God answers:
—Jist hud oan a minute, pal. Lit’s git one thing straight. Every fuckin time ah
come doon here, some wide-o pills ays up aboot what ah should n shouldnae be
fuckin daein. Either that or ah huv tae enter intae some philosophical fuckin
discourse wi some wee undergraduate twat aboot the nature ay masel, the extent

109

ay ma omnipotence n aw that shite. Ah’m gittin a wee bit fed up wi aw this selfjustification; it’s no for you cunts tae criticise me. Ah made yous cunts in ma ain
image. Yous git oan wi it; you fuckin well sort it oot. That cunt Nietzsche wis
wide ay the mark whin he sais ah wis deid. Ah’m no deid; ah jist dinnae gie a
fuck. It’s no fir me tae sort every cunt’s problems oot. Nae other cunt gies a fuck
so how should ah? Eh? (Welsh, “Granton Star” 129).
This is the earful that twenty-three-year-old Robert Anthony Coyle, “Boab,” gets from God after
he has been kicked off his third-tier church-league soccer team, asked by his parents to find his
own place to live, dumped by his girlfriend for his archrival on his now former soccer team,
thrown in jail and beaten by the police for defacing a payphone, fired from his job at a moving
company, and punched by a café owner for being short on change. All of this has occurred
within a twenty-four hour period. Then, when he sits down in a pub for a much-needed pint of
lager, God sidles up next to Boab to chastise him. Could it get any worse?
Yes it could, and it does. As punishment for being a “lazy, apathetic, slovenly cunt,”
God transforms Boab into a bluebottle fly: “Yir a piece of slime,” God says to Boab, “An insect.
That’s it! An insect . . . ah’m gaunny make ye look like the dirty, lazy pest thit ye are”
(“Granton Star” 130-31). After becoming a fly, Boab visits his former soccer captain and friend,
Kev, the one who had kicked Boab off the Granton Star football team. Boab is able to
communicate to Kev by first using catsup and later ink, which he traces across walls or paper in
response to Kev’s questions. Because Kev has been so kind, Boab decides not to take revenge
on him. Boab does exact vengeance on his ex-girlfriend Evelyn and her new boyfriend Tambo,
who had replaced him on the Granton Star team. Boab regurgitates cat feces onto their takeout
supper of curry. He gets back at his former boss Rafferty by dropping bits of rat poison on his
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sandwich. Finally, he reaches his parents’ home and finds them involved in femininedomination sex. Their tryst is interrupted by a phone call from Boab’s sister. When his mother
hangs up the phone, she spots a fly on the wall, Boab, and swats it with a newspaper. Then, she
and Boab’s father resume their activities. The next morning, the Coyles find their battered son,
naked behind the family sofa. His massive internal injuries prove fatal.
Based on this summary, we might sympathize with Boab. Nevertheless, Boab has, in
many ways, truly brought all of this on himself. Right? Boab is like some other Welshian
characters that we have encountered: most notably, Renton, Sick Boy, Begbie, and Robertson.
He has gone through life believing that he, as an isolated individual, is the center of the world.
His shock at being asked by his parents to give them some space, at being removed from Granton
Star, at being dumped by Evelyn, at being beaten by the police, at being abused for not having
enough money, at being fired from his job, and at being visited by a God in which he has never
really believed indicates just how disconnected, unsympathetic, and egocentric he is. Heaven
forbid that he ever consider what other people go through everyday. During his whole life, he
has never thought about anyone else or others’ needs. He has assumed that everyone and
everything were put on the earth to serve him. And he has not taken responsibility for his actions
(more often inactions). Like Robertson, he is a parasite. This is not to say that what happens to
Boab is not awful. What happens to Boab is certainly tragic. Welsh’s God’s point is that,
despite the awfulness and tragedy, Boab is responsible—sort of.
So, what exactly is “Granton Star”? And following that, what is its point?
This sixteen-page story may be called many things. It is a farce. The ridiculous plot and
sardonic tone that Welsh employs make this one of his most hilarious stories. It is part
intertextual homage and part parody. Playful all the while, Welsh manages to implicitly or
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explicitly incorporate or allude to some of the so-called classics of Western literature: including
the biblical stories of the Fall of Adam and Eve, Jacob wrestling the angel, Jesus wrestling the
devil, and Jesus casting the demons into swine; Homer’s The Odyssey; the medieval morality
play Everyman; John Milton’s Paradise Lost; Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “Young Goodman
Brown”; Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels; Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment;
Jean-Paul Sartre’s No Exit; and, of course, Franz Kafka’s “The Metamorphosis.” As noted
earlier, the story is also a tragedy, conceptually on par with Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and
Shakespeare’s King Lear.
Of all these literary affiliations, “Granton Star” is in closest league with the medieval
morality play Everyman. In the late-medieval period, morality plays were performed during
religious festivals. Such plays are allegorical renderings of the Christian quest for salvation.
The protagonist confronts the Christian obstacles of sin, temptation, and mortality. Usually, a
darkly humorous trickster figure confronts the protagonist, thereby forcing the suffering
Christian “everyone” to confront his or her moral status. A few factors, though, must be kept in
mind when we address Welsh’s foray into this genre.
Welsh is a postmodern Scot from Calvinist Scotland. Therefore, the materials and
energies he must deal with make his morality play, as it were, a bit different from medieval
morality plays. Unlike Everyman and many other of its contemporaries, “Granton Star” is
informed more by Calvinist doctrine than by Catholic doctrine. As such, the story begins from
failure and continues to fail. If predestination is Calvinism’s only legacy, then a moral allegory
is completely moot. There can be no quest toward salvation because everything has already been
decided. Moreover, as Welsh ironically hints, this is a morality play written after Nietzsche,
after the presumed death of God. Again, moral allegory is moot. It is also written within the
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postmodern situation. In this situation, God has been either appropriated or replaced by
capitalism, faith in God is either non-existent or reductive, and religion is either passed off as a
commodity or as a passé superstition. It might be surprising, therefore, that Welsh of all writers
would employ this genre and unearth the concerns that such a genre entails. Despite his
reputation as an iconoclastic rebel of the so-called chemical generation, Welsh is very concerned
about morality, and this includes the interrelation of Christianity and society.130 Moreover, he is
not one to accept the common sense of the status quo as the whole truth. In the case of “Granton
Star,” he accordingly takes on the postmodern situation’s common sense by making it confront
itself; he does so through an old, seemingly passé genre.
As “Granton Star” suggests, the conflict between the morality of late capital and the
morality of John Calvin and John Knox (c. 1505?-72) has reached critical mass. God has had
enough, and Boab, as our representative, pushes the envelope too far. Hence, there is still a story
to be told, a moral to “tease oot,” as Spud might say. Something has to give. A transformation
must occur if human beings and God are to mean anything. Well, every good moral allegory
contains a transformation, and Welsh honors this fact. Outside of Boab’s obvious physical
transformation, a major transformation in this morality play is Calvinism’s. To bring about this
transformation, Welsh opens a situation in which the bad sense of Calvinism confronts the good
sense of Calvinism. Welsh’s story is about the sins, temptations, and dramatic death of one kind
of Calvinism, ultra-Calvinism.
So far, we have discussed Calvinism according to the doctrine of predestination,
undoubtedly Calvinism’s bad sense. According to such a view, God is arbitrary, gratuitous,
jealous, and vengeful. There is plenty in the Bible, in both the Old and New Testaments, which
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attests to such a God.131 There is also plenty in the Bible to challenge such a God.132 For a
dialectical mind like Welsh’s, such a contradictory situation is not a seal of hopeless
impassibility; instead, it is the site from which hope can emerge.133
As discussed earlier, Augustine, Calvin, and ultra-Calvinists placed a contradiction at the
core of Christianity with the doctrine of predestination. Over time, one side of the contradiction,
predestinarianism, became hegemonic, subordinating the supposed unconditional love of God as
a result. But the conflict still exists. It exists between Paul’s interpretations of Jesus and Jesus’
teachings and practices.134 Indeed, it exists in the passage from Romans quoted above. Most
important for us as we deal with the Scottish situation, this contradiction is at the core of
Calvinism itself. For example, in an argument for preordained justification, Knox begrudgingly
admits, “but yet we must suffer God to work in us.”135 In this admission, he is indicating that
even though God has preordained everything, human beings must still be engaged in the matters
of this world. The Reformers themselves knew that there was a significant gap in the doctrine of
predestinarianism.
This should lead us to wonder how loyal Calvinists were and are to this doctrine. To gain
some perspective, we do not have to look farther than Calvin himself. Even though Calvinism
and predestination have practically become synonymous (thanks primarily to Calvinists
themselves), predestination was at best a peripheral concern in Calvin’s theology. Despite what
was actually Calvin’s anger-driven attempt to lock his Roman Catholic persecutors out of God’s
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good favor, the Covenant of Grace is what Calvin intended to be the heart of his theology, and it
is, therefore, the ultimate concern of Calvin’s Institutes.136
Before the Reformation, the Covenant of Works was privileged in practice, if not in
thought. Everyman is a prime literary illustration of this covenant: by righting one’s sinful ways
through good deeds, one can reconcile with God. The Covenant of Works is basically the
covenant of the Old Testament, which asserts that by humans offering up their labor to God, the
human relationship with God can be secured. This explains the importance of offerings,
sacrifices, a plethora of laws, and the specialization of church vocations in Jewish and Christian
antiquity. However, since the time of Adam’s supposed betrayal of God, and since the
subsequent eviction of humans from paradise, so-called good works and a growing mountain of
imperatives, prohibitions, and priests had never really worked that well. This covenant had the
opposite of its intended effect: humans and God had become increasingly estranged from each
other; consequently, humans had also become alienated from each other.137
Enter the Covenant of Grace. With the life, teachings, and death of Jesus of Nazareth,
and with the subsequent realization of his Christhood, God washed away all human sin, debt, and
death, according to general Christian theology. Instead of continued sacrifice and the
multiplication of laws, God entered integrally into human life instead of dealing with it
imperially. Ceasing his insistence that humans become more like him, he became human.
Through this integration, reconciliation occurred. “Immanuel,” one of Jesus’ Jewish names,
indicated that God was no longer separate from humans but was with them. By God becoming
vulnerable and personally risking suffering, he forged a real social and material bond with
humans, replacing the abstract bonds of mediatory sacrifice, ecclesiastical representation, and a
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laundry list of laws.138 From the crucifixion onward, it was through this reconciliation that the
grace of God—boundless, unconditional, freely given love—became integral to everyone and
everything. It was this interpretation of scripture that led Luther, Calvin, and other Protestants to
rebel against the Roman Catholic Church.
In Calvinism, the doctrine of grace is obviously important as a theological concern, but
its practical, political implications are perhaps even more so. Regardless of whether one is a
Reformed Protestant or not, the implications of Calvin’s theology have affected everyone.
Exceeding even Calvin himself, Calvinism indirectly asserted through theology and directly
asserted through political practice the sacredness of the equal distribution of power. The
political implications were consequently enormous. Calvinism, despite Calvin’s later
conservative turn,139 effectively established the constituent members of the multitude as the
agents of sovereignty.140 In other words, without the obedience of the common people, the kings
and bishops would be powerless.141 Moreover, by alienating the power from the multitude,
appropriating it, and then profiting from it, the secular and religious lords were challenging the
power of God, for he was represented by the multitude. This emergent strand of Calvinism is a
prime example of liberation theology.
In few countries is the influence of an emergent Calvinism more evident than in Scotland.
The Reformation and Scottish Kirk did in many ways descend into religious zealotry, cronyism,
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and terrorism.142 Indeed, the person many look to as the initial firebrand of ultra-Calvinism is
Knox. Such a perception of Knox is not unfounded.143 However, Knox challenged bad-sense
elements within Calvinism. 144
When Knox was banished to the Continent because of his Reformist activities, he
befriended and studied under such major figures as Calvin himself. Ultimately, however, Knox
became disappointed with Calvin because Calvin’s theology did not adequately materialize in
Calvin’s politics or in his political advice to Knox. The theological liberator counseled Knox to
become more moderate in his political radicalism in Scotland. In Knox’s view, Calvin conceded
the sovereignty of a throne over that of God’s multitude. Partly because of Knox’s more
democratic bent, arguably a consequence of his own subordinate socioeconomic status, he would
not make such a concession. His strained, often incendiary relationships with both Queens
Mary—not to mention his infamous treatise The First Blast of the Trumpet against the
Monstrous Regiment of Women145—demonstrated at their core his insistent conviction that no
person should have power over another.146 Both Calvin and Knox were actually interested in the
right of humans to be free of authorities who abused them, to be the Church instead of under the
Church, and so forth. This meant that humans were empowered to live life in relative autonomy
rather than serve a master—except for Jesus, of course, who was supposedly a servant to his
servants. And it entailed that humans were part of a human family of equals. Unfortunately,
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Calvinist bad sense overwhelmed Calvinist good sense, and made a mockery of what the actual
Protestant Reformation originally stood for.
It is part of Welsh’s objective to overturn—transform—what Calvinism and its God have
become by dredging up Calvinist good sense. As we have uncovered, this good sense is
certainly present in Calvinism, even though it is submerged. Indeed, Welsh’s morality play is
impossible to understand without Calvinist good sense in mind. With it now in mind, we are
prepared to unlock the moral of his deceptively simple story.
Boab Coyle, along with D. S. Robertson and Francis Begbie, is the logical culmination of
Calvinist bad sense. If we extrapolate the doctrine of predestination into the postmodern context,
we arrive at the apathy, lack of sympathy, and antisocial behavior that we have witnessed in a
number of Welsh’s characters. Indeed, like Boab, one does not even have to believe in God to
assume that one is of the elect, and if one is of the reprobate, there is no act that can change that
status. In a strange way, then, the doctrine of predestination brings about a cynical equality by
making human life and human history pointless. The elect and the chosen are both subordinates
to a preordained end, and any free will that exists is really only a means to keep oneself from
being completely bored in the interim. Therefore, there is really no reason to be concerned
about, by, or for anything except assuaging one’s boredom.
Welsh uses this lack of concern as a launching point for making both Boab and the reader
extremely concerned, if not appalled. He suggests that God is not as incomprehensibly rational
and superhuman as the God envisioned by Augustine and Calvin. Welsh’s God cares deeply
about what happens to people. He will become a ragged, self-deprecating barfly in order to talk
some sense into us. He will admit that he has been wrong. Moreover, he will contradict all
preconceived notions that we might have about him. For instance, Welsh’s God plays the Old
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Testament devil, the tester which the biblical God would send to help humans realize something
about themselves. This role is in keeping with the darkly humorous trickster figure of the
morality play genre. Accordingly, God tests Boab in order to have Boab reach a point of
transformation. God also plays the penitent protagonist of the genre. Even though he says that
he cannot punish himself because he is immortal, even though he says that he is tired of “this
repentance shite,” and even though he says that vengeance is his, he does actually punish
himself, and the story demonstrates that vengeance is not totally his (“Granton Star” 130).
Despite all the angry words, God tries to give Boab a second chance. At first, it seems
that Boab might make something of his second chance. For one, he forgives Kev. As a fly,
Boab appreciates life more than ever before. He is grateful for any and all kinds of food,
including feces. Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, he becomes fond of the society of all others,
including flies. He learns through observing his parents that other people also have desires and
needs. Nevertheless, Boab’s internal transformation does not match up to his external one. He
squanders his second chance. Boab primarily uses his new powers to become the jealous,
vengeful, and gratuitous God of ultra-Calvinism. In effect, he punishes the God that he had met
in the pub by proving him right. Moreover, it is not God but Boab’s own mother who literally
brings Boab back down to earth.
Earlier, we noted that Boab is responsible—personally responsible—for what has
happened. This is true, but it is true in a paradoxical way. The interesting thing about an
individual’s responsibility is that it is a node of responsibility in a whole web of responsibility.
Personal responsibility, as it is most commonly understood today, is a chimera unleashed by
bourgeois-liberal society. It is egocentric. True personal responsibility is the individual’s
recognition that human life is the shared responsibility of each and every individual. In light of
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this, Boab’s punishment is everyone’s punishment. After witnessing the transformation and
death of a friend he betrayed, Kev takes to drinking heavily, and his performance as a footballer
declines. Evelyn, Tambo, and Rafferty become extremely ill. Moreover, Rafferty becomes
hyper-vigilant because he cannot figure out which employee poisoned him. The Coyles lose
their son. The awfulness and tragedy of the human condition—the nastiness, as Spud calls it—
belongs to each and every individual, God included.
As the God of grace, in contrast to the God of predestination, Welsh’s God is in each and
every human, Boab’s mother included. Welsh cleverly hints at this during Boab’s inquisition of
God:
Boab found God’s whingeing pathetic. —You fuckin toss. If ah hud your
powers . . .
—If you hud ma powers ye’d dae what ye dae right now: sweet fuck all.
(“Granton Star” 129)
For the next page of the story, God offers Boab a litany of things that he could have done in his
life. These most recently include contributing more to his soccer team, being more sensitive to
Evelyn, being a human with needs who recognizes that his parents are humans with needs, and
being able to defend himself against unjust treatment by a café owner and Rafferty. God
concludes this litany by saying, “So ye hud they powers, ye jist couldnae be bothered usin thum.
That’s why ah’m interested in ye Boab. You’re just like me. A lazy, apathetic, slovenly cunt”
(“Granton Star” 130).
Because “Granton Star” is a morality play, we are safe to assume that Boab is everyone;
moreover, when God says that Boab is just like him, he is saying that he and Boab are the same
person. Therefore, when Doreen, Boab’s mother, inadvertently kills her son, she not only brings
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judgment down on everyone but also on God. We might be reminded here of the Nietzschean
mad man’s proclamation that it is we who have killed God.147 But Welsh will not let us off the
hook. Welsh’s God has already indicated that Nietzsche “wis wide ay the mark.” God is not just
in Boab. He is also in all of the other individuals that populate Welsh’s fictional world and that
compose the potential multitude of Scotland and of the whole world. God is everyone, and as
long as there are people around, God’s post mortem cannot be signed.
As the morality play genre’s name makes explicit, there is a moral. Welsh’s morality
play is no exception. Because Welsh tends to work on multiple levels at once, there are multiple
but intertwined morals in “Granton Star.” Without knowing themselves, humans cannot know
God, for God is within each and every one. Grace is not some gift from above, but a bond that
emanates from within human life. Carl implies as much in Glue, when he muses, “The best ye
can do, what is in yir power is tae acquire grace” (279). Lastly, humans choose which kind of
God exists: either 1) an alienating, alienated, arbitrary, jealous, vengeful, and gratuitous God; or
2) an integral, compassionate, just, gracious, and loving God. To again borrow words from
Glue, God is “nae some cunt else” (278).
As our discussion of Filth has uncovered, and as our discussion of “Granton Star” has
indicated, the kind of God with which humans have collectively come to associate themselves is
certainly not a graceful one. This goes a long way toward explaining why Welsh has chosen to
undertake the daunting task of putting on a Reformed morality play within the postmodern
empire of late capital.
3.3 Reformation Virtue: Integration
Welsh is interested in uncovering and then promoting the emergent, practical aspects of
Christianity and Calvinism. Whether or not Welsh is a practicing Calvinist Christian is not
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important. What is important is that he attempts to shake loose a very important thread in
Scotland’s historical-material fabric so that it may contribute to a world based on something
other than dogma, segregation, estrangement, and gratuitous judgment. There must be a world
that is not founded on “zero tolerance,” on the “same rules” applying in each and every case, and
on “the games.” Humans must be more than parasitical, scavenging worms and flies, whose only
connection to each other is their mindless consumption of each other’s power.
One Scottish philosopher, theologian, and pastor during the early years of the eighteenth
century thought so, too. Francis Hutcheson contended with the bad sense of the Reformation
legacy while at the same time keeping a cinder of its good sense alight. He presented an
alternative to the categorical, universally-applied principles that effectively aimed toward
transcending the messiness of human life. He spotted a productive, connecting energy in the
midst of human contradiction and conflict: a “moral sense.” He was arguably able to do so
because his theories carried forward emergent elements of the Reformation and embraced
emergent elements of the Enlightenment that bourgeois ideology and capitalism could not
tolerate: passion, unconditional love, liberation from dogma, distributed power, and the
unconquerable potential of humans. Enabling the emergence of these elements was a sixth
sense, for lack of a better term.
For Hutcheson, a moral sense was incorporated in human individuals. Nevertheless, this
sense was only productive when humans socially connected to each other. Hutcheson, therefore,
was not interested in merely finding “zones of relative freedom to retreat into, those light,
delicate spaces where new things, different, better things can be perceived as possibles” (Filth 3).

122

Hutcheson was concerned with demonstrating that a healthy world was universally probable by
way of the interconnected life of human individuals.148
However, the reader of Filth and “Granton Star” might find it difficult to locate such vital
human material. At best, humans seem to connect for what is “mutually advantageous to baith
parties, likesay,” until they find their “ain place” (“Granton Star” 122). Reflecting the
predestinarian logic of ultra-Calvinism, the commonplace rationales that prop up late-capitalist
society and culture do not make division a vice but a virtue. In his time, Hutcheson could not
abide by the cold rationality that was gripping the burgeoning modern world, the world that
would ultimately bring about the postmodern empire of late capital. He saw a social situation
that had appropriated Calvinist bad sense and was taking it to its extreme. 149
The influence of the Reformation’s emergent force on Hutcheson’s thought is
inescapable. The absence of a mediator between humans and their God, as asserted by the early
Reformers, is something that Hutcheson takes even further by practically grounding God in
human beings. The affiliation between God and humans is not mediated by reasoning but is in
nature itself.150 Furthermore, knowledge of God is an affective, not rational knowledge. 151
Epistemology is not, therefore, a matter of reason; it is, instead, a matter of what Hutcheson
would call affection and passion. Pathos, therefore, is the primary form of human knowledge.
From it comes sympathy, the means and end of the moral sense. Consequently, Hutcheson’s
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moral theory does not take us away from or above material human life. It takes us directly into
it.
The Hutchesonian moral sense is, therefore, material. In Hutcheson’s words, it is “in the
constitution of the soul.”152 The moral sense is inextricable from human life. Though not in a
particular organ, the moral sense is a material reality and a physiological part of humans that
becomes active when humans interact with each other. It is, however, situated in human
particularity: i.e. how it operates in each individual is unique, just as with other senses. So, even
though the moral sense adapts to the diversity presented by individual humans, it is not
monopolized by any individual. It instead becomes active when individuals open themselves to
others or share themselves with others. This is an important point to stress. The moral sense is
not automatically “turned on”; like other senses, it must be stimulated or, as Hutcheson would
put it, excited.
A century after Hutcheson, through the vantage of dialectical materialism, Karl Marx
effectively places the same dialectical process of sympathetic integration at the center of
dialectical materialism’s ethic:
the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man
through human labour, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has
palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of the process of
emergence. Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and of nature, man as
the existence in nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has
become practically and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, a
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being above nature and man—a question which implies an admission of the
unreality of nature and man—has become impossible in practice. 153
Marx establishes that the ultimate concern of human social, political, and economic life is not
glorifying an abstract, alienated, and estranging power, such as a gratuitous, incomprehensible
God. (Today, that God is the empire of late capital.) The ultimate concern of human life is to
make collective human life probable by recognizing the practical, material, and autonomous
power of the graceful human individual, “profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the
senses.”154 Therefore, it is through the integration of all human power—sympathy—in the
human individual that congregation emerges as a probability.
Bruce Robertson’s and Boab’s sin—the greatest sin in Marxist and Christian terms—is
that neither one recognizes others’ lives in his own particular life. Therefore, neither Robertson
nor Boab recognizes that his particular life is connected to others’ lives. By not integrating what
Marx calls the species-being into their lives, they are doomed to a living death, like the one Jesus
describes in Luke: “‘for you are like graves which are not seen, and men walk over them
without knowing it.”155 Being alive as a human entails integrating the whole social life of all
human individuals—their sympathetic life—into oneself. Instead of the parasitical life of a
tapeworm or fly, an integral life “acquires grace” by revering what others have produced; this
reverence is most evident when the human individual produces vital materials and energies for
them.156 Thus, humans produce a “world without end.”157
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Now, let us discover what practice Welsh employs to map such an emergent world
without end.
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Chapter 4
Enlightenment Thread: Mapping Emergence
Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities
from him. . . .
—David Hume158
For ilka thing a man can be or think or dae
Aye leaves a million mair unbeen, unthoucht, undune. . . .
—Hugh MacDiarmid159

A bad bar joke happens to be one of Welsh’s most humorous, provocative, and
conspicuously philosophical stories as well as one of his explicitly “Scottish” stories. The joke
goes something like this. Two longtime philosopher friends from two major Scottish universities
meet up at a university bar and then go to a working-class Glasgow pub. They talk shop with the
locals and get drunk. They are challenged by a football hooligan to settle their philosophical
dispute in a fistfight. The snobby one loses to his down-to-earth comrade. The police break up
the fight and haul them off to the station. The snobby one gets beaten again by the cops, while
his mate is released. “The Two Philosophers” is deceptively simple, which is part of what makes
the story even more hilarious and, for us, all the more worthy of attention.160
The two philosophers in the ten-page short story are long-time academic rivals. One, Lou
Ornstein, is a Jewish man from Chicago, a Marxist, and a devotee of Thomas Kuhn’s assertion
that knowledge is not innocent (i.e. accepted truth or science is censored and manipulated
knowledge), and that breaks with official knowledge are necessary to the growth of knowledge.
He holds a professorial position in the University of Edinburgh’s philosophy department. His
counterpart, Angus “Gus” McGlone, is a Glasgow native, a classical liberal in the bourgeois
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eighteenth-century tradition, a Conservative Party member, and devoted to Karl Popper’s
theories about the evolutionary and transcendent reason (i.e., true knowledge is not contingent on
experiential factors but becomes purified through rational criticism). McGlone teaches
philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Despite their philosophical differences, however, the
two philosophers have much in common: successful academic careers, success at drinking,
lesser success at womanizing, and failure at convincing each other.161
Ornstein comes to Glasgow and finds Gus at the bar of the Byres Road hostelry, which is
popular amongst the university crowd. Gus is talking to one of his undergraduate students, who
is making advances on him. She leaves after also flirting with Ornstein. The two philosophers
gradually descend into their usual habit, rehashing the Kuhn-Popper debate about knowledge and
politics. Both have been looking for a way to put this tired topic to rest, after years of fighting it
out in conference papers, journal articles, and drunken conversations. It is Ornstein, though, who
comes up with the perfect solution: have someone outside of the ivory tower, a seasoned
Glasgow barfly at a working-class pub, judge their arguments and declare a winner.
A man after Gramsci’s heart, the American-born dialectical materialist thinks that the
organic intellectual, the knowing man in the street, will be the best arbiter. The effete patrician
McGlone is at first unsettled by the prospect of presenting his case before inebriated plebs, but
his curiosity and competitiveness will not permit him to back out. So the two philosophers hash
out their positions before two domino players—talkative middle-aged, working-class men—at
Brechin’s Bar. Unsurprisingly, one of the men, “auld Tommy,” sides with Ornstein’s more
161
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down-to-earth and optimistic attitude over McGlone’s elitist, dismissive one. Tommy’s
counterpart does not side with McGlone or Ornstein; instead, he finds that quibbling over closely
related epistemological categories begs the question about knowledge: “S’only names bit. . . .
Magic, science, whit the fuck’s the difference? S’only names we gie thum” (“Two
Philosophers” 114). Overhearing the debate, auld Tommy’s mate’s son, a soccer enthusiast
wearing a blue Rangers strip, thinks the two philosophers might be having fun at the older men’s
expense. Auld Tommy tries to reassure him, but he is still suspicious. After listening a bit
longer, the young man and his mates have had enough and insist that the two professors settle
this academic feud once and for all by taking it outside and really fighting it out: “Yous two in a
squerr go ootside” (“Two Philosophers” 15). McGlone is, of course, taken aback, but Ornstein
takes the suggestion seriously. Also encouraging the two philosophers is the threat of a worse
fate at the hands of the hooligans.
They do as the drunken young man with the blue strip suggests. Ornstein beats McGlone
to the ground and then kicks him. The police intervene and interrogate the professors. McGlone
brandishes his bourgeois academic credentials, which has exactly the opposite result he had
anticipated. Duty Sergeant Fotheringham punches McGlone in the stomach and sends him back
to lockup. Ornstein, on the other hand, gets on well with the police and is soon freed. As he
walks through Glasgow on the way to the subway system, the Underground, he is surprisingly
pleased with himself for doing something he had never done before, and he concludes that this
was the perfect antidote for the abstract philosophical reasoning promoted and protected by
bourgeois academia. For the Chicago materialist, the fight proved his point: unknown
knowledge is not make-believe or magical; one just needs to walk out the door and wrestle
knowledge to the ground. Ornstein’s now substantiated epistemology effectively blends
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Kierkegaard, Marx, and Mohammed Ali: knowledge is produced by having faith in its presently
unknown truths, grounding it in material reality, and giving accepted knowledge or common
sense a “squerr go ootside.”
But what in the world does this story have to do with Scotland? Speaking broadly, it has
everything to do with it. Speaking more particularly, it is a literary rupture that uncovers a
complex of forces which have composed Scotland and its identity during what we call the
modern era.162 However, we are getting ahead of ourselves. In order to assert whether Scotland
even exists, how it exists if it does exist, and, as we will postulate in the next chapter, what kind
of Scotland is in the offing, we will travel down a few interconnecting paths. These paths will
trace across a specific spatiotemporal terrain. As with the previous chapters, this chapter will
focus on the relation between contemporary Scotland and a particular historical-literary period
from its past—in this case the emergence of modernity from the eighteenth century through the
twentieth century. We will first follow a literary path that places Welsh’s story in close
connection to the work of another Scottish writer, Robert Burns. In fact, Burns’s poem “The
Twa Dogs” is a springboard, touchstone, and template throughout much of this chapter.163 The
formal and conceptual qualities of the comparable literary pieces discussed will bring us to an
intersection, connecting our literary exploration with philosophical investigation. David Hume’s
epistemological and moral philosophy is not only linked nominally to Welsh’s short story; his
theories directly bear on broader topics related to social knowledge and Scottish nationality, both
of which entail deep-seated internal conflicts. Then, we will cross paths with cognitive science.
Even though this convergence might not be an obvious one now, its validity will become more
evident after following the paths mentioned. Cognitive science—cognitive linguistics in
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particular—will shed light on what Welsh, Burns, and Hume, among other Scots, have been up
to and still are up to since the 1707 Union of Parliaments: they have been building Scotland
through a dialectical process of cognitive construction. Therefore, following chapters that have
focused on the epistemological categories of mythos and pathos, we will be traveling in the
domain of logos, the rational aspect of knowledge. These encounters on our Enlightenment
pilgrimage will help us to locate Scotland, re-envision nationalism, and lay the groundwork for
considering a global politics that is boosted, not threatened, by particular social groups or
nations. Such a politics will be enabled by the virtues of congregation and integration;
nevertheless, it will also incorporate a virtue of emergence.
4.1 First Enlightenment Strand: Knowing Pilgrimages
As far as literary genre is concerned, “The Two Philosophers” might arguably be an
allegory or parable, a tale that imparts some moral truth through a relatively simple, predictable
plot. As mentioned above, though, the story is also a popular type of joke: “Two people go into
a bar. . . .” Many narrative jokes are allegories with a twist, replacing a moral with a punch line.
In other words, such jokes are destabilizing allegories that challenge one’s epistemological or
moral assumptions. They often tear away the façade society wears to rationalize its often
hypocritical norms; therefore, jokes demystify human life by exposing the supposedly sacred as
at least mundane, if not profane. Geoffrey Chaucer’s body of proto-modern work, particularly
The Canterbury Tales, is emblematic.164 He strings together a whole network of such narrative
jokes, one playing off at least one of the others. Ultimately, the individual narratives come
together to compose a masterful example of the estate satire.
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In order to give his body of tales coherence while retaining a democratic or polyphonic
voice, Chaucer employs a travel motif. This approach is, of course, not new. In the history of
Western literature, it is common to find some sort of physical movement connected to the overall
growth of a character or characters, literally moving the plot along by enabling encounters and
crises, mapping out both physical and conceptual terrain, and so forth. Sometimes travel logs,
sometimes quests, and sometimes pilgrimages, such narratives are highly conscious of human
experience’s materiality. Physicality and thought coincide, one compelling the other. Each also
reflects the other.
This integration of the mind and body is reflected in how people will frequently use
spatial and temporal metaphors to describe works of art, such as novels or movies. When many
people describe a good story, for example, they make statements like these: “It moved me.” “I
could relate to the characters.” “I felt like I was there.” “You get a good sense of where the hero
is coming from and where she is headed.” Moreover, because of the integral connection between
bodily movement and cognitive activity, it is not therefore surprising why so many parables,
allegories, jokes, narrative songs, and the like have been popular in most cultures for much of
human history. To wax Socratic, thought is weak unless the body is involved. To wax Sartrean,
“doing and understanding are indissolubly linked.”165 However, we cannot, as Socrates and his
students allegedly did, all pick up and walk around a tree to think. Therefore, singers and
storytellers have come up with ingenious ways to help us still experience physical thought. They
help us to unite “the organism with the environment.”166
The characteristics of proto-modern Chaucer’s narrative techniques are certainly in
postmodern Welsh’s fiction. We noted previously the multi-voiced structure of such books as
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Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno: individual characters tell their respective but interlocking tales,
not unlike the characters in The Canterbury Tales. It is also true that the estate satire has been
most successfully employed by writers from subordinate social classes—both writers fill this
bill. Chaucer writes from the burgeoning middle class of the medieval period, and Welsh writes
from the lumpenproletariat-cum-middle-class of the postmodern era. Both write in their
respective vernaculars: Middle English and Scots. The old hierarchies are not sacred to them,
and hastening those hierarchies’ decline is certainly an objective. In fact, pointing out the upper
estates’ faults turns out to be more than a joke. It is a serious deconstructive cultural engagement
with significant political, economic, and, yes, philosophical implications. But to be significantly
political and so forth, such a story must be topical, which means it must be embedded in its
social and historical context. It must deal with the materials and energies that intersect in its
singular moment and place. It would, therefore, be a mistake to rest easily on just drawing a
correlation between Welsh and Chaucer. Accordingly, to get nearer to Welsh while nevertheless
continuing to trace out a literary genealogy, we should look beyond Chaucer’s emerging
England. We should look closer to Welsh’s home, to Scotland, to Robert Burns.
Despite Burns’s reputation as a noble savage—a “heaven-taught ploughman”167—Burns
is sophisticated in the sense that he cleverly plays off of people’s expectations and prejudices.
Even so, he is a Romantic, in the best sense of the term.168 If there is one thing positive about
Romanticism, it is its celebration of life during the emergence of modernity. This celebration
frequently takes the form of a focus on common life. However, paying attention to common life
and putting it on a pedestal are different things. Burns is not always consistent when it comes to
the latter point, yet his most compelling works are arguably those wearing a critical Janus face.
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In many of his poems and songs, Burns does critique those one might expect: the English,
religious zealots, the socioeconomic elites, and so on. Careful attention, though, uncovers how
seriously he criticizes those whom he supposedly romanticizes: Scots, Jacobites, humble
Presbyterians, the poor, and so on. Though Burns was an early figure of the Romantic era, he
was also one of Romanticism’s greatest deviants—much as J. M. Synge was later for the Irish
Literary Renaissance. It is one thing to give voice to or honor those people and places on the
edges of “respectable” society and culture, but it is wholly another to permit them to be insular or
esoteric. It is generally assumed that Burns is guilty of the latter, but a closer evaluation of his
work uncovers his critical dedication to the former. “The Twa Dogs,” for instance, exemplifies
Burns’s ability to both laud and censure Scots while making it seem that he is primarily
interested in deriding the English.
In this dramatic poem, Burns produces his own estate satire from an interesting vantage
point, that of two dogs.

Caesar, a dog of an indeterminate continental breed, and Luath, a

ploughman’s collie named after Burn’s deceased dog (which was named after Cuchullin’s dog in
Ossian’s Fingal) sit down on a knowe, or hill thought to be a fairy mound, to compare notes
about their masters’ stations. Caesar’s name and Continental connections associate him with
nobility and the Classical world. Luath, on the other hand, is tied to Gaelic myth, tenant farmers,
and lower-level peasants in general. Caesar is worldly, while Luath is somewhat provincial.
Each is in the dark about the other’s experiences under a different social class—that is, until they
complete their conversation and descend from the knowe.
The poem’s movement, however, alters the pilgrimage pattern Chaucer has given us.
Instead of following a relatively linear or progressive path, the two dogs converge for an
afternoon on a hill, and they part ways after the sun has set. Traveling has certainly occurred,
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and it allows for the encounter. However, substantial movement itself effectively takes place
offstage, much as it does in, say, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot or Endgame. Whereas
humans on pilgrimages must strike out to voyage abroad in order to locate themselves, a process
which Chaucer ironically parodies, the dogs instead converge from abroad, or below, in order to
situate humans, the topic of their dialogue, in a problematic sociocultural context: in effect, they
come together to map out the ground below, on which the humans live.
Arguably, Burns is compelled to flout the pilgrimage tradition because he is actually
trying to locate Scotland. Maybe Chaucer was likewise looking for a post-feudal England, but
he was more accurately shoring up “Englishness” by humorously purging it of its less savory
characteristics. Indeed, the tales do virtually form a peristaltic journey, documenting a voyage
through England’s bowels. Burns, however, is not boosting an already established
“Scottishness.” To do so would be to presume that Scotland is, to use a popular psychological
term, self-actualized. Both Chaucer and Burns are sensitive to their respective sociocultural
moments—their respective historical grounds—which compel them to differ in their use of the
same genre. Chaucer employs the travel motif to analyze and dissolve the feudal systems that
were, during his time, still relatively stable and hegemonic, despite the burgeoning middle class.
Burns, on the other hand, writes in a late-eighteenth-century Scotland dealing with a
disintegrating, not emerging situation. This disintegration occurred despite, if not because of, the
1707 Act of Union.169 Chaucer’s England was on the rise; Burns’s Scotland, as discussed above
and below, was at best in limbo, and so his poem reflects that. Nonetheless, the political
situation for Burns is, as it was for Chaucer centuries before, inextricably connected to the
historical and epistemological ones.
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As discussed in previous chapters, Scotland has been subordinate in many regards—
nationally, politically, economically, and culturally—for at least three hundred years. Despite
moments of autonomy in some of those regards over the same period, it is still practically a dog,
at least in the view of those who have been dominant, the English. Burns takes this subordinate
position, though, and elevates it. However, he does not elevate it to subordinate the English or
some other. He just brings the subordinate to the level of equality so that it can achieve some
sort of autonomous productivity.
Burns decides that the best medium through which to get closer to the Scots is through
humans’ proverbial best friends, loyal servants, and fellow carnivorous pack animals, canines.
So, instead of denying the status of Scots as virtual dogs, Burns makes this status a point from
which to launch one of his most decisive appraisals of Scotland’s situation.170 Certainly, “Ye
Jacobites by Name” and “Robert Bruce’s March to Bannockburn” are powerful Scottish selfevaluations. Burns, though, is most compelling when he comes at a topic by a less conspicuous,
more complex tack, such as in “The Twa Dogs.” The closer he gets to the ground and the people
who live on it—instead of flying into nationalist and ahistorical abstractions—the more incisive
and productive are his critiques, which are frequently leveled at his fellow Scots.
In this and other poems and songs, Burns does not elevate the Scots over the English, the
poor over the rich, or the humble moderate over the zealot. Burns, like other Romantics,
attempts to find if humans are possible, how they are possible, and what kind of world they
might make. For Burns, humans are not reducible to biological determinations, and neither are
they justified by metaphysical ideals. Humans living strictly as animals—like mice, lice, or
dogs—is not what he observes or wants; humans living strictly as rational or spiritual beings—
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like the “unco guid”171—is also not an option. Burns’s view, demonstrated through the body of
his work, is not that far removed from his fellow Romantics; but he is more tied to and more
explicit about local politics. Yes, he too celebrates the two Revolutions of the eighteenth
century, the Rights of Man, and universal freedom from tyranny; however, he does not approach
them through odes to immortality, the sublime, sage savages, and almost other-worldly
songbirds. For Burns, mice, lice, dogs, and less-than-perfect laborers are not merely satiric
stand-ins for higher concepts; they are the very media through which such concepts are forged.
And more often than not, these mediatory materials are particular to Scotland.
Satirists rarely write without intending for something to emerge from the tangle of their
situations, and Burns is no exception. He, along with writers such as Hugh MacDiarmid, is
proud of something in Scotland, even if it has not yet crystallized. And whatever that something
might be, it will be based on something other than idealized social groups or some essentialist
notion of nationality. It will emerge from the realities on the ground, where dogs and humans
share their lives. As in many of his poems and songs, Burns therefore begins his investigation
close to the ground. In the case of “The Twa Dogs,” being close to the ground is both a harsh
Scottish self-analysis and an affirmative point of epistemological and ontological emergence.
Openly admitting that he, the Scots, and Scotland are in a state of subordination , Burns seizes
that ground from which to observe the potential materialization of something else. 172

171

Scots for “self-righteous.” The unco guid are frequent targets of Burns’s pen. See, for example, Burns’s
“Address to the Unco Guid” and “Holy Willie’s Prayer” (37-39, 56-59).
172
Nairn makes the assertion that Scotland is a nation that is not a state (Faces of Nationalism180). I agree
with his point, but the phrase “state of subordination” fits here because of its allusion to estate or status, which Burns
and later Welsh undermine. I am also intentionally employing a play on words. Scotland historically is a collection
of sub-nations, thus a non-nation, which contributed to its subordinate post-Union status, which was a consequence
of the ordination of Scotland’s James VI as England’s James I. Such play, though, is serious, as Burns’s and
Welsh’s works attest. Having subordinates—e.g. peasants, dogs, heroine addicts, or pub crawlers—serve as ironic
and frequently playful agents of critique is not a celebration of the state of subordination but is more likely a method
of short-circuiting a system that, based on dominance and subordination, creates such a state. Therefore, if I may

137

Additionally, as a consequence of his fidelity to the materials before him, Burns arguably
tries to discern whether Scotland and the Scots are possible beyond subordination. If they are
possible, he is then focused on discerning how Scotland and the Scots are possible, which leaves
him once again working with the materials that converge and shift before him, not some
predetermining myth or transcendent dream. Burns, therefore, is a cartographer. He maps out
the is in order to lay the groundwork for something else to emerge—from that same is. It just so
happens that in this instance, two dogs work as his surveyors.
Once Caesar and Luath sit down, they begin to share their observations. Caesar starts by
describing how opulently his master’s set lives (lines 51-70). Caesar’s “Laird” and the laird’s
“flunkies” do not have to worry about having warm enough clothes, having heated rooms,
knowing how the coal is dug and delivered, and so forth. Such work is done by the personae
non grata, the lowest orders of hirelings and peasants, whose own clothes are rags and whose
makeshift homes cannot keep out the cold. Another fact that preoccupies Caesar is food
distribution: the “ha’ folk” and even the worthless “Whipper-in” have more food than they can
eat, but the “Tenant-man” and his fellow “Cot-folk,” who procure the majority of the food, have
scarce a morsel to eat.173 The laird thanks these workers by yelling insults at them, incarcerating
them, and stealing from them (lines 93-100). The logical assumption Caesar comes to is that the
lives of people like tenants and cottars are barely worth living, for “surely poor-folk maun be
wretches!” (line 102). Nevertheless, he is shocked by the fact that they persevere despite their
totally miserable circumstances.

use Sartre’s language from Critique, the two writers “negate a negation,” which opens the current ideological and
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Caesar, however, discovers that the lower orders do not live in complete misery despite
their miserable circumstances. Luath discloses, “They’re no sae wretched ‘s ane wad think” (line
103). According to the Highland collie, the folk traditions, close-knit community, and Kirk are
what give his people—the wretched of Scotland—their perseverance (lines 107-38). They have,
according to him, a life filled with riches that are not so-called material wealth, but shared
cultural and spiritual wealth. But Burns sneaks into the poem a critical observation. The poor
romanticize the rich, which indicates the laborers’ acquiescence. Luath thinks that the lairds of
the land are at heart noble people (lines 146-48). Caesar, though, has some unexpected news for
Luath. Luath is surprised to find out that the affluent, the supposed stewards of Britain, are
petulant, self-absorbed, and morally bankrupt (lines 149-70, 191-228). Their loyalty is to
accruing wealth and to Continental high society, not to Britain and most definitely not to
peasants.
So, what does Burns uncover in reference to the persistent question before the Scots,
“Whither Scotland?”174 As to whether Scotland and the Scots are possible, the initial impression
is not very positive. If Scotland exists, then as of the late eighteenth century, it was composed of
self-deprecating slaves living under petty aristocrats—“Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation.”175
This is not a pretty picture, which Burns makes every effort to show. However, his negation of
Scotland, at least through his undressing these two major social classes, is paradoxically an
affirmation of Scotland. And what amounts to a negative affirmation opens the door to figuring
out how Scotland is possible and ultimately what kind of Scotland is possible.
174

“Whither Scotland?” is a question that members of the Scottish Renaissance posed to themselves and to
their compatriots during the first few dozen years of the twentieth century. This question is reflected in much of
modern and postmodern Scottish letters, including that of Burns, MacDiarmid, Nairn, Neal Ascherson, Candia
McWilliam, and Welsh.
175
“Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation” is one of Burns’s most famous nationalist songs, played as a
dirge, which scolds the Scots for allowing themselves to be sold to England for “English gold” when Lowland elites
signed the 1707 Act of Union (511-12).
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4.2 Second Enlightenment Strand: Reasoning with Antisyzygy176
The title of Welsh’s estate satire, complete with a voyage through Glasgow from a
university bar to a football fans’ pub, could just as accurately be titled “The Two Humes.” As
with Kant, and arguably as with any significant philosopher, there are more than two Humes.
For our purposes, though, we will stick with two. Gus McGlone and Lou Ornstein represent
these two Humes. With Ornstein-Hume, we have the radical speculative empiricist, and with
McGlone-Hume, we have the conservative anglophile. The speculative empiricist, or populist
skeptic, demonstrates a materialist stance. Like a Gramscian, Ornstein-Hume sees what is and
charts the alternative probabilities out of it. The classic liberal McGlone-Hume, on the other
hand, asserts what should be and pushes what is in its direction by appealing to civilized norms.
Enlightenment Scots’ ideas—such as Hume’s, Adam Smith’s, and Adam Ferguson’s—
have become well-entrenched commonplaces and ideologies since the eighteenth century.
Instrumental knowledge—along with its sociopolitical counterpart civil society—is probably
their greatest collective legacy. However, there is a problem in this legacy of the early-modern
bourgeois revolution. In their efforts to preordain enlightened knowledge or moral civility as the
universal ground of all human life, prominent Enlightenment thinkers—including Hume and
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Antisyzygy is a concept attributable to G. Gregory Smith, who held that Scotland and its literature are “a
combination of opposites,” which is a “reflection of the contrasts which the Scot shows at every turn, in his political
and ecclesiastical history, in his polemical restlessness, in his adaptability, which is another way of saying that he
has made allowance for new conditions, in his practical judgement, which is the admission that two sides of the
matter have been considered” (Modernism and Nationalism: Literature and Society in Scotland 1918-1939: Source
Documents for the Scottish Renaissance, ed. Margery Palmer McCulloch [Glasgow: Association for Scottish
Literary Studies, 2004] p. 6). In short, antisyzygy is the paradoxical core of Scottish life. Ontologically and
epistemologically, Scotland is a fabric of contradictory elements that weave together to make a mutable, potentially
evolving whole. It is, therefore, no surprise why MacDiarmid would have been attracted to this concept, which
surfaces throughout much of his work: i.e., Scots and Scotland are the consummate embodiment of dialectical
processes. In fact, MacDiarmid expanded the concept, particularly in A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, and even
made it the nominal subject of one of his poems, “The Caledonian Antisyzygy” (MacDiarmid, Selected Poetry, eds.
Alan Riach and Michael Grieve [New York, NY: New Directions, 1993] p. 230).
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later Immanuel Kant—satisfied their liberalism, but they also unintentionally undermined the
very human subjects they attempted to empower.177
Hume, in the last book of Treatise of Human Nature, and Kant, in his second and third
critiques of reason, promote a social framework in which enlightened individuals tap into a
common stream of experience or knowledge which will lead them to civil society or moral
consistency.178 Now, it is only fair to admit that such ideas were and are certainly a breath of
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Nairn, Faces of Nationalism 75.
Contrary to much of what he writes in Treatise, Hume appeals to the wisdom of custom when it comes
to humans’ sociopolitical activities. See in particular sections 7 through 11 of Book 3. We are dealing with one of
two Humes, McGlone’s Hume. Anticipating Popper, this Hume sides with an evolutionary optimism when it comes
to social institutions and relations: “Time alone gives solidity to [a government’s] right; and operating gradually on
the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable” (556). Admittedly,
Hume does so with great equivocation. In an effort to remain descriptive, he notes how the interests of a
government and its constituency can be at odds, which his empirical observation of history demonstrates. But he is
pulled in the direction of justifying the necessity of civil society, in spite of the plethora of evidence that questions
its very feasibility: “Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labour, and
industry, we can extract them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society:
Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation” (David
Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp [Oxford, UP: Oxford UP, 1998] p.
87). Hume is locked in an indefensible position not because some sort of just or egalitarian world is impossible. He
is caught in this cul-de-sac because part of him is almost uncritically dedicated to bourgeois hegemony over human
labor, which is founded on the unequal distribution of materials and power—vis à vis the natural rights of rulers and
private property. Even though we can connect one Hume’s speculative empiricism to Marx’s dialectical
materialism, the other Hume is no Marx, and he is not interested in a paradigm shift that would upend the “natural”
evolution of civilization. Revolution for the bourgeois Hume is only justifiable as a correction within civil society:
for example, when a tyrant must be resisted or overthrown for the sake of national interest. In view of this, not only
is this Hume no Marx; he is no Tom Paine either. The Hume of civil society believes in the priority of abstract
relations—property, allegiance, obligation, and so forth—when it comes to the sociopolitical life of humans. This
Hume, though, is at stark odds with the Hume of human possibility—the Hume who does connect well to Marx, the
Hume who guides us here (see his epigraph above). Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, does not have to equivocate,
for he is not trying to have it both ways, as it were: the human individual is justified as long as he or she constantly
moves to conform his or her will to reason (Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary Gregor [London: Cambridge
UP, 1997] p. 102). This, for Kant, is also the basis of a civil—even holy—society. He famously writes, “the human
being (and with him every rational being) is an end in itself, that is, can never be used merely as a means by anyone
(not even by God) without being at the same time himself an end, and . . . humanity in our person must, accordingly,
be holy to ourselves: for he is the subject of the moral law and so that which is holy in itself, on account of which
and in agreement with which alone can anything be called holy. For, this moral law is based on the autonomy of his
will, as a free will which, in accordance with its universal laws, must necessarily be able at the same time to agree to
that which it is to subject itself” (110). Some would argue that Kant’s seamless consistency makes his theory much
more powerful than Hume’s. Perhaps as a rhetorical matter, this is so. But as an ethical matter, Hume is more prohuman than Kant. Kant’s is an agonistic or monastic morality, while Hume’s is a communitarian ethic.
Alternatively, like many utilitarians, Hume is on the side of social justice that originates from the needs and interests
of most people; however, despite the appeals to the proto-utilitarian concept of civil society already discussed, he
inadvertently betrays a lack of confidence in institutions based on precedence, not to mention that he is more than
suspicious of social systems based on moral laws. Justice is only possible if all parties act justly, which makes
justice impossible in a society founded on the accumulation of wealth and thus the unequal access to wealth
178
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fresh air when considering the logic of feudalism that preceded them and the logic of
totalitarianism that has followed since. On their faces, Hume’s appeal to experience as the basis
of knowledge and his subsequent appeal to shared social values would apparently be in league
with what we have been promoting in this study. Likewise, Kant’s appeals to idealized reason
break the stranglehold on truth so long imposed by, for example, kings or the Church. Both
philosophers, like their political counterparts in the Renaissance and their religious counterparts
in the Reformation, emancipate the individual from tyrannical pre-modern systems. That being
said, though, the Hume of the Treatise’s third book and the Kant of the last two critiques might
not have broken as much as they had hoped from the status quo or from vulgar appeals to
predestination. On the one hand, they moved to wrench reason away from religious and
monarchic ridiculousness; on the other hand, however, they succeeded, even as they tried not to,
in helping to formulate the modern alienation of reason and society from most humans. Hume’s
appeals to experience and dominant social values do not, upon closer examination, include the
wider multitude’s experiences or values outside of emerging bourgeois society. The possibility
of inclusion is there; Hume, however, officially desired something else. 179

Kant does in fact

liberate reason from imperialistic human institutions, but he leads it further away from the
human multitude—to an even higher and remote plane, to God. Knowledge and social life,
therefore, have become products that have been extracted from their actual producers, humans,
(Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morality 83-98). Hume is consistently adamant about its being impossible to
establish or enforce a “system of eternal rational measures of right and wrong” (466). In Hume’s case, then,
“Caledonian Antisyzygy” is more than evident.
179
Hume is consistent in his contradictoriness. He desired to be one of England’s elite, even though he
suspected that he would not be accepted because of being unmistakably Scottish. Because England was not going
to, in his mind, be a receptive home, he favored France. And when he did describe what his identity should be, he
claimed the predictable Enlightenment cosmopolitan rank of “a citizen of the world.” See Alexander Broadie, The
Scottish Enlightenment: The Historical Age of the Historical Nation (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001) pp. 58-61. There
were also times when he would embrace being a Scot. Some argue that, in fact, Scottish Presbyterianism, Scottish
law, and the clannish communitarian social systems in the south Lowlands were the materials from which he
constructed his philosophy. See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 281-86. Some, such as Frantz
Fanon or Nairn, would recognize Hume’s inconsistency or hybridity as a symptom of his subordinate socio-cultural
status.
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and have been relocated in what is for most an unapproachable domain. In other words, the
system makers become subordinate to their own systems, and the systems become further
removed from their ground even as they mine it for resources at an accelerating rate.180
However, this is where the paradoxical or negative affirmation mentioned above, in
relation to Burns, may come in. If humans in their common life make reason, knowledge,
society, culture, and so forth, then there is the possibility—and to continue a more militant tone,
the probability181—that humans will wrestle them back down to the common plane or mortal coil
and reintegrate them into their particular situations. Some might argue that this privileges
intuition, irrational knowledge, uncertainty, and so forth. To an extent, it does; however, neither
reason nor society is thrown out, just repositioned. What we call reason today owes its birth to
very irrational beginnings, and civilization to frequently barbaric forces.182 I say irrational and
barbaric because an empirical review of human history, sociology, and psychology will tend to
undermine the validity of temperate reason and civil society being the foundations of human
thought and action. Humans might rationalize, or give reason, to their lives by building mental
structures in which to plug their experiences and presuppositions; however, any reason that
comes about is the effect, not the initial cause or basis, of their lives. Humans might live

180

Or, to put it politically, constituent power is neutralized by the establishment of constitutions, as we
touched on in chapters 2 and 3.
181
Probability, not certainty, is the cornerstone of Hume’s thought. Probability begins as a possibility, but
as one’s experience increases and consequently as one’s ability to work with experience’s materials improves, a
possibility may become more than a fantasy, belief, or hope. It becomes probable because, to use Hume’s idiom, it
is a possibility that contains more “rigour and firmness.” This does not mean that other possibilities will be
foreclosed, as it were. They will always be entailed by a probability and will perhaps also become more valid with
the accumulation of materials (information, elements, and so on) and speculative (projective) production with them.
(Hume 106, 124-55).
182
Again, Benjamin’s observation about the barbarism inherent in civilization is apt.
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according to reason and social norms that stem from it; however, reason and its mechanisms are
secondary though integral aspects of human existence, not the core.183
The Hume of the first and second books of Treatise, along with the Hume of such
writings as An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, arguably knew this. 184 The first book
of Treatise reads like an essay on physics, and to an extent, it is just that—an essay on the
movement of things, impressions, passions, and ideas. Hume basically argues that there is no
epistemological ideal or meta-knowledge, or to put it another way, there is no pre-written masternarrative to which we can refer or on which we can depend. Establishing the certainty of initial
causes, overarching ideals, and predetermined truths is, to him, contrary to the movement of life.
Then, in the second book, Hume follows Francis Hutcheson in charting out how the interactions
between the material world and human senses, or passions, create knowledge and, more
importantly, increased probabilities for humans in the world. He renames Hutcheson’s moral
sense and calls it sympathy, in an apparent attempt to make it more secular. But without splitting
hairs too much, the two concepts refer basically to the same thing—a collectively activated
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Human energy, what Hume following Hutcheson would call “passion,” is the basis of all human life;
therefore, reason “is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them” (Hume 415).
184
Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford, UK: Oxford
UP, 1999). I must, in all fairness, write a brief apologia at this point before we turn our direction to Hume and
Scotland. As much as it might seem like it, I am not dismissing Kant. In fact, he is good company as we chart out
the material and political ramifications we face when confronting radically fragmented global capital and its
postmodern imperial logic. Kant was extremely concerned about the tyranny of baseless dogma and anti-thought
that he witnessed throughout history and during his life. To be frank, a Marxist would be hard-pressed to find a
better example of a theoretical predecessor in the bourgeois revolution, except perhaps for Hume, as we will explore
below. The latter point leads me to the second part of this apologia. The reason that Hume will be brought to the
foreground here, but not Kant, is because we are dealing with the particularity known as Scotland. By no means will
Kant be absent. Kant’s specter cannot help but haunt a discussion about Hume because much of Kant’s work, which
is today more influential than Hume’s, was in large part a response to the Scottish skeptic. But the Scottish skeptic,
even more so than Hutcheson before him and Kant after him, rode on the crest of and contributed to one of the most
powerful ruptures in humans’ comprehension of their own lives, the Enlightenment. Hume’s being at the right place
at the right time had much to do with him being in the middle of eighteenth-century Scotland. Indeed, as we have
suggested, Hume’s personal and political battles with Scotland and “Scottishness” go a long way toward explaining
how he could be a founder of both modern particularistic empiricism and modern universal civility. They also go a
long way to understanding modern Scotland.
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physical sense that connects individual human beings regardless of socio-cultural differences.
Indeed, Hume’s ethic, like Hutcheson’s before him, is an integral thus communitarian life ethic.
Even though morality is technically the topic of the third book of Treatise, Hume’s ethic
is operating from the first book onward. Hume’s is a practical ethic, and a human-friendly one at
that.185 According to Hume, attempts to locate first causes or to fathom providential intention
lead people into a futile world of infinite regressions and mystifying beliefs. In other words,
searches for capital-T Truth do more to lead people away from engaging and producing living
truths. By undermining optimism based on providential design, Hume resituates power in
humans, at least until he appeals to the primacy of civil society in the last book of Treatise.
There are sections of the third book that consistently follow the epistemological, psychological,
and sociological insights of the first two books; however, Hume waxes more and more
conformist as he proceeds, effectively undermining the revolutionary probabilities that dominate
the majority of his groundbreaking work.
Welsh’s story illustrates Hume’s contradictory positions, but like us, he sides in favor of
Hume-the-materialist instead of Hume-the-classical-liberal; in effect, Welsh finds the former
more valid than his antithesis. Philosophically, one could certainly make the argument that
Kuhn’s theories on knowledge, which Ornstein favors, are the direct postmodern descendent of
Hume’s empiricism. Alternatively, on McGlone’s side, one could say that Popper’s also are, if
one looks at the latter part of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, his political tracts, and his
historical writings. Contradiction is in fact a significant characteristic of Hume’s philosophy—as
well as his life.186 An interesting biographical commentary on this contrariness emerges when

185

Hume 177.
According to Tom L. Beauchamp, Hume bases his moral philosophy between particularity and
universality, which allows for his “moral diversity, but do not translate into either a pure conventionalism or an
186
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Welsh bases McGlone in Glasgow, where Hume wanted to go for a “legitimate” academic
career. McGlone represents the establishment and retroactively anticipates what would have
ostensibly happened to Hume if he had succeeded in procuring a position at the university where
his mentor and greatest influence, Hutcheson, had taught. McGlone does represent Hume’s
conservative, or classical liberal, politics—bourgeois politics. Ornstein, however, hails from
Edinburgh, where Hume had ended up serving as a librarian after being rejected for
professorships at Edinburgh University and the University of Glasgow. Ornstein is originally
from the New World, the American Midwest. Not Ivy League and not part of Britain’s patrician
intelligentsia, Ornstein represents the renegade philosopher. He also undermines the classism
and imperialism still extant in Anglo-Saxon politics. What we are dealing with is not just a
philosophical matter or a biographical matter—it is also a political matter.
McGlone-Hume represents the quintessential citizen of the British Empire. Hume’s
politics were at least moderate and often conservative. He was one of the Edinburgh intellectuals
who helped man the city walls when the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion came down from the
Highlands. And his calling himself an Englishman for most of his life, along with writing one of
the popular English histories of his time, made clear where his predominant socio-political
loyalties were. Like Swift before his expatriation to Ireland, Hume was radical philosophically,
but his politics were far from antiestablishment, which means far from a resistance to English
imperialism. In fact, Alasdair MacIntyre provocatively links Hume to the Anglicization of
Scotland and the virtual sellout of Scottish philosophy. 187 The standards of modern civil
society—not to mention international relations—that are justifiably affiliated with eighteenthcentury England do in fact owe much of their existence to Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, such
unqualified cultural or historical relativism of standards” (Introduction, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of
Morals 45).
187
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 281-99, 300-25.
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as Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson.188 Whereas Ferguson’s theories of civil society
were based on the martial aspects of ancient Rome and the Scottish Highlands,189 Hume’s ideas
about an ideal government were obviously modern and bourgeois, formed with Westminster (not
Holyrood) in mind. In view of this, Hume himself practically defied his own insight about
experiential knowledge by attempting to disassociate himself from Scotland and its unique
philosophical and sociocultural heritage. He might have, as MacIntyre suggests, tried to shoot
straight toward an ahistorical universal—Anglo-British hegemony—by bypassing what he
personally considered to be a constricting immediate context—Scottish antisyzygy.190
But as another example of negative affirmation—or the other side of his antisyzygy—
Hume’s materials were nevertheless Scottish. Historically, politically, personally, socially, and
culturally, Hume was in the middle of an intersection that was categorically Scottish, even if
being categorically Scottish meant being categorically scattered. He might have wanted to
support the hegemony of Englishness in the United Kingdom, practically begging for his mind to
be appropriated south of the Borders. But the forces buzzing around him in eighteenth-century
Edinburgh, that liminal city of Scotland, made him Hume, not his predecessor Newton or
contemporary Locke. Hume’s knowledge was formed in the conflicted reality only a Scot could
know.
This is the fact that Welsh ironically brings home when he has Ornstein pummel
McGlone. One can almost hear Welsh saying, “You cannot call yourself an empiricist unless
you are willing to deal with reality or, even better, you cannot call yourself a Scottish
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Nairn, Faces of Nationalism 73-89.
Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge UP, 1995).
190
MacIntyre Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 312, 324.
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philosopher unless you can handle a squerr go ootside.” Knowledge is not based on reasonable,
civil ideals. It is based in human, material production—being, becoming, living.
Ornstein-Hume represents the Scottish Enlightenment’s heretic. Hume violated even the
liberal stance of the Presbyterian Moderates, including Hutcheson. His staunch atheism, unlike
the more popular deism of the eighteenth century, broke with British polite society, including the
academic tolerance of universities in Scotland’s Central Belt. Consequently, he did not get the
highly coveted Professorship of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University, so
he spent much of his academic career as a librarian, not as a lecturer, in Edinburgh. His thick
Broad Scots dialect and gregarious personality are thought to have led to suspicions about his
legitimacy as a respectable British thinker. But such setbacks did not stop Hume from
continuing his research or his writing as an increasingly popular public intellectual. Even if his
peers could lock him out of the halls of academia, they could not avoid having to deal with his
theories. His work’s significance is verified by the attention it received during and after his life.
Moreover, he was irresistibly friendly and great company, not unlike his younger Continental
counterpart, Kant. He was and is a key figure of the Enlightenment overall, and of the Scottish
Enlightenment and Scotland in particular.
We will direct our attention to aspects of this latter Hume. I am not ready to concede
totally to MacIntyre’s premise that Hume was the thinker who handed Scotland’s mind and thus
its body to England. One Hume probably did do this, but another Hume, Welsh’s OrnsteinHume, set the groundwork for something else. When McGlone chooses Popper as his theoretical
predecessor, he violates one of the basic Humean tenets: Reason is not primary, but secondary.
Consequently, knowledge is not a miraculous, pure, linear, and impeccably logical unfolding of
destiny. On the contrary, knowledge is when two forces—bodies or passions—come into
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contact and spark an impression. Even then, knowledge might merely be an intuition or a
partially apprehended event. It might form the basis of a new habit, or it might rupture
habituated knowledge (beliefs, assumptions, and the like) to open the way for other probabilities.
One’s imagination might encourage him or her to move toward another probability, connecting
impressions that would lead to the materialization of that probability, and perhaps rupturing the
status quo. Or one’s imagination might entangle a probability in fantasy, thereby disabling its
materialization. 191 Is there some tool or filter that might help knowledge out of its logjams,
ensuring fidelity between impressions and material reality?
Enter logos. Reason is what Hume calls a “calm passion,” which functions as mechanism
that situates impressions and ideas so that they do not become bogged down in contradiction,
imagination, and so forth.192 With reason, therefore, Hume does not provide us a path
connecting experience with a predetermined end. In other words, he is not giving us a treasure
map with an “x” marking the spot. He provides us with something much more democratic and
ethical. Before us, he lays out how we actually know—through materially grounded interaction,
emotion, connection, correlation, speculation, and correction. What Hume calls reason is fidelity
to a truth emerging from a situation. Reasoning, therefore, is mapping out the materials before
us so that we have firmer ground to stand on. We put them into their possible combinations. As
we do so, we begin to place them in their most valid or probable combinations, corresponding to
the particular characteristics of a given situation. And from the present’s probabilities, we can
then project future probabilities. Then, of course, when we enter the future—the next present—
we will continue likewise: locating, situating, correcting, and projecting truths. Hume,
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Hume 250.
Hume 179. Compare to Hutcheson’s characterization of the moral sense, discussed in chapter 3.
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therefore, finds in humans the ability to produce understanding of the is but also the ability to
produce what can be by working rigorously with what is.
Is, though, is apprehended first and foremost from what is immediate, according to
Hume. Extrapolating his thought, the immediate includes not only immediate objects, immediate
needs, immediate family, and so forth; it also includes the immediate social, cultural, economic,
and historical forces that each human encounters. In larger part, Hume’s philosophy does not
support radical bourgeois individualism, in which humans, by some execution of individual will,
single-handedly and ahistorically form the universe to their liking (that ultra-Calvinist capitalist
God rears it head again). Instead, as Marx later would, he finds the individual human being to be
a focal point from which to ascertain what some have called human nature or humanity—but
what we, following Marx, have been calling species-being.
The individual is the integration of diverse forces in a specific time and locale which
congregates with other individuals. Preceding Marx, Hume observes that general human
experience, which is shared through the social interaction of individual humans, enables humans
to produce their world.193 As a consequence, we come face to face with one of Hume’s most
important insights—the speculative, or creative, nature of the labor of human knowledge.
Knowledge is projective; that is, knowledge is built in the spatiotemporal immediate but is
193

At one point in the third book of Treatise, the revolutionary Hume emerges right in the middle of a
passage by the conservative Hume: “Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions. . . . Nature has . . .
trusted [human relations] entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac’d in the mind any peculiar original
principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were
sufficient to lead us” (526). Even though the sentences surrounding these intend to substantiate civil society with
“three fundamental laws of nature”—stability of possession, its transference by consent, and performance of
promises—these two sentences point to an alternative, emergent probability—the common. Elsewhere, Hume
becomes even more explicit about the importance of the common: “Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all
enjoyment . . . and that because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his
fellow creatures. . . . The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more
shall we be familiarized to [our] general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse
could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other” (An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals 109, 115).
Compare to Karl Marx: “Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite
stage of social development—production by social individuals” (Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of
Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus [New York: Penguin, 1993] p. 85).
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always opening to possibilities. With this characteristic of speculative knowledge, we approach
the next portion of our answer to the question, “Whither Scotland?”
4.3 Third Enlightenment Strand: Cognitive Cartography
How are Scotland and the Scots possible? Let us turn again to “The Twa Dogs” for
suggestions. Through the personages of two dogs, Burns demystifies the terrain before him.
Granted, he does retain a fondness for certain aspects of the “cot-folk’s” sociocultural life;
however, and most significantly, he undermines the nobleness of both poverty and affluence. He
distributes blame to all Scots for Scotland’s status, which is a negative affirmation: because of
their own acquiescence and self-destruction, Scotland and the Scots are not only possible but
regrettably very real. They are instrumental in the production of Scottish subordination in
general and their self-defeating estate system in particular. What Burns does is this: he takes the
status quo of Scotland—a dissolute, subordinate stateless nation that may not even be a nation—
and galvanizes it. Conflict was always probable because residual and emergent socio-cultural
energies existed before the Scots even came to the west of Scotland from Ireland in the fourth
and fifth centuries AD, and after they entered into the Union in 1707. Class conflicts, existing
before and after feudalism, were always probable; however, because of various historical and
material reasons, they had not been systematically activated or they had settled into bad sense,
submerged under residual forces. Burns, however, makes a systematic attempt to activate or
transform latent energies by intentionally agitating underlying conflicts. He does so by
employing a challenging though well-worn literary structure, allegorical estate satire. As noted
above, he modifies that genre by placing the meaningful action or labor off stage and into the
world of the spectator. And, not unlike what Swift does to the Irish in “A Modest Proposal,”
Burns turns his dramatic poem against Scots to ostensibly spur them into resisting his
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characterizations of them. Effectively, Burns makes it impossible for Scotland and the Scots to
not exist. He vivisects them, which ironically affirms their existence and promotes their
autonomy.194
By means of a discursive trick, he encourages a situation in which not becoming an active
subject is invalid, even if one begins out of anger, pride, and so forth. But unlike Swift, a virtual
outsider in Ireland during his time, Burns’s ability to alter his and Scotland’s situation is more
likely. His poems and songs not only point to how Scotland was, but they also point toward
envisioning and building alternative probabilities for Scotland. On the surface, poems like “The
Twa Dogs,” “Holy Willie’s Prayer,” and “Robert Bruce’s March to Bannockburn” might seem to
do little more than chastise the Scots for their failures. In the case of “To a Mouse,” for instance,
humans in general are taken to task: their “best-laid schemes” are bound to fail when they are
disconnected from the ground of daily human life.195 (Moreover, if Burns seems harsh, Welsh’s
critiques of Scots make Burns’s pale in comparison.) However, despite patinas of cynicism,
fatalism, and disappointment, there is something highly affirming in Burns’s satirical and
polemical poems. (The same goes for Welsh’s fiction.) How is this possible? A complex
productive practice of mapping is sparked in each literary instance.
There is a strong mapping tradition in Scottish letters since, if not before, the
Enlightenment. Moreover, there is arguably a national purpose in this mapping, whether
intentional or not. In the eighteenth century, Tobias Smollett’s Humphry Clinker and Janet
Schaw’s Journal of a Lady of Quality are good examples of this tradition. In the Romantic and
194

In this respect, Burns reflects the third phase of the native intellectual theorized by Frantz Fanon: such
an intellectual is one who defends “his nation’s legitimacy and who wants to bring proofs to bear out that
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Victorian phases, we have, as discussed, many of Robert Burns’s poems and songs, and we have
Robert Louis Stevenson’s stories as examples. Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s A Scots Quair and Hugh
MacDiarmid’s epic poem A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle are exemplary of the Modernist
period. And the postmodernists often turn to this cartographical tack: e.g. Alasdair Gray’s
Lanark, William McIlvanney’s Laidlaw mysteries, Duncan McLean’s Blackden, Candia
McWilliam’s Debatable Land, and A. L. Kennedy’s So I Am Glad. What they have in common,
despite their differences, is an acute consciousness of historical and psychological displacement
and fragmentation. Consequently, there is an impulse to map out the disjointed terrain before
them. But there is also uneasiness in these writers’ works when it comes to pinning things down
too much or marking out too definite a territory.
Tobias Smollett, for example, scatters his characters all over the United Kingdom, all the
way down into Wales, in Humphry Clinker.196 The theme of illegitimacy, the frequent
occurrence of absurd coincidences, the disjointed epistolary narrative, and the radically opposing
opinions and personalities make this book intentionally frustrating and hilarious. The Sterne-like
playfulness is, as it was for Lawrence Sterne, serious. A ragtag collection of individuals from
different generations, social classes, and typecasts are on individual or group pilgrimages. Like
The Canterbury Tales, the whole body of this eighteenth-century novel is a collective voyage.
But as we have noted about Burns’s poetry, the voyage is a dynamic process: A Scot builds
Scotland by first dispersing and then recombining its fragments.
In the next century, Robert Louis Stevenson similarly tracks down evidence and connects
the dots of a dualistic entity in The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.197 City streets,
buildings, rooms, and mental pathways reflect and influence each other. As the psychological
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thriller progresses, one may sense how the barriers between physical structures and
psychological states are all but nonexistent.
Then, in the early years of the postmodern phase, Alastair Gray’s Lanark takes things a
step further than its predecessors by making place and person indistinguishable while at the same
time making place and person continually mutable: both Lanark-the-person and Lanark-the-city
are subject to frequent, unexpected spatial and temporal anomalies.198 For instance, Lanark-theperson’s skin becomes that of a reptile. Buildings, roads, and other structures come and go
without explanation. Distances bear little relation to travel time. Time itself speeds up or slows
down depending on where a character is at a given moment. Close literary comparisons can be
made to Samuel R. Delany’s novel Dhalgren and his Neveryòn series.
The mapping in such works reflects and advances the insights of Hume’s speculative
philosophy discussed above. Hume is in good company with these writers, for his theories
helped open the door to the sorts of experiments his literary counterparts have pursued.
Speculative empiricism, which is as much a creative cognitive system as it is a
phenomenological or epistemological philosophy, brings to the fore not only situation-specific
analysis—mapping out the is—but it also insists on extrapolating probabilities. Expressly, if
some thing, some place, or some situation can be thought of, then it can be.199 To do this,
humans actually use the probabilities of the present—in the “medieval” space discussed in
chapter 2—to imagine something else, which makes that something else probable as well. The
veneers of apparently static sociocultural significations and predetermined historical movement
are pulled away, opening up alternative probabilities, situations, or spaces. To echo Hume,
speculation based on material reality enables us to break the hold of prejudice, which actually
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forces a disconnection from material reality.200 To borrow Hume’s famous phrasing, intransigent
custom and prejudice are based on what ought to be instead of what is.201 Hume’s theories,
though, enable us to project another world (or other worlds) from our world instead of referring
to idealized models.202 Hume’s avoidance of normative or predetermined systems points to his
ethic: sympathy for humans as they are and confidence in their productive capabilities. His
science, as he called it,203 demonstrates a conviction that humans can produce better ises when
they grapple with the is that they inhabit than by producing more oughts to escape it. This
Humean ethic may help us to understand why seemingly fantastic literature is in fact very
realistic, and it highlights the ever-present ability of humans to produce their world.
Thus, Humphry Clinker is not a chronicle of weird characters’ journeys and opinions. It
is a document of sociocultural and economic forces that affect Scottish identity. Mr. Hyde is not
just some monster that Stevenson created to thrill readers. He is a figure who calls attention to
the unsteadiness of identity, the limits of juridical and scientific laws. Lanark is not an
ungrounded aesthetic experiment. It is an attempt to situate humans in a society, if not a world,
that is consistent only in its instability. What we have are writers dealing with the materials they
have been dealt, and they are trying to locate and construct something different—and more
vital—out of those materials.
In chapter 2, we approached this topic of production from a more historiographical
viewpoint. We were interested primarily in locating the raw, or prehistorical, productive energy
that powered historical production, which we then explored further in chapter 3 when we
discussed the possibility of integrating that energy. Here, we will focus on how such production
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occurs in practice. The discussion about Humean epistemology that has brought us to this
point—specifically our focus on Hume’s speculative knowledge—lays the groundwork for an
exploration of the practice of mapping in the modern Scottish national context.
In good Humean fashion, we should probably first state the is of “The Twa Dogs” and
“The Two Philosophers.” Earlier, we looked at the poem in a more literary and historical way,
which is certainly appropriate. Now, we are going to move even deeper into the systems and
structures underpinning the tale. The “reason” that arguably controls the world of laird and
cottar in “The Twa Dogs” is a hybrid socioeconomic system that sets up what is, overall, a rigid
binary estate system: decaying clan society, pseudo-feudal hierarchies, and burgeoning
capitalism form the environment for Scotland’s exploitative, self-absorbed property owners and
stoic, self-destructive laborers. This system is completely “reasonable” to the people of the
poem, for it satisfies the ideals of an established hierarchy that both the higher and lower orders
accept and perpetuate. Indeed, this system was still at work in Burns’s time, perpetuating the
cruelly rational predestinarian logic discussed in the preceding chapter: some are the a priori
elect, and most are the a priori reprobate. According to that system’s members, therefore, they
lived in a civil society. But to continue as Hume would instruct us, we should see if there are
other probabilities emerging from the is before us.
The dogs, contrary to human common sense, find the human social system to be totally
irrational and anything but civil. In fact, they ultimately find it to be pathological. The satirist
himself, Burns, obviously discerns not only a radically antihuman logic in this system; he finds a
radically anti-Scottish one. If not acknowledged as secondary to basic biological and
psychological needs and labor, the logos and the civitas founded on it are biologically, socially,
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and morally destructive to humans in general and to Scots in particular. The dogs give us a
starting point from which to move toward probabilities they do not actually state but imply.
The similarities between Welsh’s “The Two Philosophers” and its eighteenth-century
predecessor might not be readily apparent beyond their literary affinities; however, they both
confront similar situations, and they similarly open up to alternative probabilities. The “reason”
that rules late-twentieth century academia in Scotland echoes eighteenth-century social
hierarchies. Before the two philosophers even step foot into Brechin’s Bar, Ornstein’s thesis has
been proved. Knowledge is contextually determined—determined by time, space, material
factors, ideological factors, cultural factors, and so forth. It depends on human beings, their
social interaction, and their usage of materials at a given time, in a given place. The very fact
that two intellectuals have been having the same argument for years—at conferences, in journals,
and so forth—points to the existence of certain material realities: The academic world to which
they belong is only possible in a particular socioeconomic environment. Not unlike international
corporations, “The Academy” is really a collection of fragmented bourgeois enclaves throughout
a generally impoverished world. The University of Glasgow is a case in point. Glasgow, one of
the first industrialized “New Towns” in Europe, is now like so many towns of its kind: the
greater number of its inhabitants are trapped in cycles of poverty and in unsatisfying jobs
because of dried up industries, while those in the minority are mobile professionals who live and
work in areas practically removed from the larger material reality. The very idea that a dialogue
about knowledge is restricted to trained professionals is also an indicator of a hierarchy similar to
the one uncovered in Burns’s poem. Institutionally recognized intellectuals—patronized by the
ruling class via universities, endowments, grants, and so forth—are the postmodern equivalents
of the laird’s flunkies. They have very little knowledge of the labor that actually creates and
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maintains the basic material and societal structures that enable academic discourse, publishing,
and so on.
The auld Tommys of the world are integral to the intellectual labor of the philosophers,
yet the academy is inaccessible to them. Welsh, through Ornstein, accordingly points out that
knowledge is only possible through reintegrating the so-called immaterial labor of intellectuals
and the material labor of machinists, bartenders, neds, and the like.204 Or to put it more bluntly,
as Welsh does, the mind has to be embodied, literally connected to the physical world.
Knowledge can no longer be the monopoly of one select group of humans. Knowledge is
generated by everyone, and therefore, it must be redistributed to everyone in order for it to be
viable. Scotland, along with many places like it, is subordinate because of disintegration and
misdistribution; consequently, as we are suggesting here from a Humean-Marxist perspective,
distinguishing between lack in materials and lack in knowledge is superfluous. Accordingly,
Scotland’s self-concept and historical material status are practically one and the same. So, again,
one might ask, “How Scotland?”
To find out how something occurs, it is advisable to find out what that something is made
of. Systems and structures—whether social, economic, or symbolic—are founded on a particular
historical-material ground. This goes for nations, too, which are systems composed of a matrix
of other systems.
In “The Twa Dogs,” Burns first gives us specific references to establish a ground. We
know, for instance, that the dogs are not only in Scotland, but in a specific area of Scotland. The
place that bears the “name o’ auld king COIL” is Kyle, Ayrshire. Burns launches the tale from
very near the place of his birth, which is culturally and socially more similar to the Border
204
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Marches and Highlands than it is to the Central Belt, the power center of Scotland during the
eighteenth century. So Burns situates the tale in a Scotland frequently ignored or made exotic.
Moreover, the poem is unmistakably situated in the eighteenth century. References throughout
the poem to cottars (tenant farmers) and the relationship they had with lairds (landed gentry in a
pseudo-feudal system) are references to an economic phenomenon that really came into being
after the Reformation, the revolution that began the disintegration of monarchic hegemony north
and south of the Borders. Moreover, by explicitly invoking an ancient Scottish king’s name,
Burns connects Scotland to a pre-English past, when the Gaels who emigrated from Ireland, the
Dalriada Scots, were settling the western coast and islands, and when they were absorbing the
Picts to the north and battling the Brythonic Celts to the south. A temporal marker also opens a
fertile seam at the base of Scotland. The placement of the poem in June puts it close to the
Summer Solstice, one of the most holy days in ancient agrarian religions, including the religion
of the Celts. This connection is suggestive because of the dualistic characteristics and possibly
emergent message of the poem. According to Celtic myth, the Summer Solstice is the time of
year when heaven and earth are married; consequently, the sun god impregnates the earth
goddess in order to secure his rebirth following the winter. It is also the mythical death of the
oak king, which enables him to transform into his winter double, the holly king. Burns was wellversed in Scotland’s folklore, so such mythological elements cannot be ruled out as part of the
ground. Thus, in the first stanza of “The Twa Dogs,” before we even get to Caesar and Luath,
we already have a ground that implies all of Scottish history, from the days of Gaelic chieftains
to a beautiful midsummer day in the eighteenth century.
Welsh, on the other hand, presents us with a ground that consists of one of the
Enlightenment’s most profound epistemological battles, and it contains a Scottish common sense
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haunted by self-congratulatory defeatism.205 The philosophical concerns of the Enlightenment
were symptoms of dramatic changes since the Renaissance: in technology, politics, population,
economics, literacy, and so on. Just as Scotland’s folk history is not erased from the world of
two Enlightenment dogs, the Scottish Enlightenment haunts the world of two postmodern
philosophers. Moreover, as reflected in the work of Hutcheson and Hume, Scotland’s
contributions to the Enlightenment include the notion that humans are interconnected at a deep,
practically physiological level. The punches and kicks flying in the last quarter of “The Two
Philosophers” literally drive that notion home. Welsh also locates in the ground a consistent
tendency in Scotland to protect itself by abandoning itself—in effect, success through failure. In
the name of conservatism or “classical liberalism” or provincialism, Scots have facilitated
Scotland’s subordinate status and its subservience to Scottish and, thus, English elites.206
So, is “The Twa Dogs” a medieval tale? Is “The Two Philosophers” actually an
eighteenth-century argument? Burns’s poem is modern; likewise, Welsh’s tale is postmodern.
Even if many of their materials are obviously from the past, both tales are significantly
determined by their particular situations. Neither tale is based in the past, but the materials of the
past are integral to their grounds. As we discussed in chapter 2, the present does not produce
itself ex nihilo, out of nothing. The past comprises the materials from which the present and,
therefore, the future are made. There is a continuum of substances, even though the forms may
differ: history does not repeat itself, but it does build on or transform itself with materials
produced along the way. Therefore, a ground is a rich, dynamic space of the present.
So, now that we have located a ground for both literary works, what do we do? First, we
might think back to the problem presented in the previous section, “Whether Scotland?” The
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problem was generally resolved by pointing to a negative affirmation: Scottish antisyzygy—
whether historical, philosophical, artistic, or psychological—is proof of Scotland. The
question—“Is there a Scotland?”—asserts Scotland’s existence. This might still seem too
abstract, even if it is not an abstraction according to speculative empiricism. An initial reading
of Burns’s poem, for example, could understandably lead one to believe that Scotland is
disintegrating beyond hope, that it has been thrown to the dogs, that it practically does not exist.
One would be justified in assuming that Burns is just pointing out Scotland’s success at being a
failure. But even in a brief analysis of the first stanza, we have found a Scotland that is an
undeniable and rich historical-material reality. This does not mean, though, that Scotland’s
status, as presented throughout the tale, is the healthiest of probabilities. As a consequence, we
are endeavoring here not only to validate a negative affirmation but to also demonstrate how
Scotland can exist affirmatively despite its subordinate and self-destructive status. Establishing a
ground is the first step in mapping out what Burns and Welsh present to us. With that said, we
are now ready to do some mapping.
Designating a ground and mapping out from it—versus, for instance, establishing a
prefabricated national ideal and making everything fit into it—better enables us to understand
how Scotland exists and what forms it can take. This directly and intentionally reflects an
insight of recent cognitive science: instead of forming knowledge according to strict semantic
rules or to an ideal, humans build knowledge spatially and temporally from a particular
experiential location while tapping into a densely packed set of materials. Humans do what is
called mental mapping,207 which is a major recent discovery and subject of analysis. To
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investigate an instance of mental mapping, one in fact has to conduct mental mapping oneself.
Accordingly, we will conduct a fairly thorough mapping of Burns’s Scotland in “The Twa Dogs”
to illustrate the process, as well as introduce the terminology used by cognitive scientists to
explain that process. Then, we will be prepared to conduct a briefer but more interpretive
analysis of contemporary Scotland via “The Two Philosophers.” 208
Through his presentation of the dogs’ dialogues, Burns expands the ground, Scotland,
through cognitive construction.209 In cognitive construction, mental spaces are opened up from
the ground, S in this case (Figure 4.1).210

S

Figure 4.1
With the production of new spaces comes the possibility of producing even more spaces. Spaces
can then connect to others, self-correct according to new data, and so forth.211 As a consequence,
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the ground and the knowledge it produces can expand. This is certainly a dialectical process, and
according to leading practitioners of mental mapping theory, it is an experiential and
physiological phenomenon. 212 “The Twa Dogs” is a compelling instance of this process in
action.
Before Caesar and Luath even speak, they expand the ground by entailing rich historical
materials. Caesar enters first, and his very characteristics imply correctly that Scotland or at
least certain classes in Scotland are involved in maritime activities that connect Scotland to the
Continent: “he was nane o’ Scotland’s dogs; / But whalpet some place far abroad, / Whare
sailors gang to fish for Cod” (lines 10-12). International relations have proved profitable, as
Caesar’s engraved gold collar indicates (lines 14-15). Luath, on the other hand, implies a more
landlocked and less materially profitable side of Scotland, which historians say was the dominant
side of Scotland during the period: “The tither was a ploughman’s collie” (line 23).213 However,
as noted earlier, Luath implies non-capitalist wealth, for lack of a better term; Luath also entails a
connection to Scotland’s mythological, Gaelic past.
Through these two dogs, Burns is able to first designate two focal points, or referents, in
a frame of reference. The frame we will be using relates to the material history of eighteenthcentury Scotland; accordingly, the referents are the elites and the lower-level laborers, which we
will respectively designate a and b.214 He also begins opening spaces215: C for Caesar and L for

“Experience soon teaches us [the] method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where
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Luath. When Caesar is introduced, frame a is established in the ground, and space C is created;
when Luath arrives, frame b is established in the ground and space L is created (Figure 4.2).

S

C

a

b

a: elites
b: laborers

L

Figure 4.2
From this point on, each consecutive passage of dialogue creates a new space: e.g. Ci, Lj, Ck,
Ll, and so forth. And these spaces connect through references to the foci a and b. 216
When Caesar does speak, he refers to the hegemonic minority of Scotland, a, from which
he comes; he does so on his way to focusing on the marginal majority of Scotland, b, from which
Luath comes. Caesar first comments on the fact that the laird and even lower-level servants on
the laird’s estate eat “a dinner, / Better than ony Tenant-man / His Honor has in a’ the lan’: / An’
what poor Cot-folk pit their painch in, / I own it’s past my comprehension” (lines 66-70). Based
on the materials to which he has access, Caesar’s first space is connected to the ground via a1’s
reference to referent a, and b1’s reference to referent b. Caesar maps out a cottars’ Scotland in
which hunger and destitution are the norm. Most of Luath’s first response (lines 71-82) validates
Caesar’s assessment, so C’s fidelity to the ground is to this point intact. Nevertheless, Luath
adds a little more information: “But how it comes, I never kent yet, / [That his master’s people
are] maistly wonderfu’ contented; / An’ buirdly chiels, an’ clever hizzies, / Are bred in sic a way
contextual specifications” (Fauconnier 12). There is a high probability that each situation can have multiple frames
and referents. However, for the purposes of clarity, focusing on a smaller number of frames and referents at a time
can yield deeper results.
215
These are also known as “cognitive domains.”
216
Mental spaces are “externally linked by connectors, that relate elements across spaces, and more
generally, structures across spaces” (Fauconnier 39).
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as this” (lines 83-86). Despite the cottars’ lack of nourishment, they find some way to live, if not
thrive. Therefore, L is connected to the ground by b2 referring to referent b (Figure 4.3).

a

S

b

a: elites
b: laborers

b1

a1

b2

C

L

Figure 4.3
Something significant occurs after Luath makes his observation. Caesar is not ready,
based on the empirical evidence before him, to accept Luath’s information. In effect, he points
out the lack of fidelity in Luath’s space L. He notices how Luath and his people are “negleket . .
. huff’d, an’ cuff’d, an’ disrespeket,” and equated with cattle (lines 87-90). Then he goes on to
describe how inhumanely the laird treats them (lines 93-100). He concludes that “surely poorfolk maun be wretches” (line 102). Therefore, Caesar creates space Ci, which is an expansion
beyond C based on the additional data. It connects to the ground by linking b3 to b1; because it
downplays Luath’s data, though, the link is indicated by a broken line (Figure 4.4).217
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Figure 4.4
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Because a1 has so far proved faithful to a, a is presumed to be entailed by it; therefore, a1 practically
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Luath, “a gash an’ faithful tyke” (line 29), cannot disagree with the presence of elements
in Caesar’s construction, but he adds new, more substantial data to the mix, elements about
which Caesar had been ignorant. Luath provides a litany of the “poor-folk’s” riches, which
include their families, conversations about religion and politics, harvest celebrations, New Year
merry-making, and so forth. To drive the point home, Luath adds, “My heart has been sae fain to
see them, / That I for joy hae barket wi’ them” (lines 137-138). The collie, therefore, creates
space Lj, connected to the ground via a link between b4 and b2 (Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5
Despite Caesar’s earlier doubts, Luath’s mapping has proved its faithfulness to the ground. In
fact, with the emergence of space Lj, Ci cannot stand as it is and be valid.
To retain fidelity in his mapping and thus project probability, Caesar would have to
construct another space to establish fidelity to the ground, Cij, connected by a link between b5
and b3, as well as a cross-spatial connection via a link between b5 in Cij to b4 in Lj. This in turn
would correct the misapprehensions of the first Ci. However, it is important to note that even if a
previous space might be invalidated, in part or whole, it is still conserved. 218 No materials are
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lost, just re-calibrated. Caesar, though, does not actually construct Cij in the poem.
Nevertheless, based on the dialectical nature of the poem and on the personalities of the
characters, Caesar would presumably create such a space and branch off from it, and that is why
we will still construct the space (Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.6
The turn of the poem comes about halfway in the poem—at the twenty-first stanza, right
after Luath discloses that he has barked in joy with the “Cot-folk.” Luath brings his attention to
the people of the higher estate, the world of Caesar’s laird. He sees an increase in greedy rascals
entering the aristocracy, doing their best to destroy laborers and undermining the noblesse oblige
of nobility who “aiblins, thrang a parliamentin, / For Britain’s guid his saul indentin” (lines 14448). So, Luath opens space Lk, connecting it to the ground by linking b6 to b4 and a2 to a (Figure
4.7).

will then remain in force for the mental spaces into which it has floated. In other words, inheritance is not an ‘all or
nothing’ process” (62). Hume would say that such residues are possibilities that lack vivacity and vigor.
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Figure 4.7
It is at this point that a mapping situation emerges which is parallel to the one that
focused on the laborers. Sometimes forgiving to a fault, Luath has constructed a space in which
the higher Scottish nobility is noble in every sense of the word, but the lower nobility and
ascending aristocracy are not. Caesar is quick to provide Luath with more accurate and, for
Luath, incredible data. The nobility, their cronies, and all their flunkies are the scourge, not
stewards, of Britain. They are far from being “For Britain’s guid! [They are] for her destruction!
/ Wi’ dissipation, feud an’ faction!” (lines 169-70). Caesar creates space Cl, which links to the
ground by way of a link between a3 and a1. Caesar’s evidence causes Luath to create a new
space, Llm. Llm reflects Caesar’s information and is connected via links between a4, a3, and a2.
Like Cij, Llm reestablishes fidelity to reality. But unlike Caesar earlier on, Luath continues to
equivocate and thus also creates another, counterintuitive, space. Ln is a space Luath constructs
to perpetuate his idealization of not only the nobility but also of the cottars. He imagines that if
the upper classes would only take part in more folk activities, then they would be honorable once
again (lines 175-88). He connects this space via linking a5 and a4, as well as b7 to b6. These
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connections mean that space Ln still includes Caesar’s information but in a repressed form, hence
the broken lines in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8
If Luath had been shocked into denial by having his romantic view of the nobility
shattered, Caesar is apoplectic by Luath’s insistence on rehabilitating the laird’s set. He
exclaims, “L—d man, were ye but whyles where I am, / The gentles ye wad ne’er envy them!”
(lines 289-90). As Luath does in stanzas fifteen through twenty, Caesar provides a litany of facts
about the higher estate. Unlike Luath’s litany, though, Caesar’s does not provide a flattering
picture of his estate. He also uses the actual, not idealized, facts of laborers’ existence to contrast
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the two estates. Caesar, therefore, constructs space Co, connecting to the ground by way of a
link between a6 and a3, and by linking b8 to his last reference to b, b5. As a consequence of the
information Caesar has shared, Luath would have to create another space, Lop, in order to retain
fidelity to reality. As with a similar situation mentioned above, this does not actually occur in
the poem, but we will go ahead and assume that such a projection would occur. Despite
instances of Luath’s folkloric conservatism, he is generally affable and open-minded. Lop would,
therefore, be connected to b in the ground by linking b9 to b7 and cross-spatially to b8. It would
be connected to a by linking a7 to a5 and cross-spatially to a6 (Figure 4.9).
In their dialogue, which is effectively an exercise in Humean empiricism, the two dogs
have in fact refined, reintegrated, and consequently enlarged the ground they both come from.
When we refer to fidelity in mental mapping, we are actually delineating between possibility and
probability. The two instances in which Caesar and Luath lack fidelity to actual reality, they are
certainly still dealing with possibilities, but these possibilities do not reach the level of
probability. Particularly in Luath’s case, we are confronted with one of those oughts that so
perplex Hume, not to mention Caesar. Another consequence of the dogs’ exchanges is that they
have helped Burns reach his satirical objective: readers, presumably his contemporary Scots, are
encouraged to analyze themselves, to reconnect with the actual reality of Scotland, and to engage
in a little cognitive construction of their own. Now that we have the cognitive process and
terminology of mental mapping in hand, we can now explore what Welsh is up to in “The Two
Philosophers.”
Ornstein is the first to be introduced. Because of his Jewish-American and educational
background, Ornstein indicates that Scotland is an international place and is, at least
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superficially, a more tolerant society than it had sometimes been in the past. Moreover, by his
very affiliations in the US and in Edinburgh, along with his Marxist leanings, Ornstein expands
the ground of Scotland to effectively include all of Western academic and political thought.
Ornstein is also greatly aware of his physical and social surroundings. Consequently, the story is
filled with references that help connect not only the reader to the narrative but also to its ground.
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McGlone, on the other hand, demonstrates cosmopolitan insularity: he is a snob. As a member
of the recently ascended Scottish bourgeoisie, he has very little interest in associating with fellow
Glaswegians; nevertheless, he is a philosophical universalist, believing that all humanity is
connected through idealized reason. His perspective, though, broadens the ground by connecting
it both to a specific class phenomenon that has occurred in variations throughout modern Scottish
history and also to a general philosophical phenomenon of modern Western history. So, we have
from our initial contacts with Ornstein and McGlone two parallel spaces produced out of the
ground of Scotland, much as we did with Caesar and Luath.
Beyond the two spaces created by the introduction of the two characters, Welsh’s story
does not begin mapping in earnest until halfway through, when Ornstein and McGlone leave the
bar at the university hostelry. So that we do not wander too far abroad, it is helpful to point out
focal points, which for us are also referents, and their frame of reference. The philosophers’
respective positions on epistemology supply us our focal points, and our frame is knowledge in
postmodern Scotland: McGlone is the defender of one focus, bourgeois rationalism; and
Ornstein is the advocate for what he calls unknown knowledge, the other focus. When Ornstein
and McGlone disembark from the subway, they enter Govan, a working-class section of
Glasgow.
Immediately, another space opens up, and it is related to McGlone. Among his
colleagues and students, he poses as a man who pulled himself out of the mean streets of
Glasgow, but the truth is something different. In fact, he did not grow up in a Govan but in
middle-class Newton Mearns, where he “had led quite a closeted life” (“The Two Philosophers”
113). Alternatively, from Ornstein’s side, a space opens up that connects the Chicagoan’s
Jewish-Irish neighborhood to this place that is a “mixture of the traditional and new” peppered
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with vacant lots (“The Two Philosophers” 113). On the surface, these two instances of cognitive
construction might seem unrelated to the frame we are using. They are autobiographical details
about class, place, and personal identity. Nevertheless, as the story proceeds, the frame and
spaces are integral to expanding the ground for the next instances of construction. Govan is
unknown knowledge, but by comparing it to known knowledge, South Chicago, Ornstein is able
to proceed. Unknown knowledge becomes known knowledge, which opens access to more
unknown knowledge. Particular situations, such as one’s place of origin, are not ends in
themselves but are access points to more spaces.
No sooner has Welsh disclosed these personal references to the two philosophers than
Ornstein has to ask for directions to the nearest pub. An elderly woman points them to the spot,
Brechin’s Bar. Ornstein, who is not up on his Scots pronunciations even if he represents Humethe-Scot, mispronounces the name: “Bretchin’s.” McGlone corrects him: “It’s Breekin’s Bar,
not Bretchin’s” (“The Two Philosophers” 113). Then, Ornstein associates the correctlypronounced name with a town in Scotland by the same name. He assumes, therefore, that the
clientele’s football loyalties will be with the town indicated by the name, but he is wrong, as
McGlone points out. The color blue on the game strips worn by the people going into the pub
signifies the Rangers Football Club.
Such seemingly mundane details are significant to the mental mapping and, therefore, to
mapping this tale. Each instance, however mundane, supplies the materials for building spaces.
In Welsh’s tale, Ornstein consistently demonstrates his epistemological stance by not wasting
any moment and the materials each moment contains. Ornstein quickly opens up a new space,
and its viability is established by the link he makes with the previously unknown, despite some
of the invalid conclusions he draws. What he does not know does not keep him from
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constructing knowledge. McGlone, as the voice of reason, intercedes. This will force Ornstein,
if his cognitive construction is to be valid, to modify his knowledge by constructing new spaces.
Ornstein, like Caesar and Luath before him, does not seem to be someone who would be too
resistant to modifying previous spaces by building new ones that include new data. Because of
the sensitivity to signs Ornstein demonstrates throughout the tale, he will have little difficulty
creating spaces to accommodate proper pronunciations, differences in places despite nominal
similarities, and so forth.
Even though McGlone seems to have the upper hand on knowledge at this point, a look at
his own new spaces will demonstrate that he does not. As the narrator tells us, McGlone has led
a relatively closeted life, and he is consistently not willing to expand the walls of his knowledge.
In the moments after leaving the Underground, McGlone only opens new spaces in reaction to
Ornstein’s cognitive constructions. McGlone might possess data that Ornstein does not, but it is
Ornstein who opens up spaces in the face of new or “unknown” data, such as the location of a
pub or the team preferences of the local soccer enthusiasts. Regardless of how McGlone’s
cognitive processes function, he does nevertheless map out new spaces because he, too, is not
previously familiar with the situation into which Ornstein has led him. In effect, if he is to
continue on their little pilgrimage together, he has little choice but to open and enter new spaces.
The two philosophers enter the pub, Brechin’s Bar, and cognitive construction takes an
interesting, physical turn. To start with, both philosophers respectively build new spaces that
practically renovate preexisting academic structures. Where the official academy has failed in
growing knowledge, the pub reinvigorates it. In fact, the pub has more in common with the
academy envisioned by Scots during the Enlightenment than do the corporate institutions of
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higher learning that dominate today’s academy.219 The pub, as in the public’s place kept by a
publican, is an institution long tied to the sociocultural life of the common constituency, and in
Britain and Ireland, the pub is a particularly important institution for the working and lower
classes. Certainly, imbibing alcohol is part of the institution, but it is secondary or
complementary to its sociocultural functions, a fact that might escape some Americans. Ornstein
and McGlone also each create new spaces to accommodate their new peers, the two domino
players who not only serve as referees but also as philosophers. Of course, Ornstein has no
problem with constructing these spaces, while McGlone is resistant the whole time. As noted
above, though, when the discussion becomes more heated, it invites the younger pub goers to
intercede. Even with auld Tommy and his mate weighing in, Ornstein and McGlone cannot
seem to adequately deal with their age-old impasse. The drunken, bloated-faced Rangers fan and
his mates pick up on the friction, and they suspect that the two academics are doing the usual:
patronizing the lower estates in order to carry on their petty, self-serving activities, much like the
gentry Caesar describes to Luath a couple of centuries before.
It is important at this point to remember that McGlone and Ornstein have let the cat out
of the bag, as it were, because they have constructed and entered spaces that have not only
altered their discursive context. They have, through cognitive construction, entered into spaces
that include the working-class Glaswegian pub goers and their entailed experiences and thus
knowledge. The previously unknown to McGlone and Ornstein is seeping into the known, and it
quickly begins to flood in. Before they know it, the two philosophers have moved into positions
that overwhelm their biases and assumptions. Along their journey, they have been building up to
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this point where cognition becomes real.220 Knowing is when nerves, blood, muscle, fat, and
fluid work in concert to engage the world and produce something out of that engagement.
McGlone is not prepared for that engagement, which is why he cannot adequately counter
Ornstein’s punches when they have their fight on the street outside of the pub. All he can do is
express surprise. McGlone is incapable of employing the data (materials and energies) that he
has before him, and this inability consequently keeps him from building new spaces. He is
literally hard-headed. There is no remarkable change in his attitude even after his skull hits the
curb. His inability to adequately fight his way out of this situation indicates that he has again
entered another epistemological cul-de-sac, but this time the cul-de-sac is not one that protects
his elite status. He tries to disconnect once more from the world and the actual knowledge that is
produced in it—the is. However, each blow by Ornstein and then by the police will not permit
him to return to the realm of ought, where he would continue to alienate the power of knowledge
from the ground. On the other hand, Ornstein has, through open reception of materials and
through cognitive construction, approached and then built strong connections to what had
previously been unknown. Possibility becomes probability. As a consequence, each punch or
kick Ornstein gives to McGlone is a resistance against the violence of epistemology founded on
fantasy and prejudice—the antihuman core of preclusive reason.
It would be understandable if one assumed that McGlone is basically a tweed-wearing
bearer of wisdom, not much of a threat to anyone except maybe his students at grading time.
One would hardly suspect him of being a cold-blooded authoritarian, perhaps the academic
version of the trainspotting books’ Begbie or Filth’s D. S. Robertson. When, however, we look
at what he represents in relation to knowledge and thus to human life, he is a very real threat.
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Above, I noted that actual cognitive construction does not begin in earnest until midway through
Welsh’s tale. We find out near the beginning of “The Two Philosophers” that cognitive
construction has been in a “cul-de-sac” for most of these two academicians’ “parallel careers”
(112, 111). The first half of the story does nothing more than document the virtually paralyzed
status of knowledge. This is important documentation because it indicates the fact that human
cognitive construction is not automatic and can be thwarted by the protectors of official
knowledge. Knowledge runs into dead ends because individuals can short-circuit knowing by
abstracting it, restricting it, or as Jean-François Lyotard warned, cashing it in for vulgar
performativity.221
McGlone, of course, does not really mind this dead-ended situation. He is a respected
intellectual with a secure position at a respectable Scottish university, and this is not to mention
he has students flattering him and making sexual overtures toward him. In other words, he has
accumulated a lot of cultural capital, and risking the loss of it is not a likely option. Therefore,
he is one of the bastions of the ruling orders, policing the very aspect of human life that makes
humans human—the ability to transform materials into thought and thought into materials.
McGlone perpetuates the disintegration of labor power, separating the human work of knowing
from the work of being and becoming.
To say the least, Ornstein is the veritable voice in the wilderness professing knowledge
that is not sanctioned by the McGlones of the world. He is deeply troubled by the status quo, a
status quo that alienates and hoards knowledge. He is not only conscious of the intellectual
surrender his and McGlone’s academic deadlock represents; he is also aware of the dire
sociopolitical implications that will arise if production of “legitimate” knowledge continues to be
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divorced from general human life. He knows that another conference presentation, article in a
refereed journal, or class lecture is not going to help the situation either. So he turns to what has
never let him down before: “unknown science,” the kind of science that Hume proposed two
centuries before and that ultimately prohibited Hume from university posts. The primary
Humean element of knowledge, an impression sparked by passion, comes most explicitly in
Ornstein’s first punch. Before the University of Edinburgh professor knows it, the citadel of
knowledge, as personified by McGlone, crumbles to the ground. New knowledge floods in.
After the fight and after the police station, Ornstein returns to the streets, and like his literary
predecessors Caesar and Luath, he descends into the very ground from which he emerged. He
reenters the Underground, where the public transport system will presumably carry him and his
significantly expanded knowledge into Scotland, where he will connect and construct
knowledge. Ornstein, along with other Welsh characters, expresses a basic human need to
imagine and realize other probabilities. Nevertheless, as cognitive construction implies and as
“The Twa Dogs” and “The Two Philosophers” demonstrate, there are multiple probabilities.
4.4 Enlightenment Virtue: Emergence
We have covered here two aspects of the question, “Whither Scotland.” Is Scotland
possible? And if so, how so? We have answered by way of looking at the interrelation of
cognitive construction grounded in Scottish historical-material experience. But we have actually
done more than that. We have encountered a productive process that is not just a matter of
abstract signification. Philosophers—from Socrates to the Stoics, from Hume to Marx, and from
Adorno to Derrida—have all pointed to the palpability of theory, to the worldly labor of thought.
There is no reason, therefore, to assume that particular situations, such as a nation, are split
between a material reality and a theoretical one—that the life of Scot who goes to the pub after a
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grueling day at the shipyard or unemployment line is divorced from what goes on in the
philosophy department at the University of Glasgow. Scotland is not the culmination of some
essence buried in the sinews and genes of the Volk; nor is it merely some imagined
community. 222 To be viable, it is an ongoing dialectic human process that employs material and
immaterial labor.
Above, I claimed that Welsh’s story had everything to do with Scotland. Scotland is
praxis, and mental mapping theory gives us a method to locate and analyze how that practice
works.223 One begins with particularity, but we quickly find that particularity is itself rich with
consequences. A single spatiotemporal site is an intersection where many materials flow, and
that the individual human is both a product and producer within such intersections. Moreover,
and just as important, the cognitive construction is not a monastic individualistic exercise. For it
to be valid and viable, it must be a radically cooperative venture. It is an open-ended pilgrimage
in which the pilgrims dialectically map out and build knowledge together. Burns and Welsh
illustrate this insight, and more significantly, they attempt to direct Scots to a praxis enabled by
the virtues of congregation and integration but motivated by a virtue of emergence. Poetry and
fiction, therefore, are not academic to these writers. Writing is material. Writing is politics.
Writing is ethics.
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How Scotland is probable brings us closer to what kind of Scotland is probable in the
postmodern phase. For a nation that is also not one, what is Scotland to be? Being a nation or a
nationalist does not by itself guarantee good sense. Nations, national identities, and nationalisms
come in all sorts of forms, and they do not necessarily demonstrate fidelity to truths, to
experiential grounds, or to human life in general. We are constantly—and rightly—reminded
that the modern period was rife with instances of nations and nationalisms that base themselves
on exclusion and even extermination. The glaring examples, of course, are Germany in the
1930s and Rwanda in the 1990s. In both of these cases, racial essentialism was used as a brutal
means to national ends. Others, such as the former Soviet Union and today’s imperial United
States, formulate themselves according to abstract ideals executed through mechanical systems,
whether they are called bureaucracies, social services, or something other. The USSR employed
an extremely rational antihuman framework in the name of equality. The US employs a highly
mobile, protean, and hydra-like collection of systems that defuse resistance in the name of
freedom. Brutality is not far removed from either of these systems either, just obscured a bit by
the respective ideal adopted by each. There are also nations and nationalisms founded on
resistance against or emancipation from an oppressor. South Africa and the Republic of Ireland
are examples. These are nations founded on opposition. To generalize, they have a bifurcated
nature. On the one hand, they define themselves as former or current victims. On the other, they
define themselves according to a national character—ethnic, societal, or religious—that existed
before a colonial or imperial situation or that existed on such a situation’s margins. There are
many other examples, many of which are variations of the ones above or are hybrids. Again,
these are generalizations, but they reflect the dominant common sense about how and why
nations, national identities, and nationalisms are formed.
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Nevertheless, Scotland and most other “lesser” nations or societies do not fit neatly into
the sort of grand national narratives glossed above. Presumably all instances of human
socialization demonstrate one or more of the mentioned habits associated with building a nation
or nationalism. It is not uncommon for differences between people to be distilled into essences.
It is not uncommon for some shared aspiration or ideal to emerge in a human community. Most
groups of people have had a history of victimization or superiority or both. So, really, the kind
of nation or nationalism one has is really a matter of praxis. Thinking back to cognitive
construction for a moment, a nation or nationalism is characterized by the way it is mapped out,
the probabilities it opens up, the fidelity or lack of fidelity to its ground, the ability or choice to
correct itself according to new data, and so forth. In other words, a nation or nationalism is a
result of human production, which becomes a basis of further production.
Returning to the etymology of “ethics,” the ethos of a nation or nationalism is its use—its
praxis. But people’s use of something does not necessarily equate to “good” use, as we have
noted up to this point. And in this so-called postmodern and post-nationalist era, the uses of
nationalism are worthy of scrutiny, to say the least. Nevertheless, re-conceptualizing what it
means to be, say, a Vietnamese, Chilean, or Scottish nation today is perhaps a means—a praxis
driven by a virtue of emergence—by which not only to glimpse national possibilities but also to
produce the probability of a deeply connected, healthy global community.224 Doing so will help
us to explore in the next chapter a Scotland defined independently either of England or of a
nationalist ideal while not neglecting its subordination to imperialism and its own folkloric
residues. All of this will better enable us to conceive of a cooperatively constructed universal
truth—a truth that will materialize in the counterimperial multitude and will make an alternative
postmodern world a probability.
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Nevertheless, to emerge from “the nastiness,” as Spud calls it in Porno (284), without
inadvertently creating more nastiness, we will need to incorporate one more virtue into the praxis
that is the ethic of emergence: forgiveness.
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Chapter 5
Postmodern Loom: Emergence through Forgiveness
But Och! I backward cast my e’e,
On prospects drear!
An’ forward, tho’ I canna see,
I guess an’ fear!
—Robert Burns225
What awaits us is a history of liberation . . . relentless and as painful as it is
constructive. The constitution of strength is the experience itself of the
liberation of the multitudo. The fact that in this form and with this force
constituent power cannot but appear is irrefutable and that it cannot but impose
itself as hegemonic in the always renewed world of life is necessary. It is our
task to accelerate this strength and recognize its necessity in the love of time.
—Antonio Negri226

A sacred, magical brown bull, Donn Cuailnge, from ancient Cooley, Ireland, has escaped
and is charging through the Isle of Erin with an entourage of hundreds of cattle. All of the
ancient Scoti—the Irish—are after him because the rules of sovereignty depend on it. Medb, a
goddess who has been degraded to the level of a mortal queen by the time of the ancient Gaelic
epic Táin Bó Cuailnge, and her husband Ailill have had a domestic dispute over who has the
most power, using their individual material possessions as evidence. 227 They are equal in
everything except a bull that belongs to Ailill. Medb conspires to steal from Ulster Donn
Cuailnge, the most physically and magically powerful bull in Ireland. Her plan is perfect,
considering that the cattle raid (táin) will take place while the warriors of Ulster are paralyzed.
During holy periods, particularly during the Celtic new year of Samhain, the men of Ulster are
immobilized by birth pangs, as a result of a curse. But there is one warrior, Cúchulainn, who is
not affected by the curse, a fact Medb and the rest of Ireland comes to regret overlooking.
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Accompanied by his charioteer Laeg, the “Hound of Culann,” which is the meaning of
Cúchulainn’s name in Gaelic, becomes the sole protector of Ulster. Cúchulainn is Ulster’s King
Conchobor’s favorite hired sword, even though Cúchulainn comes from questionable parentage
and low estate. His special abilities in martial arts and his manic emotional condition prove
useful to the kingdom’s needs, even though Cúchulainn’s volatility is the cause of recurrent
comment and accommodation. When word gets to Cúchulainn about Medb’s plot and the
fugitive bull, he immediately takes on the bandits, which begins a full-fledged internecine war.
Among the fords and standing stones on the Murtheimne Plain, he single-handedly engages and
kills the majority of Ireland’s armies, including former friends and even a foster-brother. Only
after he has fended off four kingdoms’ warriors for over six months, and after he is near dead
himself, the Ulstermen recuperate from their pangs and come to assist Cúchulainn in the final
battle. But it is uncertain whether Conchobor and the Ulstermen are truly committed to the
cause. After a lengthy battle, Ireland, including Ulster, is exhausted by war, so it is decided that
Donn Cuailnge and Ailill’s bull will settle the dispute. The bull of Ulster wins against the bull of
Ireland and spreads his remains throughout the whole island. Nevertheless, Ireland remains at
war over the coming years, and Cúchulainn ultimately comes face to face with his deliverer, a
raven.
In the veldt of 1980s apartheid South Africa, a giant Marabou Stork and its entourage of
other Marabou Storks threaten to destroy all of the wildlife in a tropical paradise that Scottish
émigré and businessman Lochart Dawson plans to develop into elite housing and an upscale
nature preserve.228 None of the black Africans are, according to Dawson, up to the task of
protecting the property. So he hires Scots Roy Strang and Sandy Jamieson to take on the job of
finding and killing the marauding band of enormous, nightmarish birds. Roy is an unlikely
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mercenary because of his extreme lack of self-confidence. He is preoccupied about his and his
siblings’ parentage, his appearance, and his sexuality. He is also self-conscious about his
socioeconomic background, which is the root of most conflict between him and his employer.
Even so, he is even more committed than Dawson or Sandy when it comes to the task at hand.
The storks prove elusive but belligerent, so the closer Roy and his driver Sandy get to finding
them, the more carnage the birds create. The storks kill whole colonies of flamingos—thousands
of the birds—as well as anything else that gets in their way. Finally, though, in the last few
pages of Nightmares, Roy comes face to face with the leader of the Marabou Storks, the monster
and perhaps savior that he has been chasing throughout the book.
Both Cúchulainn and Roy might come across as variations of the sort of heroes so
popular in Hollywood movies. One can almost hear the screenwriter’s pitch: “Despite all
reasonable odds, a Celtic warrior faces duplicitous and horrifying foes to come out on top and rid
the world of evil.” To see our hypothetical pitch coming to fruition, one need only look to two
popular “Scottish” movies and an “Irish” memoir-turned-film-sensation that came out in the
1990s: Rob Roy (1995), Braveheart (1995), and Angela’s Ashes (1999, 2000). Celtic myth and
legend—whether Gaelic, Arthurian, Welsh, or Scottish—are rarely, if ever, unambiguous.
Indeed, it is uncertain how heroic Cúchulainn and Roy actually are. It is also unclear whether
the two are fighting against evil or fighting for it: both serve as mercenaries to less than credible
lords, an arrogant king and a sadistic capitalist, respectively. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed
to find in Gaelic mythology or Welsh’s body of work an unproblematic protagonist.
Cúchulainn’s and Roy’s death tales further articulate this ambiguity.
Years after The Táin, Cúchulainn has done his usual day’s work in a battle, singlehandedly cutting down hundreds of men and evading magic. Then, unexpectedly, he is mortally
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wounded by a cursed spear thrown by Lugaid, the son of a man who Cúchulainn betrayed and
had murdered. Cúchulainn’s life’s work of killing comes back to haunt him. Cúchulainn drags
himself to a standing stone, and with a belt, he defiantly straps himself upright to the stone so
that he does not sit or fall prone to the ground. This is when Morrígan, an enigmatic goddess
who commonly takes the form of a raven, lands on his shoulder. Her gesture is apparently what
signals Lugaid to come and finish his revenge by decapitating the Hound of Ulster.229 However,
it is unclear if Lugaid kills Cúchulainn. Perhaps the raven has delivered the hero from death
before Lugaid’s blade touches the Hound’s throat.
After Roy has chased the leader of the Marabou Storks for an indeterminate period of
time, a final confrontation occurs. “The large Stork was right there,” observes Roy, “But
something was far from right” (Nightmares 258). The scene and the personae in it keep
transforming into other places and other people. Roy has difficulty figuring out who is his
enemy: “I hear other voices shouting. Their faces are just at the periphery of my vision”
(Nightmares 261). Apparently, he, too, is affected by whatever strange force has descended on
the scene of the final battle, for his trusted companion Sandy has a gun pointed at him. In his
final moments, before Sandy pulls the trigger, Roy looks into a mirror and “sees the image of the
Marabou Stork. It’s on the flamingo . . . tearing into it, ripping it to shreds, but the flamingo’s
still alive, I see its dulled eyes” (Nightmares 262). Is this a reflection of something occurring in
the background? Is it an allegorical or clairvoyant image presented by an oracle-like mirror? Or
is Roy seeing himself, literally and figuratively? If so, is he the stork or the flamingo? We soon
get an idea in Roy’s final monologue:
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The sun is rising behind me and my shadow spills out away from it, out in front of
me. My spindly legs, my large overcoat, my massive beak . . . I have no visible
ears. . . . I have the gait of a comical scarecrow, I shuffle like an old man who has
shat his pants. . . . I spread my large, black wings. . . . (Nightmares 264)
Nevertheless, Sandy has turned his shotgun on Roy-the-Stork, and it goes off. As in
Cúchulainn’s case, it is unclear whether Roy-the-Stork flies away before or after the blast. Has
the bird delivered Roy to death, or from death?
We will soon return to that question.
It might seem odd that I would introduce such a markedly postmodern ethical system and
a markedly postmodern novel with a Gaelic epic that predates even the Fenian literature we
discussed in chapter 2. But juxtaposing them as ethical and literary documents of historically
distinct sociocultural situations that share common materials and energies helps to set the stage
for the following analysis.
Addressing their literary juxtaposition first, the similarities between Welsh’s Nightmares
and the ancient Gaelic Cúchulainn stories from the Ulster Cycle are, to say the least, remarkable.
They are both epics in form and scope. They are focused on extremely ambiguous characters.
They are written during historical periods of monumental conflict and change. They are both
“Scottish” in the sense that they respectively document 1) the situation of the people (the Scoti)
who would become the primary shapers of Scottish history during the first millennium AD, and
2) the situation of the people who will decide Scotland’s future as it enters the third millennium.
Even though these epics are from distinct time periods and are written in different styles
(one in Gaelic poetry, the other in modern prose), they share the same basic elements of their
shared genre. To achieve the objective of a quest that actually moves on many levels, the

187

protagonists must go on a journey that is mythological, emotional, and empirical. As epic
protagonists, Cúchulainn and Roy are allegorical figures. They are intended to represent
everyone. Nevertheless, because epics are typically tied to a particular sociocultural situation
(e.g. The Odyssey to ancient Greece or The Bluest Eye to black America), an epic’s protagonist
bears the unique problems and hopes of his or her particular situation. Therefore, Cúchulainn is
a representative of prehistorical Gaeldom, and Roy is a representation of postmodern Scotland.
The former situation is marked by severe unrest and transformation at the dawn of the Romandominated medieval period, and the latter marks a situation of subordination on the inner
periphery of the empire of late capital. Moreover, what is treated as “historical” in epics is
actually a blending of the mythological and the historical. Those events which seem fantastic
have substantial impact on those which seem mundane, and vice versa. Also a hallmark of the
epic tradition, one narrative strand intersects with, digresses from, or interrupts others, thereby
justifying, contextualizing, correcting, or enriching another narrative strand or the whole story.
It is a complex process of mental mapping. 230 As students of epics or sagas might also know, the
genre is rarely written (or sung) just to entertain, and they are not just told to transmit myths,
inspiration, or historical facts. As entertaining and instructive as epics may be, they are
significant because they are deliberative and prophetic—they try to solve a problem and project a
solution. In effect, they try to make history. They do not, therefore, separate the past, present,
and future, but bring them into vibrant though sometimes conflicted interaction.
Thus, Welsh’s working in the epic tradition and our touching on it here are not premodern regressions. The epic is a dialectical literary process that can perpetually uncover
emergent materials and energies, and Welsh’s second novel arguably fills the bill on all counts.
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Now addressing the ethical juxtaposition of the Ulster Cycle and Nightmares, the two
worlds that Cúchulainn and Roy inhabit are ones where forgiveness is all but destroyed. In
Cúchulainn’s situation, a world based on regeneration beliefs and a proto-democratic society of
tightly-knit agrarian communities is dissolving under a culture of war and power-consolidation
that is burgeoning throughout Europe.231 In Roy’s situation, the culture of war and accumulation
has become hegemonic and has become an empire of death.232 The plight of the multitude,
which Roy represents in Nightmares, is bleak. Nevertheless, an alternative probability is
negatively implied—a generative, cooperative world. What is lacking in both worlds, though, is
the virtue of forgiveness. In the case of Cúchulainn’s situation, the consequence is the adoption
of a death-ethic over the life-ethic entailed in much of Celtic sociocultural fabric. In case of
Roy’s situation, the potential consequence is the total liquidation of life—human and
otherwise—and thus a tragic end of history.233
In both stories, the virtual outcasts of their respective societies—Cúchulainn and Roy—
perpetuate systems that are determined to consume them, not forgive them. These are systems
without room for forgiveness because, as we have charted in the preceding chapters, they depend
on giving up, not giving to, others. Systems of war and death depend on giving up, not giving to,
oneself or others. Therefore, such systems create a situation in which humans do not give to
themselves and to each other the very possibility—no, probability—of accessing and producing
what makes them human, life. Consequently, humans become like “some animal being eaten
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from behind while its face seem[s] to register disbelief, fear, and self-hate at its own impotence,”
as Roy notes about the look on Kirsty’s face as he rapes her from behind while holding a mirror
to her face (Nightmares 183). Estranging life, which is giving up on the vital present that is
made probable by past presents and that makes probable future presents, is a catastrophic
historical-material phenomenon.
So, returning to our earlier questions about the raven and the stork, do the ambiguous
birds that visit Cúchulainn and Roy at the end of their respective tales deliver them to death, or
from it? As one might guess by now, the answer is not explicitly stated in Welsh’s novel; nor is
it clear in its Gaelic predecessor. From here on out, we will focus our attention on Nightmares;
nevertheless, materials and energies from the prehistory of Scotland’s Irish predecessors will
periodically emerge. On the one hand, their emergence will illustrate the insights of the
historical-material historiography theorized and practiced by such Marxist thinkers as Antonio
Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, and Raymond Williams (the historiography and thinkers which have
influenced much of this study). On the other hand, the prehistorical Gaelic materials and
energies will give us a “language” to use as we analyze Nightmares. For example, the figural
importance of the Marabou Stork becomes clearer when the Stork is understood as a postmodern
emergence of Morrígan, the raven who visits Cúchulainn as he is about to die. As we have
discovered in the preceding chapters, Welsh’s work invites such connections—congregations
and integrations. For Welsh, like James Joyce, everything is in play.
In Nightmares, Welsh once again gives us a rich ground of materials and energies from
which to construct probabilities; therefore, this last chapter will weave a map that will lead us to
our answer about the bird figure. To help us navigate this rich ground and the multiple
probabilities it might enable, Welsh effectively gives us a compass. Welsh drops hints
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throughout his whole body of work, including in Nightmares, that something hangs in the air
between us, “just something, some kind of second chance” (Glue 455). This is admittedly not
the most deterministic compass, but it will still help us to not wander aimlessly as we proceed.
To begin addressing the complicated situation presented by Nightmares, we probably
need to take a somewhat Calvinistic approach to the text: nail down the book, discover its
ultimate concern, and do not get lost in the magic that emanates from it.234 The basic
background and plot of Nightmares runs like this: Roy Strang, the son of John and Verity
Strang, is from Edinburgh’s schemes, like the characters in Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno.
Unlike the trainspotters and hooligans, Roy is a loner, reminiscent of Bruce Robertson in Filth
and Boab Coyle in “The Granton Star Cause.” Partly because of his socioeconomic status, partly
because of being a victim of childhood rape, and partly because he has never had the opportunity
to root himself in any ground, Roy is “a dangerous floater” (Nightmares 107). When we meet
him, he is comatose in the hospital. His coma is the result of a failed suicide attempt. He
narrates his story to us while in a semi-vegetative state. From what he tells us, we may piece
together what brought him to this point. Despite being acquitted of brutally raping Kirsty
Chalmers, or perhaps because of his acquittal, Roy came to realize that he had benefited from the
unjust society that had tormented him throughout his whole life. His inability to cope with his
life of brutality against others, most notably the brutal rape of Kirsty, compelled him to take his
own life. To settle the score, per se, he taped a plastic bag over his head and passed out while
watching a soccer match on television. Before he could die, though, he was found and sent to
the hospital, the location from which Roy narrates his life to us. During the time Roy is in the
hospital, he is tended to by nurses and doctors; he is visited by his mother and father, his two
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brothers and sister. He is also visited by a woman who does not disclose herself until the last
quarter of the novel. Roy discovers, and thus we discover, that she is Kirsty. As the novel nears
conclusion, Roy begins to return to consciousness, and Kirsty realizes this. This is the moment
she has been waiting for. She cuts off his eyelids, removes his feeding tube, cuts off his penis,
stuffs it into his mouth, and stabs him in the neck with surgical scissors. She leaves him to die,
hemorrhaging and suffocating.
The narrative is divided among three levels of consciousness: deep subconscious,
subconscious, and semiconscious. Roy moves between a dream world, which is at the deep
subconscious level, and a memory world, which is at the subconscious level. Periodically, the
external world intercedes when he comes close to consciousness. Therefore, he moves back and
forth between two strands of knowledge that we have previously discussed: mythos and pathos.
In this novel, mythos is split between a terrain of mythology and a terrain of memory—between
the heroic mercenary who hunts the Marabou Stork in beautiful South Africa and the dangerous
floater who terrorizes one of Edinburgh’s roughest housing scheme communities, Muirhouse. In
effect, these are two interconnected mythos-scapes, operating like Peter Pan and his shadow.
Alternatively, Roy’s pathos-scape consists of basic sensorial stimuli and raw emotions until near
the conclusion of the novel.
And logos? The part that logos plays in Nightmares is consistent with speculative reason,
as explored in chapter 4. The narrator who moves back and forth across the terrains of Roy’s
consciousness is inextricably linked to each dimension but cannot restrict itself to any particular
terrain. All levels of Roy’s consciousness present Roy-the-narrator with materials and energies;
thus, the narrator is a conduit. As discussed in the Introduction and systematized in the previous
chapter, a conduit does not master the various materials and energies that flow to it; instead, a
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conduit congregates and integrates those materials and energies to bring about the emergence of
an alternative probability. Logos is this compositional mechanism; thus, Roy-the-narrator is a
weaver and mapper that mirrors Welsh’s writing technique. He is the logos-conduit working
with the materials coming to him from the mythos- and pathos-scapes.
At this point, it might prove helpful to restate that these aspects of knowledge have been
instrumental in discovering the three virtues that we have located in Scotland’s historicalmaterial fabric. Moreover, let us review how those virtues interact. Congregation brings
emergent materials and energies together. This convergence is impossible without the human
individual who can integrate these materials and energies into his or her being. Therefore,
integration connects emergent materials and energies to the individual so that he or she may
enter into congregation. These two virtues are actually interrelated processes. By themselves,
they are not substantially productive. Incorporating or sharing materials might not produce
alternatives to the status quo, “the nastiness” (Porno 284). Enter emergence. It brings about a
constructive dynamic when added to the other two virtues. When integration and congregation
are connected to emergent force, a creative navigational process begins, in which alternative
probabilities begin to materialize.
On the one hand, this tripartite praxis might appear too idealistic. Because it entails
elements of creativity, sympathy, and purposefulness, it inadvertently gives the appearance that
residual bad sense has disappeared—that the nastiness never existed. But as chapter 4 has
demonstrated, all materials and energies—whether emergent or residual—continue to exist
within emergent constructions. (Effectively, the materials and energies of the past are never
lost.) What makes common sense or dominant society good, bad, emergent, or residual is a
matter of ethos—how existing materials and energies are used. The ethos operating in a
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situation is the key to ascertaining what probabilities will materialize. On the other hand,
because of the construction-like characteristics of this praxis, the whole ethic presented here
might come across as too mechanical. In light of this, is there a virtue at work as the virtual
spirit or soul of the systematic trio of virtues we have already uncovered? Indeed, there is:
forgiveness. What is interesting about this virtue is that it does not exist independently of
congregation, integration, and emergence. These apparently mechanical virtues and the
productive mechanism to which they give rise produce something non-mechanical but
nevertheless integral to them. Forgiveness is not a spirit that we can insert into the tripartite
praxis that makes up the ethic of emergence; it is one that this praxis brings into being. Even so,
forgiveness cannot be taken as a given.
As we have seen throughout this study, and as our discussion of Nightmares has already
indicated, the three virtues that we have presented (not to mention the three ways of knowing)
can be disconnected, perhaps still are disconnected, and can again be disconnected even after
they have been connected. Moreover, their disconnection is something that the dominant system
of our day—the empire of late capital—desires and facilitates. In order to continue as an
emergent practice, the process that gives rise to forgiveness must continue to reincorporate
forgiveness into every aspect and thus into the whole process.
Individually, each “mechanical” aspect of the ethic of emergence—congregation,
integration, and emergence—implies some level of forgiveness. To bring about congregation,
individuals must be willing to take the risk of giving themselves to each other, not despite their
differences, but with their differences. In effect, a congregation of individuals must forgive each
individual. To bring about integration, each individual must be open to all materials and
energies from the multitude of human individuals; thus, he or she must be forgiving. To bring
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about emergence in a particular situation, a congregated multitude of integrated individuals must
not only forgive any nastiness in that situation; that multitude must also be able to give itself to a
previously unknown alternative situation. In effect, such a multitude must “fore-give” itself to
the probability that it has mapped out before itself from the materials and energies that it has
congregated and integrated.
Nevertheless, as we have discovered, congregation, integration, and emergence cannot
occur in isolation, at least not in any substantially ethical way. Congregation must give itself to
integration, and vice versa. They must weave in and out of each other. Once the interaction
between congregation and integration is established, the congregation-integration process must
give itself to the emergent probability that it has enabled. If this process resists continuing
toward a probability that it has opened, as McGlone does in Welsh’s short story “The Two
Philosophers,” then it jeopardizes that alternate probability. Equally as important, such
equivocation also permits the dominant situation from which the congregation-integration
process is emerging to appropriate and neutralize its emergent materials and energies. All told,
then, the virtue of forgiveness entails individuals giving themselves to each other, giving
themselves to a cooperative praxis, forgiving the situation from which they emerge, and giving
themselves to an alternative future to which they themselves have given birth.
In the final pages of this study, we are going to weave together the threads that we have
untangled from the Scottish situation. More expressly, we are going to juxtapose the three
virtues of the emergent praxis that we have uncovered in the medieval, Reformation, and
Enlightenment situations by following the narrative structure of Welsh’s Nightmares: mythosscape, pathos-scape, and logos-conduit. On the one hand, this weaving will be an illustrative
deployment of the practical ethical system we have been building towards: the ethic of
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emergence. On the other hand, it will be an envisioning of a Scotland that is autonomous
because of its ability to grow and to connect to other subordinate global entities under the reign
of the empire of late capital.
How should we proceed? We should begin with death. If we take death to be not only
the conclusion of an isolated individual’s life but also the process of alienating individuals from
each other, from themselves, and from what they produce or could produce, then we see what
Welsh takes on in his whole body of work. He is taking on the empire of late capital, which is an
empire of death.235 He, of course, comes at his target from a particular situation, postmodern
Scotland; nevertheless, his ultimate concern is not just Scotland, but what comes after Scotland:
a Scotland after Scotland, a world beyond Scotland, and a system of life that emerges from the
current system of death.
Each of the stories we have explored ends in some kind of death or near-death: In
Trainspotting, Renton personally cheats death by betraying his friends in a high-stakes drug deal.
More importantly, he kills the bond between his mates and himself. In Glue, Gally’s and
Duncan Ewart’s deaths haunt the collective life of Carl, Billy, and Juice Terry. In Porno, Renton
again abandons his mates, but the most dramatic instances of the novel are Begbie’s psychotic
obsession with killing Renton and Begbie’s almost fatal meeting with an automobile. In Filth,
death is virtually the ground, process, and end. Bruce Robertson’s whole childhood is dominated
by the death of others and his own alienation. His whole adulthood is about perpetuating a
system of death. And his supposedly final end, brought about by hanging himself, is less a
conclusion than it is a coda to his existence as one of the living dead. In “Granton Star,” Boab
dies twice. Like Robertson, he has been one of the living dead; after God effectively kills Boab
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as a human—which is really God’s attempt to give him a second chance at life—Boab is hellbent on exacting revenge, which results in his own death and the suffering of others. In “The
Two Philosophers,” McGlone is like Boab. He is among the living dead until his friend and
colleague Ornstein gives him the opportunity to gain a new lease on life. McGlone squanders
this opportunity, which results in his being beaten on a curb and then incarcerated by the police.
Finally, Nightmares is told by a person trapped in a literal and figurative purgatory, and Roy’s
semi-dead state is apparently ended by the woman whose life he destroyed. Even so, these
deaths do not necessarily have to end in death. In each case, death negatively affirms an
alternative. Thus focusing our attention on Nightmares, we will begin with death on each level
of Roy’s consciousness in order to locate the submerged alternative life.
5.1 Congregation Spool: Fowl Mythology and Faulty Remembrance
The last moments of Nightmares are confusing, to say the least, and the meeting with the
Marabou Stork complicates the situation even further just when one might hope that the Stork’s
appearance would clarify everything. Just as in Filth, finding the body or the perpetrator of a
crime does not actually solve the case. As a figure, the grotesque, feathered scavenger-predator
confounds human conceptions of what is “natural,” “logical,” and “good.” Speaking
ecologically, does the Stork protect life by consuming disease-ridden carrion? Or does it serve
death by killing such animals as flamingos? One could answer, “Both,” and that answer would
get us somewhat closer to the complex entity we are dealing with. Thematically speaking,
Welsh is concerned about people and institutions that dominate others, and the Marabou Stork
thwarts such domination. The staunch pro-apartheid white South African capitalist Lochart
Dawson, the dream incarnation of Roy’s actual Uncle Gordon Strang, is such a person. Thence
the Stork signifies resistance to all that Dawson represents: racism, exploitation, and private
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property. To enrich this figure even further, storks are also associated with birth, hence the
folklore about storks delivering babies. Thus, it is more than both a servant of death and
protector of life; it is also a deliverer of life. We are dealing with an animal that is the figural
representative of a threefold power: devourer of death, taker of life, giver of birth.
As strange as such a figure might seem, one will frequently discover it in Gaelic myth,
legend, and folklore. Instead of coming in the form of a stork, this tripartite force’s most
frequent and provocative representative is another ambiguous bird, the raven. In European
history, ravens have not received much good press mainly because of the role they played, along
with rats, in carrying disease, particularly during the plagues of the Middle Ages. If we look
deeper into the ancient Celts’ understanding of the bird, though, we find a more complicated
relation between people, ravens, and birds in general. Ravens, other black birds, and water fowl
certainly could be harbingers of impending demise. Like the Norse Valkeries, they could aid in
war and deliver warriors souls’ to the afterlife. But they were also capable of disrupting war.
Moreover, they could indicate change, either positive or negative, and foretell birth. Unlike their
messenger-bird or -angel counterparts in the Jewish and Christian traditions, the message implied
by ravens’ appearances would rarely be self-evident. They represented a multifaceted, holistic
life-force instead of an authoritative, hierarchical one. The most provocative embodiment of this
force, for the Gaels and for us in this context, is Morrígan. 236
We will need to turn again to the mythic Celtic seam of Scotland’s ground to bring
Morrígan to the surface. Just as Roy is really never separate from the Marabou Stork,
Cúchulainn’s very existence is conjoined with the tripartite goddess Morrígan. In one sense, she
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was with him generations before he was born. She played a significant role in the lives of his
truly mythic predecessors, the Tuatha Dé Danann, the proto-Gaels who invaded Ireland and
conquered the Fomorians.237 Even though it would not presently be appropriate to spend more
time on the early invasions and the literature that grows from them, it suffices it to say that
Morrígan has always played a significant role in Gaelic culture. Because she is also closely
associated with such figures as Medb, Cúchulainn’s archenemy in The Táin, she is practically
omnipresent and certainly ambiguous. When he is a child, Morrígan watches over him in the
form of a war crow.238 When he woos his wife Emer, she foretells the couple’s courtship and
then complicates it.239 During the battles between him, as sole protector of Ulster, and the other
four Irish kingdoms led by Medb and Ailill, it is Morrígan or one of her surrogates who, through
confusing warriors, incites certain battles and frustrates truces.240 In many of his battles, she flies
in raven form beside his chariot or sits on his shoulder. In her other common forms of a washer
woman and milkmaid, she tells the hero about his coming death and heals him during battle.241
In The Death Tale of CuChulainn, again in the form of a raven, she sits on his shoulder as he dies
against a standing stone.242 Despite their ambiguous, sometimes antagonistic relationship,
Cúchulainn and Morrígan are practically inseparable.
Turning back to Nightmares, one will perhaps encounter a significant problem when
posed with what may initially seem to be a preposterous question: “Who plays the role of
Morrígan?” Indeed, I am asserting that the Marabou Stork is Morrígan, or to be more precise,
the Stork is a postmodern emergence of the Gaelic figure. With that qualification out of the way,
237

MacKillop 414-16.
Kinsella 80.
239
Jeffrey Gantz trans., The Wasting Sickness of Cú Chulaind & The Only Jealousy of Emer, Early Irish
Myths and Sagas (New York: Penguin, 1981) pp. 155-78.
240
Kinsella 98, 141, 155, 223, 238.
241
Kinsella 133, 137.
242
Tymoczko 61.
238

199

let us return to our seemingly preposterous question. In keeping with Morrígan’s habit of
perplexing things, and in keeping with Welsh’s habit of not allowing a story to ever really
conclude, the answer is not at all as simple as one might expect. If one has just finished the last
page of the novel, the answer will seem obvious: “Kirsty plays Morrígan, delivering Roy from
his wasting body. As the Marabou Stork, she dismembers him—figuratively beheading him by
cutting off his penis, then stuffing it into his mouth.” However, if one reviews the book, paying
even closer attention to the last chapter, up to when Kirsty castrates Roy, it is also evident that
Roy is the Stork and thus also Morrígan. He has already figuratively killed and devoured
Kirsty—by taking her energy, by taking her soul (Nightmares 191, 208, 229, 264). So, we need
to delve further to better comprehend how this Stork figure operates.
If we return to the passage from Nightmares quoted above—in which Roy describes his
bird-like features—Roy seems unequivocally to be the Stork. If this is so, Roy is his own
murderer, midwife, and savior. We are, therefore, confronted with the fact that in his
dreamscape as Roy-the-hero, Roy is actually a twofold character: one part Roy-the-Stork and
one part Sandy-Roy, for lack of a better way to delineate them. Like Cúchulainn’s charioteer,
Laeg, Roy’s companion in Dawson’s South African Emerald Forest, Sandy Jamieson, is really
Roy’s idealized counterpart and lover. Sandy is based on the professional footballer Jimmy
Sandison, whom Roy was watching on the television when he tried to suffocate himself
(Nightmares 255). Most importantly, Sandy protects Roy by helping him become a more whole
individual, which entails distracting Roy from too quickly completing his mythological quest.
Sandy’s role also includes being Roy’s dream lover (Nightmares 123, 257). This role has an
interconnected threefold effect: 1) It helps Roy accept his own bisexuality. 2) It helps Roy rid
himself of the violent, self-destructive homophobia that curses him because of his uncle raping
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him, and because of a patriarchal, anti-sexual, and working-class Calvinist culture. 3) It gives
Roy an accommodating companion with whom to share the burden of composing an alternative
life. Therefore, Sandy helps Roy make peace with his own self-concept and desires, defusing the
destructive bad sense that Roy’s self-deception has imposed on him. The twist associated with
Sandy’s role is this: to ultimately protect and deliver Roy, Sandy has to kill him because Roy is
the Marabou Stork.
We might be tempted to say that Roy-the-Stork is the “bad Roy” and that Sandy-Roy is
the “good Roy.” This temptation could prove dangerous. Sandy is the one who introduces Roy
to Dawson, and as the novel progresses, it becomes apparent that Sandy and Dawson have
associated before—as employer and employee and probably as lovers. In view of this, Sandy’s
loyalty to Roy is put in doubt. Indeed, Dawson and Sandy might have been conspiring against
Roy the whole time, waiting until Roy has fully disclosed himself as the Stork.
Sandy is probably both Roy’s comrade and enemy—a double agent. It is possible that
Sandy-Roy betrays and delivers Roy in both connotations of both terms. He betrays Roy by
helping Roy’s repressed aspects emerge, and he betrays Roy by handing him over to the enemy.
He delivers Roy by providing him safe passage through hostile terrain, but he also delivers Roy
to his doom. In effect, Sandy is both a John and a Judas to Roy’s Jesus. When we remember
that Sandy is a character that Roy himself has created, we realize that Roy is his own greatest
hope and his own arch-nemesis.
Elsewhere, though, the Stork is directly associated with Kirsty: “She kept coming after
me. The nightmares, the Marabou Stork nightmares . . .” (Nightmares 221). Kirsty, of course, is
who apparently ends Roy’s life when she dismembers him. However, as with Sandy, we cannot
be too confident in passing judgment on her. As we will discuss below, her intended punishment
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of her rapist might be what helps Roy actually ascertain a hopeful alternative world. If she is the
Stork within his dream, as compared to the virtual Stork in his conscious life, then her
elusiveness throughout the novel gives Roy the opportunity to find out that “the pursuit of the
Marabou” is “as fundamental as the pursuit of truth” (Nightmares 36). She gives him time to go
on his epic quest, pursuing truth, thereby pursuing life. In effect, she gives him a second chance
at life. One could even argue that she gives him three chances. Exceeding God in “Granton
Star,” Kirsty effectively gives Roy a third chance at life when she literally transforms him. As
she carves his body, the intensity of life that he feels literally and figuratively opens his eyes. As
we will discuss in greater detail below, it is the only time, without narcotics, that he truly feels.
Because we are dealing with mythos, we do not have to rule out the possibility that both
Roy and Kirsty are the Stork. Because we are dealing with a Morrígan figure, the Stork is not
exclusionary but congregational, and both Roy and Kirsty fulfill the roles of protector, deliverer,
and devourer; together they bring about the emergence of a postmodern Morrígan in Welsh’s
epic.
Nevertheless, what exactly is being protected, delivered, and devoured?
The answer: Roy’s memory. Today, memory is popularly treated as if it were merely a
storage bank of empirical facts. Most judicial systems, particularly in the West, have raised the
testimony of witnesses to an almost sacred level, second only to the recently discovered Holy
Grail of justice, DNA evidence. This esteem for the eyewitness is so even in the face of
mountains of evidence produced by psychologists and cognitive scientists which attest to the fact
that memory is as creative as it is empirically referential. Therefore, memory is fallible, at least
in today’s juridical environment, because it is, by its very operations, something that fabricates.
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This is why I place it under the epistemological domain of mythos and, therefore, why I put it
into relation with mythology.
I do not mean to disparage either memory or mythology by associating them in such a
way. As generative cognitive operations, they are crucial to human life. Moreover, they are
deeply interconnected, and in the case of Nightmares, Roy belatedly discovers that it might be a
mistake to keep them separate:
I’ve been trying to stage things too much in this little world of mine, trying to
exercise total control over this environment, instead of trusting myself to react to
events with dignity and compassion. So what if my two worlds are coming closer
together? It may be the way I get closer to the Stork. (123)
Together, memory and mythology make up the creative consciousness of historical-material
reality. Perhaps memory is considered more legitimate because it typically speaks the language
of a dominant sociocultural situation, whereas mythology lets circulate what has been filtered
and repressed by memory. Roy accordingly explains about his mythological world, “In here I’m
doing all the things I didn’t do out there. I’m trying to be better, trying to do the right thing,
trying to work it all out” (Nightmares 119). Therefore, memory and mythology are not bad or
good in themselves, particularly if they are recognized as being interimplicated; however, they
can be badly or well used. And bad use of them arguably comes about when they are
disconnected. Disconnected from each other, mythology can truly become a “fantasy land,” and
memory can become “practically non-existent” (Nightmares 157, 4). However, under the empire
of late capital, these two strands of mythos must be separated, just as mythos, pathos, and logos
must be divorced from one another. If they congregate their materials and energies, they pose a
threat to a system that depends on fragmentation, on a lack of critical and generative synthesis.
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Roy says that his memory is “practically non-existent”; however, this does not mean that
it is really nonexistent. In fact, three quarters of the book is composed of his memories. He only
escapes to his mythological dream world—“the beautiful blue skies of Africa” (Nightmares
57)—when his memories become too much for him or when he comes too close to regaining
consciousness. So, for someone whose memories are practically nonexistent, he remembers
much and he remembers often. Let us investigate these memories to see what Roy means by his
qualification.
Before nine years of age, during the early 1980s, Roy’s memories are scant; however,
when he reaches the nine-year mark, they begin to become an overwhelming force. As if the
hard life in the schemes and in his extremely dysfunctional working-class family had not been
enough, his father’s brother, Gordon Strang, agreed to procure Roy’s father a job in
Johannesburg, South Africa. Any relocation is traumatic, but relocating to a completely different
continent, thousands of miles away, is more so, particularly for a child. Moreover, Roy’s racist
parents were not only excited about their new prospects; they were as equally excited about
moving to what they often referred to as “a white man’s country,” apartheid South Africa
(Nightmares 24). Despite knowing “fuck all about politics,” Roy quickly realized that when it
came to his parents’ worldview, his emigrant uncle’s business practices, and the situation in
South Africa, “something wasn’t quite right” (Nightmares 62, 82). Here, Roy gives us another
tentative position. His qualifier—“something wasn’t quite right”—is important to keep in mind
because, along with the other qualifier he has presented, it is symptomatic of a mindset that is
still detached from what has actually occurred.
Roy’s comparisons of Scottish subordination and South African subordination are astute,
to say the least. Here is one of dozens of such observations:
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Edinburgh to me represented serfdom. I realized that it was exactly the same
situation as Johannesburg; the only difference was that the Kaffirs [derogatory
term for black South Africans] were white and called schemies or draftpaks.
Back in Edinburgh, we would be Kaffirs; condemned to live out our lives in
townships like Muirhouse or So-Wester-Hailes-To or Niddrie, self-contained
camps with fuck all in them, miles fae the toon. Brought in tae dae the crap jobs
that nae other cunt wanted tae dae, then hassled by the polis if we hung around at
night in groups. Edinburgh had the same politics as Johannesburg: it had the
same politics of any city. (Nightmares 80)
Nevertheless, he has stopped short of integrating this congregated knowledge into his being.
Indeed, he fell in love with South Africa, despite its not being “quite right.” His love of it did
not directly spring from apartheid, per se, but sprang from his being accepted by a society that
was ruled by apartheid. He remembers, “What I had gained there was a perverse sense of
empowerment; an ego even. I knew I was fuckin special, whatever any of them [his family] tried
to tell me” (Nightmares 88). A year later, after Roy’s father was fired, the Strangs moved back
to Edinburgh. “I was Roy Strang,” Roy proclaims, “Maybe I had to go back, but it was going to
be different. I wasnae gaunny take any shite. . . . Ah wis going to be strong. Strong Strang. Ah
wis gaunny make sure every cunt kent my fuckin name” (Nightmares 88-89). Again, he has not
integrated the knowledge that is right before him: a system of domination has done to others,
such as black South Africans, what it has done to him and others like him in Scotland. Both his
dream world and memory world have been sending him the same message, but he has always
disassociated from his own accumulated knowledge. Not only that: he has personally enacted
the logic of the system that has brutalized him and fellow members of the dispossessed. Instead
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of incorporating the knowledge and suffering of the multitude, he has integrated the dominant
system into his being, which further estranges him from others and himself.
Punctuating this disconnection is what he does to others after he has been sexually
molested and raped by Uncle Gordon. Roy became a sexual predator. Soon after his return to
Edinburgh, Roy sexually assaulted a female classmate while holding a knife to her neck, forced a
male classmate to perform oral sex on him, tormented his gay brother Bernard, and ultimately
masterminded the brutal gang rape of Kirsty. How he remembers the last incident makes his two
qualifications—that his memory is practically nonexistent and that something was not quite
right—even more disconcerting.
It is not until Sandy is about to blow Roy’s head off with a shotgun and not until Kirsty is
clipping the lids off his eyes that Roy remembers that it was he—not another recurring Welsh
character, Lexo—who had initiated the torture and rape of a woman who was actually interested
in dating him. Roy conflated Kirsty with a girl, Caroline Carson, he had held a grudge against
since middle school. Years before, Caroline had been a bystander when he was bullied by one of
her older male friends (Nightmares 99-101). Roy remembers that he was aware that the two
women were not the same person (Nightmares 261). But he took a stance reminiscent of D. S.
Robertson’s ultra-Calvinist slogan, “same rules apply” (Filth 5). Roy and three of his fellow
cashies—football hooligans known for wearing flashy clothes and expensive accessories—
drugged Kirsty and lured her away from a party. They proceeded to tie her up, tortured her, left
her standing on a table with a noose around her neck for a few hours, and raped her for hours on
end after they returned (Nightmares 177-90). Later, when the rape case went to court, Roy and
his mates persuaded the court that they were the actual victims, their character defamed by a
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woman who was angry at them for not satisfying her insatiable, masochistic sexual appetite
(Nightmares 207-12).
For over 250 pages, Roy has led not only us but himself on a wild goose chase because
he could not integrate the knowledge he gained from his mythological world and memory world.
In part, this is so because he has kept those worlds separated for too long. Just as Cúchulainn’s
bullheadedness (not to mention Odysseus’ arrogance or Achilles’ rage) keeps him from seeing
how other people’s lives are tied up in his, Roy’s inability to incorporate the experiences of
others with his own keeps him from ever practically living, at least not until the final few pages
of the novel. However, it is not only the segregation of the two levels of his mythos-scape that
makes him a flamingo to Kirsty’s Stork: “It’s on the flamingo . . . tearing into it, ripping it to
shreds, but the flamingo’s still alive, I see its dulled eyes.” For the majority of his life, he has not
been able to feel—he has had virtually no bond with the species-being of the potential human
multitude.
5.2 Integration Spool: The Bonds of Flesh
With his eyelids removed and his severed penis in his mouth, Roy observes:
She’s looking into my eyes, my lidless eyes and we see each other now. She’s
beautiful. Thank God. Thank God she’s got it back. What we took. I’m trying
to smile. I’ve got this severed cock in my mouth and I’m trying to smile. I can’t
breathe and she’s showing no mercy. . . . I understand her. . . . I understand her
hurt, her pain, how it all just has to come out. It just goes round and round, the
hurt. It takes an exceptionally strong person to just say: no more. It takes a weak
one to just keep it all to themselves, let it tear them apart without hurting anyone
else. . . . I’m not an exceptionally strong person. . . . Nor is Kirsty. . . . We’re
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just ordinary and this is shite. . . . We both understand everything. (Nightmares
263-64)
That is Roy’s last astute observation before he briefly returns to his dream world to spread his
wings as the Stork and be shot at by Sandy, and before he loses consciousness because of
massive hemorrhaging.
In the first part of his observation, he stresses his attempt to smile. This is no small
matter. In his so-called life before this point, Roy conditioned himself to not express emotion.
Even anger became more mechanical than impassioned—it was “business” (Nightmares 152,
171). Even more, feeling any sort of emotion became taboo for him. He “considered that
discretion was the better part of valour”: “It was not giving a fuck about anything,” just floating
“around in a void of indifference” (Nightmares 66, 153, 201). As a consequence, he had become
a nihilistic automaton, for which no act was unthinkable or impossible.243
At least this was the case until he saw Kirsty in the courtroom:
It became like she was the one on trial; her past, her sexuality, her behaviour. She
looked really strange in the court. It was the wey she moved. She walked like the
centre ay balance in her body had irreversibly shifted. It wis like the movement
ay some cunt that had come oot fae under the surgeon’s knife and who was
recuperating from a chronic and ultimately terminal illness. (Nightmares 208)
When he observed her, though, he did not feel sympathy; he was still too disconnected. What he
recognized was a physiological change in Kirsty that implied something else, something deeper
243

It is in thoughts and actions of such an isolated individual that Hannah Arendt finds the logic and mode
of totalitarianism: “totalitarian methods of domination . . . develop and crystallize on the basis of the nihilistic
principle that ‘everything is possible.’ And, characteristically enough, this is precisely the realm that cannot be
limited by either utilitarian motives or self-interest, regardless of the latter’s content. [. . .] What runs counter to
common sense is not the nihilistic principle that ‘everything is permitted.’ . . . What common sense and ‘normal
people’ refuse to believe is that everything is possible” (The Origins of Totalitarianism [San Diego: Harcourt Brace,
1979] pp. 440-41).
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than surfaces and abstractions. This something else—the same something else that Carl
recognizes in Glue (445)—eludes him, but he cannot neglect it. He is drawn towards it, which
leads him to his suicide attempt.
Rationalizing what proves to be a failed suicide attempt with Aristotelian ethics reduced
to a slogan in a Hemlock Society pamphlet—“GOOD LIFE, GOOD DEATH”—Roy Strang
finally made a real effort to connect to himself only to miss the point, both the point of
Aristotle’s ethic and the point of integrating with himself:
With any luck, I’d achieve half of this [maxim]. I was dying. I knew it, I felt it.
It was beyond transitory depression. I wasn’t a psychopath; I was just a fool and
a coward. I had opened up my emotions and I couldn’t go back into self-denial,
into the lower form of existence, but I couldn’t go forward until I’d settled my
debt. For me it wasn’t running away. That was what I’d been doing all my
fuckin life, running away from sensitivity, from feelings, from love. Running
away because a fuckin schemie, a nobody, shouldnae have these feelings because
there’s fuckin naewhair for them tae go, naewhair for them tae be expressed and if
you open up every cunt will tear you apart. So you shut them out; you build a
shell, you hide, or you lash out at them and hurt them. You do this because you
think by you’re hurting them you can’t be hurt. But it’s bullshit, because you just
hurt even mair until you learn to become an animal and if you can’t fuckin well
learn that properly you run. Sometimes you can’t run though, you can’t sidestep
and you can’t duck and weave, because sometimes it just all travels along with
you, inside your fuckin skull. This wasn’t about opting out. This was about the
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only resolution that made sense. Death was the way forward. (Nightmares 25455)
How right he is, and how wrong. As we know, Roy does not die; he enters into a coma that
enables him to sustain a narrative existence, including the quoted observation. So, no, he cannot
opt out, even though he tries. He will have to live before he dies. In Aristotle’s ethical theory,
the good death is impossible without the good life—without care of the self, which includes care
of others.244 Roy has not cared for himself or others despite retroactively saying that he had
wanted—intended—to. Roy, however, did begin to move toward some version of the good life
when he made this self-evaluation. However, self-evaluation is only part of an emergent praxis,
as we discovered in the previous chapter. Even so, he failed to commit to even his own selfevaluation, which is indicated by his self-deceptive conclusion: suicide in his case “wasn’t about
opting out.”
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Throughout The Ethics, Aristotle gradually, systematically builds his idea of the “good,” “happy,” or
“excellent” life, stressing its dependence on life-long development and duration (The Ethics of Aristotle: The
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson [New York: Penguin, 1976]). He asserts early on that “happiness
demands not only complete goodness but a complete life” (81). Then, he goes on to explain how goodness is a
praxis on which one “spends all his time, or the most time of any man, in virtuous conduct and contemplation” (83).
Julia Annas terms such happiness “self-sufficiency,” meaning that a person’s life produces coherence through
time—“comprehensiveness: a final end which is self-sufficient must include all the agent’s other ends” (The
Morality of Happiness [New York, NY: Oxford UP, 1993] p. 41). Put into the context of our discussion, Roy
cannot achieve a good death because his life has been, up until this point, void of any identifiable praxis, coherence,
or comprehensiveness. Moreover, the life Roy has lived is one dominated by misery, hate, and meanness.
According to Aristotle, one who produces a good life cannot “become miserable; because”—and this next
qualification is key in understanding Aristotelian and much Classical ethics—“he will never do things that are
hateful and mean” to others (84). Expressly, personal happiness is impossible without it being directly tied one’s
social and political situation—without caring for the self, which entails caring for others. The latter insight becomes
the springboard for much of Foucault’s later writing, most notably The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality,
trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 3 (New York: Vintage, 1988). For instance, he observes in his reading of Seneca that
“care of the self—or the attention one devotes to the care that others should take care of themselves—appears then
as an intensification of social relations” (51, my italics). Foucault expands elsewhere, “The care of the self is ethical
in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as [the] ēthos of freedom is also a way of caring for
others” (Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. [New York: New Press, 1997]
p. 287). Again, placing this into the present context, what Foucault calls “care of the self” falls under the rubric of
emergent praxis. In the case of Roy and Scotland, subordination is, in part, a consequence of a lack of producing a
life. Thus, when Roy tries to rationalize his suicide with a significant strand of Classical ethics, he puts ethical
systems dedicated almost totally to generation into the service of destruction.
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Roy thought that he could atone for his sins through sacrificing himself—taking himself
beyond responsibility, out of society, and thus out of life. Again, though, he does not die. He is
literally and figuratively forced to compose himself if he is ever to confront what threatened not
only his individual, Scottish life but what still threatens human life itself. Up to the point of his
self-induced coma, he effectively had no coherent narrative or life history. He was merely
flotsam carried on the currents of a fragmented, disconnected world. However, after his failed
suicide attempt, these fragments begin to congregate and take on more coherent forms in his
mythos-scape. Then, when Kirsty greets him upon his return to consciousness, these forms and
all that they entail begin to integrate into his being. His dream world, his memory world, and his
sensual world have been sending him materials and energies which he can no longer keep
separate from each other and, more importantly, from which he can no longer disassociate.
It is by integrating the congregated materials and energies that he has avoided for his
whole life that he is finally able to live, even if this means becoming one with the Marabou
Stork, the paradoxical figure of death and life. Perhaps the message here is: if one can
sympathize with one’s murderer, then one can sympathize with anyone. It is just this type of
unconditional sympathy that permeates the moment when Kirsty and Roy are looking into each
other’s eyes. It is in this moment that they share pure emotion and all that makes up human life:
suffering, love, hate, triumph, defeat, lust, sadness, happiness, pity, commitment, betrayal,
vengeance, redemption, and understanding. All three aspects of knowing—mythos, pathos, and
logos—begin to converge and integrate. This signals that three virtues of the ethic of emergence
are beginning to cooperate and enter into producing alternatives.
Where does it all go from here?
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5.3 Emergence Spool: Fugitive Histories
“She’s going,” says Roy, “don’t go Kirsty, stay with me for a bit, see this through . . . but
no no no I hear her hastily depart” (Nightmares 264). We cannot be too quick to pass judgment
on Kirsty. She, like Roy, represents us, the particular individuals of a potentially emergent
multitude who exist in a situation ruled by the empire of late capital. Because the world we live
in is still one of fragmentation and estrangement—despite brief moments of congregation and
integration—we cannot expect Welsh’s characters to single-handedly do what cannot be done
alone; nor should a novelist like Welsh be asked to do all the work for us. He weaves for us
quite a detailed, multidimensional map, which takes us to a launching point. Moreover, he gives
us an unusual sort of compass: it points to the probabilities that we already know—the bad
sense, residual ones—so that we may ascertain what direction we need to go so that we may
approach alternative probabilities. All of the stories we have discussed in this study indicate this
direction, but as Ornstein finds in “The Two Philosophers,” knowing what direction to go and
going in that direction are not the same thing. To use his idiom, it is not enough to know that
unknown knowledge is a possibility; individuals must build with the materials and energies that
they have uncovered to bring about the materialization of a probability that they have recognized
in previously unknown knowledge. To use Roy’s idiom, one has to enter into “a new situation,”
all the while realizing “that behaviour always has a context and precedents, it’s what you do
rather than what you are, although we often never recognize that context or understand what
these precedents are” (Nightmares 134). More expressly, alternative probabilities—hopeful
futures—are not possible if we, as those human individuals, do not build toward them with the
“context” and “precedents” that have enabled our apprehension of those probabilities. In short,

212

we have to honest with ourselves about where we have come from and where we are before we
can feasibly understand ourselves and break the hold of bad sense and residual force.
On the political terrain of the 1980s and early 1990s—the era of Margaret Thatcher and
John Major’s Tory Britain and Ronald Reagan’s Republican America—an attitude of zero
tolerance became official public doctrine: “Z. THERE IS NO EXCUSE” (Nightmares 241).
The “wars” on worker’s rights, poverty, drugs, culture, welfare, sex, the Third World, and so
forth were unleashed. And as Welsh brings into focus, zero tolerance meant, in the case Britain,
a war on the lumpenproletariat, working class, and women. The novel, though, exceeds the
particularity of that historical period and Scotland in scope. Nightmares indicates that zero
tolerance is a war waged on the world’s majority, its potential multitude: the global South and
peripheries, black and brown people, “white trash,” the impoverished, women, and the majority
of workers. This is not to mention the ecological terrorism being waged for profits and power.
Mentioning zero tolerance today might seem to be an anachronism. Is not everything
tolerated now? In one sense, everything is tolerated—if by “everything,” one means everything
that has to do with cheapening human life by social, cultural, political, and economic
estrangement, oppression, and exploitation. In fact, we live in a situation dominated by the
epicurean aftershocks of such an approach to human existence. Zero tolerance seems passé
because it has become naturalized: it is the hegemonic ideology.245 Lochart Dawson provides
some insight on what this ideology maintains: “Families and communities have to be broken up
further, have to be taken to where the work is, have to be denied at all costs meaningful
interaction with each other. They have to live in, as our American friends call them,
subdivisions. They have to be economically and physically subdivided” (Nightmares 45). Roy
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We have in the postmodern world the fruition of “the traditional concept of just war,” which “involves
the banalization of war and the celebration of it as an ethical instrument” (Hardt and Negri, Empire 12).
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shocks Dawson by elaborating further: “The key is the increasing of choice through the process
of subdivision you alluded to. The increasing experiencing of leisure and sport indirectly, has
encouraged a decrease in real participation which is direct communion. Therefore you have the
replacement of one or two really decent experiences with loads and loads of crap things”
(Nightmares 45). Even though it is a war waged primarily through city planning, mortgages,
rent, regressive taxes, discount store chains, food aid, the distribution of pharmaceuticals, and so
forth, this is undoubtedly a war against the collective life of human beings for the sake of profit,
which is domination through dispossession.
We have seen in the preceding chapters and pages of this chapter how this war is waged.
The people who fight are not warriors loyal to a sovereignty or cause. They, like Roy, are not
really committed to anything, not even to themselves. So, we must not confuse egoism with selfreverence. The combatants are just fragmented individuals, incoherent socioeconomic groups,
stereotyped races and genders, and so forth, all consuming like scavenger-predators in the hope
that some sense, some narrative, or some cause will emerge through the act of consuming
itself. 246 The very enemies of the postmodern global state, the largely itinerant and provincial
individuals of the potential multitude, are also the fodder sent onto the figurative and literal
plains of battle to consume and be consumed. All of this is done to benefit an amorphous,
elusive ruling power that depends on the perpetuation of this internally corrupt and selfdestructive system in order to maintain sovereignty. The individuals of the potential multitude,
such as the diamond miners in South Africa and coal miners in Scotland, have secured the means
for this postmodern global sovereignty, even as it requires their mutual exclusion. The victim,
246

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels write in The German Ideology that this “accidental character [of the
conditions of life] is only engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of individuals among
themselves. Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of [capitalism] than before because
their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent
governed by material forces” ([Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1998] p. 87).
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therefore, is also the aggressor. In effect, the reprobate of the world—again, the potential
multitude—create the energy to sustain the empire of late capital, a veritable empire of death, by
tormenting and killing one another. They enter into “a bullshit act,” which moves them “further
away from” what they could be (Nightmares 50).
One of the many glaring problems with this so-called ethic of late capitalism, which is
seamless in its duplicity, is the fact that any endurable, creative individual or collective life is
increasingly unlikely under its particular interpretation of “liberty.” In fact, democracy is
impossible in such a framework. Emergent, productive composition is strangled by static,
nihilistic chaos. Like a tree consumed by vines, a system that could provide for a longsustaining, ever-growing, and integrating life is overtaken by a parasite that exploits it for shortterm, immediate, and fragmented gains. The effect for the tree: fruitless self-defense followed
by death. The effect for the vines: a quick rise to power at the expense of life only to fall to the
ground and be consumed by other vines that will be consumed by more vines and so forth and so
on.247
What makes this situation all the more sobering, though, is that these metaphorical vines
sap away materials that could feed and form the metaphorical tree of the multitude. In an
interview Welsh gave when Glue was being published, he implies that Christianity and
socialism, not to mention Aristotelian ethics, at one time provided more good sense than bad
sense, thereby empowering Scots.248 But capitalism fragmented their internal coherence and
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This botanical description echoes Hardt and Negri’s mechanical one: “As [postmodern Empire]
constructs its supranational figure, power seems to be deprived of any real ground beneath it, or rather, it is lacking
the motor that propels its movement. The rule of the biopolitical imperial context should thus be seen in the first
instance as an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine” (Empire 62).
248
Welsh, interview. Welsh echoes MacIntyre’s diagnosis of what has happened to morality, which really
today is just a collection of fragmented structures and truisms disconnected from what is considered to be raw or, to
use Giorgio Agamben’s term, “bare” life: the “joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic
theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-hecould-be-if-he-realized-his-telos. Since the whole point of ethics—both as a theoretical and a practical discipline—
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sapped their emergent energies, leaving only incoherent, exchangeable, and consumable
fragments.249
In light of what we have observed about Scotland throughout this study, this situation is
not a mystery. From Renton, Spud, and Begbie to Bruce Robertson, to Ornstein and McGlone,
and to Roy and Kirsty, Welsh has illustrated how the lumpenproletariat, the working class, and
significant swaths of the middle class are either intentionally or unintentionally killing
themselves and each other. Together, competition and consumption are the mechanisms that
vampirically and self-destructively feed capital. Unless one is an avatar of American neoconservativism or British New Labour-ism, this is not what one could call a life-sustaining,
holistically productive ethos. Kirsty gives voice to the ethos at work when she prepares to
dismember Roy: “I don’t know who fucked you up, what happened to make you the sad,
wretched excuse for a human being you are and I don’t care. It’s not my problem. You’re the
problem, or rather were. Now I’m your problem. Might is right. You take the right. I’m taking
the right Roy, taking the right to fuck you off, son” (Nightmares 261). Today, the scapegoats
offer up other scapegoats for sacrifice, and it seems that the more literal and figurative blood
shed, the more the capitalist empire needs: exponential sacrifice for the reward of “closure” that
never really comes—never-ending death.

is to enable man to pass from his present state to his true end, the elimination of any notion of essential human
nature and with it the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral scheme composed of two
remaining elements whose relationship becomes quite unclear. There is on the one hand a certain content for
morality: a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological context. There is on the other hand a certain view of
untutored-human-nature-as-it-is” (After Virtue 54-55). See also Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power
and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998).
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“What we possess . . . are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts
from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the
key expressions. But we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical,
of morality” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 2).
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Despite the fact that late capitalism is hegemonic—its bad sense and residual force
practically dominating all aspects of human life—its weakness is that it is not the source of its
power. Roy spots this weakness while he continues his argument with Dawson about capitalism:
But perhaps the superiority of [capitalist] terminology illustrates that sport and the
sporting instinct are sovereign and that capitalism is just a branch of sport, a
warped, inferior branch of sport, sport with money. . . . Capitalism has had to
graft on sporting culture, the culture of games, in order to make the pursuit of
money seem a worthwhile endeavour in itself. (Nightmares 45-46)
The source of the capitalist empire’s power is the common individuals who compose the
multitude. By segregating those individuals, exploiting them, and turning them against one
another, the empire of capital reigns supreme. However, when those individuals congregate, and
then when they appropriate for themselves the means of production, they will materialize as a
cooperative multitude that can build toward an alternative world from materials and energies that
already exist. Such a world will be ruled by an ethic that negates the naturalness with which
capitalism has attempted to paint its ethic. The currently dominant system driven by
fragmentation, segregation, and subordination will, despite itself, provide the materials for a
system based on congregation, integration, and emergence.
5.4 Postmodern Tartan: Emergence through Forgiveness
Without forgiveness, though, emergence will not occur in any substantial, ongoing
manner. There is, as we have seen throughout this study, the constant risk of entering a cul-desac (or tomb) right at the moment when emergence is most probable. If we make a superficial
gloss of Roy and Kirsty’s last moments together, instead of the Stork-centered one presented
above, we can observe the possibility of another such dead end. Both Roy and Kirsty perpetuate
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the very system that has destroyed them. Not until his final moments could Roy forgive himself
for the system of shame, betrayal, and lack of sympathy that he personified. Ultimately, Kirsty
cannot forgive Roy. They can “only recognize” each other “through their pain and their thwarted
ambitions” (Nightmares 49). Comrades in suffering and sacrifice, they cannot connect according
to what they need most, mutual love and forgiveness; so they perpetuate a static, destructive
cycle. In such a light, Roy’s final encounter with Kirsty takes the form of a sacrifice executed in
revenge. And Kirsty is a disciple of the vengeance that Roy forced into her during her rape.
To forgive, therefore, is practically impossible if people do not perceive their role in, for
example, the cycle of vengeance and then commit to—give themselves to—an alternative
probability: “see this through” (Nightmares 264). To forgive entails that humans are going to
have to do away with sacrifice.250 In practice, sacrifice is raising death to an exclusive, sacred
level. Once it has achieved this height—as an abstract economy—then the lives of individuals
and groups become mere commodities for exchange. In such a situation, life is the currency for
the perpetuation of death. In a situation of forgiveness, however, life is not simply a medium; it
is a conduit in which existing life is congregated and integrated to bring about more life. In such
a world, we the multitude can, as Welsh has Roy so poignantly suggest through understatement,
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Sacrifice has been a topic of great concern to theologians and philosophers throughout the ages. In the
ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, for instance, the biblical Abraham’s near-sacrifice of
his only son Isaac is commended as the emblem of selflessness. Derrida’s The Gift of Death is indicative (trans.
David Wills [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995] pp. 59-81). The ethics and sacred duty of sacrifice, accordingly, is
giving up oneself for others and, ultimately, for the absolute Other. As much as I admire and am influenced by such
thinkers as Levinas and Derrida, a morality based on such sacrifice is impractical, untenable, and anti-generative.
Levinas and Derrida, nevertheless, are not the prime purveyors of the bad sense of giving-as-sacrifice, as compared
to giving-as-generation. One can indeed argue that Levinas, Derrida, and others are striving for the latter kind of
gift through the obstacle presented by death-logic. Regardless, both the victimizer and the victim are valorized, and
in the latter’s case, autonomy is further removed, not attained in any practical, historical-material sense. This is a
point Badiou tersely makes: “In his role as executioner, man is an animal abjection, but we must have the courage
to add that in his role as victim, he is generally worth little more” (Ethics 11). Less tersely, Julia Kristeva charts out
a genealogy that connects the morality behind religious sacrifice with defusing generative powers (represented by
the feminine) and with retribution (Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection [New York, NY: Columbia UP, 1982]
pp. 56-61, 70-79, 115-32).
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“consider forgiveness” (Nightmares 122). Moreover, as we should take to heart what Bernard,
Roy’s brother with AIDS, advises, “Life’s good. Hang onto life” (Nightmares 251).
Welsh’s Nightmares guides us to a point—or straps us to a standing stone with a strange
bird on our shoulder—where, as a congregated, integrated, and emergent body, we can not just
imagine but begin mapping worlds that counter the empire of death that lords over us. It is at
this point that we can see what kind of Scotland Welsh persistently, even though negatively,
conceives. It is a Scotland not divorced from Scotland, but a deeply interconnected Scotland
after the self-destructive and subordinate Scotland of the past. This implies that Scotland’s epic
does not have to end in some craggy, mystic past or in some global capitalist menagerie of the
future. Instead, it may proceed as a dynamic, emergent subordinate in a world whose majority is
composed of potentially emergent subordinates.
Nevertheless, subordinate status should not be embraced but utilized. Because
subordinates are obviously not deliberately in control of whatever imperial power that dominates
them, they cannot counter that power on an even footing. Roy demonstrates this, in both his
“dream life” and “actual life.” He cannot overcome the actual enemy that is destroying the
South African paradise by becoming its ally. Therefore, he becomes the Marabou Stork. He
cannot counter brutality—whether in the form of sexual abuse, economic disparity, and
imperialism—by replicating it. So, when the subordinated multitude emerges, there will be
risks, and there will be nothing to return to. As Roy surmises when he glimpses an alternate
probability, “I saw [the] limitations, the sheer vacuity of what [was] on offer against this
alternative. There would, I knew, be risks. Nothing this good came without risk. I couldn’t go
back though. No Way. There was nothing to go back to” (Nightmares 237). Nothing is
academic about mapping alternative probabilities. Nothing is academic about the multitude
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reworking the materials before it and establishing fidelity to submerged materials and energies.
The Roys and Kirstys of the world—not to mention the Rentons, Spuds, Begbys, Carls,
Robertsons, and Ornsteins—will be at risk when they are giving each other to each other and
themselves to themselves. However, they are already dead on arrival without doing so: they are
mere fragments circulating within empire of death.
An alternative world guided by an alternative ethic and informed by an alternative set of
virtues would present a real challenge to today’s imperial power. Such a world is a probability.
With such a probability in mind, I cannot accept that Welsh’s postmodern Scottish epic—or any
of his work for that matter—ends in self-destructive sacrifice. Instead, it is the beginning of a
postmodern fable of the ethic of emergence, which produces and renews forgiveness251:
Roy, the conflicted and winged epic hero of Scotland’s past, lies on a gurney, his
practically dead body gagging on the figural sword that infected him and
everyone he encountered with death. Kirsty, the incarnation of emergent
Scotland, walks out of Roy’s hospital room, her feet solidly connecting to the
ground with each step forward. She takes with her what life was left in Roy—not
to inflict more vengeance on Scotland or the world, but to infect Scotland and the
world with forgiveness.
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This is partly an homage and response to Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997). He uses “postmodern fables” to critique the world as we enter the third
millennium. I use mine to suggest an alternative as we proceed through it.
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Chapter 6
Afterword
The forty-one-year-old working-class single mother of two teenagers raised her right
hand, and when she opened it, a message in bold, black permanent ink emerged: “My oath is to
the people.”252 Dressed in her best blue jeans and a gauzy halter top, Glasgow representative
Rosie Kane took her oath as Minister of Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, in Edinburgh. It was
the middle of spring 2003, five years after a referendum in which 75 per cent of Scots voted for
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, nearly three hundred years after James VI of Scotland
took the first one with him to London. Not only that, 63.5 per cent voted to gain control of
Scottish taxation.253 Singing Robert Burns’s ode to equality, “A Man’s a Man for a’ That,”
Kane’s fellow Scottish Socialist MSP, Colin Fox, joined in the carnival atmosphere of resistance
that began to infect the 7 May 2003 swearing-in ceremony of newly elected representatives to
Scottish Parliament. Members of the Green Party and Scottish Nationalist Party followed suit by
pledging their allegiance to the people of Scotland, not to Queen Elizabeth II. Most Labour
members, Tories, and Liberal Democrats professed their loyalty to the Queen of England even
though they were standing in the Scottish multitude’s house.
Seven months later, in January 2004, Kane went on a brief hiatus from parliament, citing
clinical depression and the “macho culture” of Holyrood as her reasons.254 Before entering
parliament, she had been a social worker who served scheme-dwelling teens in Glasgow; her
financial situation was meager, to say the least. When she entered parliament, overdue utility
bills and taxes meant that Kane could only receive incoming phone calls at home, had to buy
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electricity for her apartment on a per use basis, and had her wages garnished. Moreover, her first
days as an MSP were under the shadow of her potential arrest because of anti-nuclear protest
activities. (Alas, she was not arrested.) All of this was going on while she was single-handedly
raising two adolescent girls.
I am not excusing her absence from her ministerial responsibilities. No, I am
sympathizing with her reasons for briefly stepping down, which she did publicly. I am
expressing awe at her honesty. How many other MSPs, Ministers of Parliament at Westminster,
or Congressmen and Congresswomen in Washington, DC, would do as she did? Moreover, she
did not quit. She took a break because she could be honest with herself and others about her
limits, which were far outweighed by her strengths.
When she returned to parliament a few months later, she returned with renewed vigor.
She put herself hard to work on a number of projects to which she had been committed before
and during her campaign for office: these included securing rights for asylum seekers being kept
in Guantánamo-style detention centers, providing free school lunches for children, abolishing
prescription drug charges in the National Health Service, and improving drug treatment
programs.255 She also became a vocal advocate for teen dropouts, derogatorily called “neds,”
and she was a leading British voice of protest as the US and UK prepared to invade Iraq. Then
in 2004, the popular, photogenic leader of the Scottish Socialist Party, Tommy Sheridan, began
politically and personally attacking her. Divisions in what had virtually been a one-man party—
“Sheridan’s Socialist Party”—were coming to the surface, and antagonism between Sheridan and
Kane, along with two other female SSP leaders, was reported to have been one of the main
causes behind rifts surfacing within the party. Sheridan attempted to paint Kane, Carolyn
Leckie, and Frances Curran as estrogen-crazed witches who were using “dark arts” against
255
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him.256 In truth, Sheridan had damaged the SSP’s good reputation because he badly handled
rumors about having an extramarital affair with a party worker. Sheridan was ultimately
removed as leader of the party that he had helped to found in the 1990s. Nevertheless,
Sheridan’s right-hand man, the Burns-singing Fox, became the new leader in February 2005.
The internecine fighting continued, which caused the SSP to only garner 1.9 per cent of the
Scottish vote in the April 2005 elections. As I write, the SSP is a dying party, which is certainly
unfortunate. Before the scandals and rifts, the general consensus in Scotland was that the SSP
would be a strong influence in Scottish politics. Regardless, there is still Rosie Kane, and I
suspect that her impact on Scottish politics will have a lasting effect that exceeds the SSP’s.
Perhaps because my mother raised two teens (my sister and me) by herself on a social
servant’s salary, I sympathize with Kane. Perhaps I envy her because I was raised in American
social studies and civics classes that trumpeted the merits of a citizen’s government, while today,
a US government of, by, and for the people is at best a chimera. Perhaps I hold Kane in high
regard because of the issues that she has chosen to take on, most of which reflect her experiences
as a working-class high school dropout, a single parent, and a social worker. Perhaps I am
humbled by her because she is actually a shy person who, before she entered the SSP, knew
“fuck all about politics,” to quote Roy of Marabou Stork Nightmares. But she has emerged from
those limitations, becoming one of the most astute and powerful voices in recent Scottish
political history.
I see Kane in the same light as I see many of Irvine Welsh’s characters—not as an icon,
but as an “everyone.” However, unlike in literature, she is not an allegorical everyone; she is a
practical everyone. “There's thousands of people living in absolute poverty out there who didn't
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even know there was an election on, who know nothing about politics,” Kane said in an
interview after her 2003 election, “I used to be one of those people before I found my voice—
and now I've found it no one is going to shut me up. I want parliament to be like the Big Brother
house, where people tune in because they care about what's happening, not ignore it because it's
full of lawyers using big words they don't understand.”257 The seasoned politician or political
junkie—whether Left, Right, or indifferent—would probably accuse her of being naïve,
idealistic, a crude populist, or a raving extremist. However, these Gramsci-haunted words from
Welsh’s character Spud might put Kane’s political vision into perspective: “It’s funny though,
man, but they political gadges aw seem like they come fae posh hames, students n that. No thit
ah’m knockin it, but ah think, it should be the likes ay us that agitate for change” (Porno 259).
Kane is neither a “gadge” nor from a “posh hame.” And if she is any kind of “student,” she is a
student of real, democratic politics, warts and all. Most importantly, she is an “us,” a constituent
of the multitude.
I accidentally came across Kane in the British press during 2003 because I was habitually
reading foreign newspapers at the time, more habitually than I already did. Under the tutelage of
President George W. Bush and a Republican-controlled US Congress, the American public and,
in all actuality, the rest of the world were being led into a war that many already knew was based
on neo-imperial lies, fabrications, and propaganda. Barring rare exceptions, the Democrats had
neither the will nor the desire to be an opposition party. The so-called free media of the socalled greatest democracy on the planet were obediently playing their role as a privately-owned,
state-controlled Ministry of Information. I have the bad habit of being a skeptic—thank you,
David Hume—so I looked abroad for information about what was really going on. Because of
my professional interest in Scotland and “South Britain,” I already read various online British
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news sites. But at the time, my interest was peaked even more. Britain was embroiled in a
number of Iraq-related inquiries, scandals, and tragedies. Dodgy dossiers, a leaking BBC news
anchor, and a beleaguered intelligence operative, along with his consequent suicide, were at the
forefront of the chaos. In the midst of all this, Scotland was trying to be something more than
the northern frontier of the UK, and Kane emerged.
I tend to look at the world the way that Walter Benjamin did; in fact, his Arcades Project
has become for me an unexpected source of inspiration and consolation. All sorts of information
and events are occurring at any given time, flooding my brain and sometimes overwhelming me.
But if I stop a moment, a whole web of connections materializes. If I can keep the moment open
long enough, I can begin to read the web, which is inevitably squirming with possibilities that
could become probabilities. I have to be quick and locate a focal point to hang onto because
such a web resists being pinned down. What I saw when Kane emerged was a central node in
one of those webs, and that particular web became the heart of this project, which, in one way or
another, I had for some time been trying to write.
My affinity for Scotland had always been a personal one. Since my teens, I had been
interested in my Scottish predecessors: Highlanders who had gone into the Lowland coal mines
after the Clearances, and Lowland farmers scratching a living along the River Tweed. Three
generations removed from the ancestors who had left the mines and farms of Scotland for the
coal and iron mines of America, I was like many Americans of Scottish, Irish, or Welsh
descent—somewhere between being totally ignorant of my ancestors and being a hopeless
kailyard romantic. The two probably walk hand in hand. The ignorance and romanticism,
though, occur for a reason. To become “acceptable,” my family, like so many recently
immigrated families in America, did everything it could to conceal its ethnic earmarks.
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Nevertheless, those earmarks would bubble up. The word “wee” made more than an occasional
appearance in family conversations. My great grandmother would slip up and recite the nursery
rhyme, “Roond a Bit, Wee Little Moosie,” while tracing out the mouse’s path on my hand and
arm until he reached his “wee little hoosie” under my arm. And while helping her cook and
clean, she would teach me mouth music. Puirt-a-beul, as it is called in Scotland and Ireland, is
an almost dead art of Celtic music, which is a type of yodel-like singing that requires
complicated tongue movement. Moreover, when her mining father’s copy of Robert Burns’s
poems and songs surfaced, complete with Papa Park’s annotations, I knew that “pieces of the
circumstances . . . were coming together,” to borrow words from Glue. But I did not have
enough to forge a deeper understanding of my genealogy. Like so many other contemporary
Americans of Celtic descent, I fell for everything the late-twentieth-century Celtic Revival
industry produced. However, it was Welsh who wrenched me from the kitsch vortex and
grounded me with his novel Marabou Stork Nightmares. Using Spud’s words again, it was “aw
startin tae come thegither in my heid” and the “real characters” began to emerge. When it came
to writing the present study, though, I felt as Spud did when he began his history of Leith.
Something was still missing. I had all kinds of researched information to use, and I still had a
hint of that kailyard romanticism to keep me inspired. However, concretion, as Marxists like
say, was not occurring.
Then, in May 2003, I read a Guardian article, and I saw its accompanying photo.258 A
working-class woman who has had more than her share of hard knocks was swearing herself to
the people, not only with her words but also with her flesh. Indeed, it seemed to me as if the
people had inscribed themselves into her very being, and there she was in a government
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effectively born at the turn of the third millennium giving the people back to themselves. I knew
that by “the people,” she meant her constituents in Glasgow and Scots from the Borders to the
Hebrides, but I felt as if she were speaking to the world. In an inexplicable way, I felt
transformed. Not as a descendent of Scottish miners and farmers, but as a human being
integrally connected to all other human beings, I recognized in her and then in myself an
alternative world. It was then that I knew, in a deep and palpable way, what Welsh is after.
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